Closes#101, #103, #104, #106, #111. Partially addresses #96.
A batch of signal-to-noise fixes reported together. Individually small; together
they are the difference between a dashboard someone reads and one they learn to
ignore.
#101 — security heuristics can be muted
A warning you disagree with and cannot dismiss discredits every other finding
beside it. Cleartext API is the reported case: on a fleet reachable only across
WireGuard, TLS adds nothing to the threat model, and the check is permanent noise.
Missing input-chain firewall is the same on a switch behind a router — the message
even says "confirm that is the case", while offering no way to record that you did.
Checks can now be muted per device or fleet-wide. Muted findings are still listed,
greyed and labelled, and excluded from the score — not hidden. Hiding them would
make the posture unauditable, which is a worse failure than noise.
#103 — the app's own requests are hidden from Recent activity
Audit entries for writes made through the UI are noise from an operations point of
view. Off by default now, with a toggle that names how many are hidden, remembered
per browser since it is a viewing preference rather than fleet configuration.
#104 — quick actions moved into the header strip
Matching the Wireless page. "Things to handle" takes the full width it was already
overflowing.
#106 — map lookups can be turned off
Geocoding hits nominatim.openstreetmap.org and the map pulls OSM tiles. On an
isolated network those hang; everywhere else they disclose where your devices are
to a third party, which the report understates. A maps_enabled setting stops both
requests; stored coordinates are still shown as plain text so nothing is lost.
#111 — the CPU sparkline says something
It was drawn in one colour and auto-scaled to each device's own peak, so an idle
device and a saturated one produced an identical picture. Now plotted against a
fixed 0-100 scale, coloured by the band its peak falls into — a flat line low in
the box is an idle device and looks like one.
#96 — groundwork
TX-retry figures come from CCQ, which only the legacy `wireless` driver reports, so
the panel is permanently empty on a RouterOS 7 fleet. The wireless package each
device runs is now recorded, and a capabilities endpoint answers the fleet-wide
question. The panel is dropped and the density chart takes the full width when
nothing can supply the data — and shown when nothing has been polled yet, rather
than hiding a panel that may populate a minute later.
Verified against the fleet: muting cleartext API moved a device's score from 87 to
90 with the finding still listed and marked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#98, #97.
The Channel Usage panel treated a radio as occupying a channel *number* and
coloured a channel amber when two radios shared it. Both halves are wrong, and the
result is not merely incomplete — it gives actively bad planning advice.
Channels are not slots. In 2.4 GHz the centres are 5 MHz apart while a channel is
20 MHz wide, so an AP on channel 1 occupies about 2402-2422 MHz and pollutes
channels 1 through 5. Showing 2 through 5 as free is why 1/6/11 exists as the only
three-way non-overlapping plan, and a model built on channel indices cannot express
that.
Sharing a channel is also not the problem. Two radios on exactly the same channel
hear each other and take turns; CSMA/CA does its job and the cost is airtime. Two
radios partially overlapping cannot decode each other, transmit over one another,
and the cost is corruption. Partial overlap has to rank above co-channel, and it
was not represented at all.
Occupancy is now modelled in megahertz and overlap classified by how two ranges
relate. On the local fleet, a 40 MHz radio on channel 1 is correctly shown bleeding
5 MHz into two channel-6 radios — which are themselves correctly identified as
co-channel with each other rather than as the worst problem in the band.
The model lives in the backend (utils/rfSpectrum.ts) with 26 tests rather than in
the browser, because it is correctness-critical and the frontend has no test runner.
Tests pin the arithmetic that is easy to get wrong: 1/6/11 is clear, 1/3/5 is three
partial overlaps, channels 4 and 8 abut exactly rather than overlapping, a 20 MHz
radio nested inside an 80 MHz one is partial rather than co-channel, and a lone
radio is clear rather than co-channel with itself.
The panel now draws real spectrum to scale, stacking overlapping radios so each
stays visible, with the clash list on hover naming the other radio and how many
megahertz they share.
Width is taken as the widest entry of a RouterOS capability list such as
20/40/80mhz, since that is the spectrum the radio may occupy and therefore what a
planner must treat as unavailable.
Per-location scoping (#97): analysis runs per CAPsMAN controller, with a selector,
because two APs on channel 6 in different buildings are not a conflict. Radios with
no controller are analysed together as standalone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Documentation only — no functional change.
The README was carrying two jobs for two different readers. Its Reference section was
the single largest block at 154 lines, and nobody deciding whether to try the project
reads an InfluxDB environment variable table — while the people who need it were
scrolling past the pitch to reach it.
Split along that seam: anything you would read before installing stays in the README,
anything you would read after installing moves to docs/.
README.md 430 lines sell, prove, install, feature overview
docs/change-guard.md 193 safety system, settings, guard states
docs/architecture.md 116 data stores, polling model, module layout
docs/capsman.md 84 role model, radio matching, current limits
docs/alerting.md 81 rules, channels, webhooks, maintenance windows
docs/api.md 77 scoped tokens, preflight, scripting
docs/configuration.md 76 environment, secrets, rotation, TLS
docs/sso-oidc.md 71 identity provider setup and behaviour
docs/README.md 20 index
In-repo rather than a documentation site, deliberately. A change to Change Guard's
semantics can edit its documentation in the same commit as the code — which, given how
often that behaviour has been refined recently, is the property that actually matters.
A static site generator can point at docs/ later without moving a file.
The Change Guard pitch stays on the front page: the problem framing, the verified
recovery timeline and the quoted prediction warning are what make someone care, and a
reference page is the wrong home for them.
Three sections are new rather than relocated, written because the split exposed the gaps:
- architecture.md did not exist. It now records why there are three data stores, the
polling cadences, and which modules are pure functions over a snapshot and why.
- Scoped API tokens shipped without usage documentation. api.md shows preflighting a
change from a script and reading the guard block afterwards.
- change-guard.md records why ip-on-bridge-port is informational rather than critical
on RouterOS 7 — reasoning that previously existed only in a commit message.
Every internal anchor and cross-file link verified to resolve, including anchors into
other documents. No content dropped, checked by keyword comparison against the previous
single file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Documentation only — no functional change.
The previous README opened with eighty lines of screenshots before saying what the
software was, then listed twenty-five feature sections in no particular order.
Change Guard — the one capability nothing else in this space has — sat fifth, under
a heading that gave no hint of it.
Reordered around the questions a new visitor actually asks:
what is it → why is it different → show me → how do I run it → full features
→ reference
"What makes it different" now leads with the problem rather than the feature: that
RouterOS applies every command immediately, with no transaction and no cross-object
validation, and that MikroTik's own documented advice for VLAN filtering is to have
a serial console ready. Change Guard, lockout prediction and Config Health follow as
answers to it, with the verified auto-revert timeline and a real prediction warning
quoted rather than described.
The twenty-five flat sections are grouped into seven, safety first. Reference
material — environment variables, Change Guard settings, secret management, OIDC
setup, tech stack, project layout — is consolidated at the end instead of being
interleaved with features, and the deepest auto-revert mechanics move into a
collapsible block: present for anyone relying on it, out of the way of a skim.
Added a table of contents; the document was seven hundred lines with no navigation.
Headings that anchors point at use "and" rather than an ampersand, because GitHub
slugifies an entity into a double hyphen and six links would have broken silently.
No content dropped: every feature, table and screenshot from the previous version is
still present, verified by keyword and image-path comparison. 713 lines to 573,
entirely from removing repetition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Personal editor preferences — font size and colour theme — were swept into the
previous commit by git add -A. Committing them would override every other
contributor's editor configuration. Removed from tracking and .vscode/ added to
.gitignore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Third round of #94 field testing. The placement bug survived v0.23.0 because the
previous fix addressed the wrong mechanism.
Cause
A CAPsMAN controller mirrors every CAP interface locally, so a CAP's radio MAC
legitimately appears on two devices: the CAP that owns the hardware, and the
controller that mirrors it. The MAC index was single-valued and first-wins over an
unordered UNION, so each radio landed on whichever row the database happened to
return first. On the reporter's fleet six radios attached to a router with no
radios at all, while their siblings attached correctly — the same access point
appearing in two places, and liable to move between polls.
v0.23.0 excluded the controller from *prefix* matches only. These are exact
matches, so the exclusion never applied. Consecutive MACs on one physical AP
resolving to different devices is what gave it away.
Fix
The index is multi-valued: a MAC maps to every device carrying it. A radio the
controller reports as local:false lives on a CAP by definition, so the controller
is rejected as a candidate at exact strength as well as prefix — an exact match
against it only ever means the mirror. Attribution now runs through
matchRadiosToDevices, which was previously tested but unused while the collector
kept its own copy of the logic.
With no radios left attributed to it, a controller that has none of its own stops
appearing in the access point list, which was the reporter's follow-up point.
SSID on provisioned interfaces
A CAP holds no configuration, so its interface rows carry a generic name and a
null SSID. The controller knows it, on its mirror of the same interface. Radios
now record the provisioned SSID from there, and the table is driven by the
controller's radio list rather than the CAPs' own rows — the controller is the
only side that knows the SSID, channel and client count together.
Band and frequency columns removed
Both were empty while the channel column beside them read 5680/ax/eCee/D. The
channel string already carries the band and the extension layout; parsing it
properly is its own task, and half-parsing it produced empty columns next to
populated ones. Requested by the reporter.
75 tests across the CAPsMAN and topology modules, including fixtures built from the
reporter's MAC set: both radios of one AP resolve to that AP, order-independently,
with a genuinely local radio still landing on the controller and an unknown CAP left
unattributed rather than absorbed. Reproduced the mirror scenario against the local
fleet before and after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#95. Addresses the second round of #94 feedback. Includes a regression
introduced in v0.22.0.
Wireless write paths were not CAPsMAN-aware (regression)
v0.22.0 widened getAP() and the bulk-SSID selector to include cap/controller
roles so a controller — normally tagged a router — would stop being invisible to
the wireless section. Those same helpers gate the write endpoints, so the change
also allowed writes to devices whose radios a controller owns. Reads needed
widening; writes needed a guard, and did not get one.
Five paths now refuse or skip provisioned radios: bulk SSID deployment, single
interface create, interface edit, interface delete, and guest network setup.
Delete was the worst of them — RouterOS will not remove a provisioned interface,
but the cached row was deleted anyway, so it vanished from the UI until the next
poll brought it back.
The check is shared: partitionRadios() splits physical radios into locally
controllable and controller-owned, assertNotCapsmanManaged() refuses an edit to a
provisioned interface and names the controller.
Neighbours identified only by MAC (#95)
Topology resolved a neighbour to a managed device by IP address. A trunk port has
no IP, so LLDP across one reports a MAC and an identity but no address — and
those links stayed unresolved, drawing an external node beside the very device it
already had on the map. Two directly connected devices appeared four times.
Resolution by MAC now runs first, before address matching, because a MAC is
hardware identity and unique fleet-wide where an address is not. This is the same
join the CAPsMAN radio matching uses.
CAPsMAN panel, from the reporter's testing
- Radios and provisioned interfaces were two tables describing the same things
from different angles; they are now one, per interface, with the access point,
SSID, band, frequency, channel, clients and status.
- Provisioning rules sit inside the configuration they apply. Rules referencing a
configuration we did not collect are listed separately rather than dropped,
since that usually means a stale reference.
- The Wireless header reported zero clients while the Clients page reported 32:
it summed the CAP-local count, which is empty under central forwarding. It now
takes the greater of that and the controller's per-radio counts, so a controller
that is also a CAP is not double-counted.
- A remote radio could be attributed to the controller by the five-octet prefix
fallback when the two shared a MAC block. Prefix matches now refuse the
controller for a non-local radio; exact matches are still honoured.
Radios tab followed device_type
device_type is user-supplied tagging, and a router with radios had no way to
display them. The tab now follows the detected wifi_role, which is a fact about
the hardware.
48 tests on the CAPsMAN module, 22 on topology, including a fixture built from the
device output in #95. Verified against the fleet: topology output unchanged, so MAC
resolution merged nothing it should not have; guards correctly permissive on a
standalone AP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All five points raised on #94 after the reporter tested v0.22.0 against a live
CAPsMAN deployment. Two were regressions in that release.
Operating channel instead of a capability list (mine)
current_channel was stored from /interface/wifi/radio's current-channels, which
is every channel the radio supports rather than the one it is using. Measured on
a wAP ax: 535 characters on the 2.4 GHz radio and 3037 on the 5 GHz one — the
"two kilobytes of text" reported. /interface/wifi/monitor gives the operating
channel (5500/ax/Ceeeeeee/D), and carries state, peer counts and TX power too,
all now shown on the radio chip.
Client counts that were zero everywhere (mine)
The panel read registered_clients from the CAP's own wireless_interfaces rows,
which are empty when traffic is processed centrally by the controller.
Monitor's registered-peers is not the fix either, and testing caught that before
it shipped: clients register on the virtual AP carrying the SSID, not on the
physical radio, so monitor on a physical radio reports zero on a busy access
point. On the test AP, wifi1 and wifi2 both read 0 while wifi3-wifi6 held all ten
clients.
Counts now come from the registration table, with each entry attributed to its
radio by following master-interface up to the interface owning a radio-mac. That
field requires /interface/wifi/print detail — it is absent from the plain
listing. Verified against real hardware: ten registrations, attributed 8 and 2
across the two radios, none dropped.
"no network" on remote interfaces
The Network column resolved from the AP's own bridge ports. A CAPsMAN-provisioned
interface is not a local bridge port, so nothing matched and the UI asserted the
interface had no network at all. It now falls back to the datapath — inline
fields or a named/.id reference — and labels the source. Where the datapath names
no bridge it says "via controller" rather than claiming no network.
Status labels
"Serving Clients" claimed something the underlying field does not say: running
means the radio is up, not that clients are connected. Now "Running" and
"Enabled, not running".
Table title
"SSIDs / Wireless Interfaces" conflated two different things; the table lists
interfaces, virtual and physical. Now "Wireless Interfaces".
Guest WiFi on CAPsMAN-provisioned radios
Raised by the reporter as an aside, and it was a real hazard already shipping.
setupGuestNetwork created virtual APs locally on whatever physical radios it
found, with no awareness that a controller might own them — the SSID would be
ignored or overwritten on the next provision while the UI reported success.
Provisioned radios are now skipped with an explanation, and if every radio is
provisioned the setup is refused, pointing at the controller instead.
37 unit tests on the CAPsMAN module. No regression on a fleet without a
controller: local bridge-port resolution unchanged, roles still correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses #94, phases A and B. Write operations are deliberately out of scope.
An access point provisioned by CAPsMAN holds none of its own wireless
configuration, so /interface/wifi/print returns rows with the configuration.* and
security.* fields absent. normalizeWifiInterface mapped nothing, stored nulls, and
the UI rendered an AP with no SSID, security or band — indistinguishable from one
that is simply broken.
Phase A — stop showing blanks
Devices are classified standalone / cap / controller / controller_cap from
/interface/wifi/capsman and /interface/wifi/cap. Both toggles can be on: MikroTik
supports a controller that also runs its own radios under itself, and the issue
calls that case out, so it gets its own role.
Provisioned interfaces are marked and labelled in the Radios tab with the
controller's MAC and an explanation that the blank fields live on the controller.
SSID, mode and channel are recovered from RouterOS's status line where present,
so the AP is described rather than blank.
Role is the signal, not missing data: an AP whose SSID is empty because the
controller owns it looks identical to an unconfigured one, and only the toggle
distinguishes them. A CAP can still hold locally-configured interfaces alongside
provisioned ones, so per-interface state is checked rather than assuming the
whole device.
Phase B — read-only controller view
Controllers now collect the radios they manage, named configurations, and
provisioning rules, surfaced as a CAPsMAN panel on the Wireless page grouped by
the access point each radio physically lives on.
CAPs are matched to managed devices by radio MAC from the controller's own
/interface/wifi/radio list, not by resolving addresses through neighbours as the
issue proposed. A MAC is hardware identity and globally unique, so unlike an
address it cannot mean two devices on two segments — the failure fixed in
v0.20.1. A radio MAC often differs from the interface MAC in the final octet, so
lookup falls back to a five-octet prefix while keeping the OUI exact. A CAP that
is not a managed device is surfaced rather than hidden; that is usually the
reason an AP appears to be missing from the fleet.
The wireless section required device_type = 'wireless_ap' in five places, which
hid a dedicated controller — normally classified as a router — from every
wireless view. Collection was gated the same way. Both now include CAPsMAN roles,
and the collector probes an unknown device once, records the role, and skips
cheaply forever after.
Not included
Provisioning, config edits and interface enable/disable. A CAPsMAN configuration
applies to every AP bound to it simultaneously, which is the fleet-wide version
of the failure Change Guard exists to prevent. It needs the same prediction and
revert treatment rather than being bolted on. Legacy /caps-man (pre-RouterOS 7)
is a separate API tree and is not covered.
Verified: API shapes probed against RouterOS 7.23 rather than taken from docs.
24 unit tests on the pure parsing and matching. No CAPsMAN hardware here, so the
read path was exercised against a seeded controller with a local radio, a matched
two-radio CAP and an unmanaged CAP; grouping, provisioning and SSID resolution all
came out correct. Confirmed no regression on a fleet with no controller: roles
detected correctly, no interface falsely flagged, wireless views unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#93.
Routing push notifications through email ingestion was a workaround. ntfy is now
a first-class channel alongside Slack, Discord, Telegram and email, using the
same alert_channels row and the same dispatch switch.
Built to cover the whole plausible configuration space rather than waiting on the
reporter's answers, so no config migration is needed once they arrive:
- server_url is operator-supplied and defaults to https://ntfy.sh, so a
self-hosted instance works — the likely case for infrastructure alerting
- both of ntfy's auth schemes: an access token (preferred; scopable and
revocable) or username/password, with none required for an open topic
- optional click_url deep-links each notification to the device it refers to
Published as JSON to the server root rather than POST /{topic} with header
metadata: the header form is ASCII-only and these titles carry per-event emoji.
Severity maps onto ntfy's priority scale so the channel stays worth being woken
by — 4 (breaks through do-not-disturb) for device_offline, log_error and
CPU/memory pressure; 2 for recoveries and discoveries; 3 for everything else.
The event type is attached as a tag so a client can be filtered to wake only for
chosen events without needing a channel per event.
Secrets follow the existing pattern: token and password are added to
SENSITIVE_KEYS, so they are masked on read and the mask placeholder is restored
to the stored value on write rather than overwriting it.
The type column is a CHECK constraint rather than a lookup table, so widening it
means dropping and recreating the constraint; done idempotently for existing
installs.
Note on trust: server_url lets an admin point the channel at an internal address.
That is the same exposure the existing Slack and Discord webhook URLs already
have, and only an admin can configure any of them. Restricting it would break the
self-hosted case this feature is mostly for.
Verified against the real ntfy.sh — a test alert arrived with the correct title,
emoji, body, priority, tag and click URL; masking verified to hide the token on
read while preserving it across a save that did not retype it. 13 unit tests
cover priority mapping, both auth schemes, URL normalisation, and rejection of
a missing topic or non-http server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#90, #91, #92.
#90 — Spurious topology links
Topology treated IP addresses and system identities as unique across the whole
fleet. They are unique only within a broadcast domain, so an installation with
physically separate segments that each reuse 10.2.0.0/24 saw devices in one
segment joined to devices in another.
The reporter pointed at shared-segment detection, and that is one of four sites
with the same flaw — but not the first. Step 2 resolves a neighbour IP to a
managed device from a global first-wins map, so a reused address silently
resolves to whichever device was loaded first; the union-find in step 6 then
merges on the resulting device id, a correct-looking key derived from bad data.
Fixing only step 6 would have left the reported link in place.
Addresses and identities are now scoped to the device that reported them
wherever they name a neighbour, so they still collapse one device's duplicate
sightings but can never join two devices. Resolution and LLDP-coverage
suppression additionally require the address to be unambiguous fleet-wide.
MAC addresses and resolved device ids are unaffected — they identify hardware,
and genuinely shared segments still merge on them.
Ambiguity detection deliberately ignores MAC divergence. A switch assigns a MAC
per port, so a device with two uplinks is reported under several MACs; an
earlier version of this fix treated that as a conflict and refused to resolve
ordinary multi-port hardware. Caught on a live fleet, where three sightings of
one CRS510 disagreed on MAC but agreed on identity. The signals used instead are
an address claimed by two managed devices, or sightings that disagree about the
neighbour's identity.
The graph builder is extracted from the route into a pure module with 16 tests,
including a fixture of the reporter's five-device, three-segment network. It had
no test coverage before, which is why a flaw this systemic went unnoticed.
Verified against a live fleet: graph output is identical before and after, and
the ambiguity list is empty when addressing is clean.
#91 — CPU load not rounded
The devices table rendered the raw value from a 5-minute Influx mean, so a
device idling between 1% and 2% displayed as 1.3333333333333333%. Rounded for
display; the sparkline keeps the unrounded series so its curve stays smooth.
#92 — Serial number in the device table
Serials were already collected, stored, returned by the API and matched by
global search, so this is presentation only: a sortable SERIAL column, and
serial added to the table's filter predicate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the lockout-prevention work: a standing audit for configurations
RouterOS accepts but that do not work, an empirical answer on /system history
undo, and corrections to the VLAN cache the editors are built on.
Config Health (new)
Eleven rules over a live snapshot, encoding MikroTik's documented Layer2
misconfigurations plus the latent lockout cases: IP or VLAN interface on a
bridge slave port, a bridged VLAN interface, a bond slave that is also a
bridge port, MTU above L2MTU, a multi-VLAN entry with untagged ports,
bridges competing for hardware offload, a port in no VLAN on a filtering
bridge, a PVID that frame-type=admit-only-vlan-tagged makes inert, a VLAN
interface whose VLAN the bridge is not tagged in, duplicate addresses, and
management that survives only on a dynamic entry. Each finding names the
consequence, the fix, how long it has been present, and the vendor doc.
Runs hourly, surfaces on the Security tab and the dashboard.
Calibrated against hardware: RouterOS 7 relocates an address off a bridge
slave port onto the bridge (actual-interface), so the stock defconf layout
works. Reporting that as critical would have fired on a default install; it
is informational unless RouterOS did not relocate it.
Change Guard: severed-connection handling
Proven on a CRS by deleting its own management address — the switch locked
itself out and self-restored unattended in ~3 minutes, twice.
That test exposed a real defect. withSafeApply treated any exception from
the apply step as "the change failed", disarming the guard and rethrowing.
But the most dangerous changes sever the connection carrying them, so the
call times out even though the change applied. The guard was stripping the
safety net off a device that had just gone silent, and reporting HTTP 500
"Read timeout" instead of telling the user the device was restoring itself.
Only luck saved it: the disarm needed the same dead connection.
Reachability now decides, not the exception. Unreachable leaves the revert
armed and returns auto_reverting; still reachable means a genuine failure,
disarmed so nothing reboots for nothing. committed_at is no longer stamped
on failed or reverted guards; resolved_at records completion instead.
/system history undo probe
probeUndoCapability tests the device rather than assuming. On 7.23.x over
the binary API: /system/history/print works, /system/history/undo does not
exist, /undo numbers= rejects the parameter, bare /undo works. Undo is
therefore untargeted, and cannot replace auto-revert since a dead-man switch
must fire after contact is lost. Binary restore stays the default.
VLAN cache correctness
- vlans keyed on (device_id, bridge, vlan_id); the old key collapsed the
same VID on two bridges
- vlan-ids ranges expanded instead of parseInt truncating "10-20" to 10
- both VLAN tables pruned, but only when the device returned an
authoritative list, so a failed read leaves the cache stale not empty
- bridge_vlan_entries.vlan_ids written and .tagged derived rather than
hardcoded false, which had left the port editor unable to see a trunk
- removeBridgeVlan matched by expanded VIDs; the ?vlan-ids= server filter
compares raw strings, so deleting one VID of a range silently no-opped
while reporting success. Multi-VLAN entries are refused in the route,
before the guard arms, since a mid-apply failure would cost a reboot
- interfaces.vlan_filtering promoted to a column
Membership is deliberately the STATIC tagged/untagged, never current-*.
These tables back the editors and updateBridgeVlan is remove-then-add, so
whatever is shown is written back; the effective view baked RouterOS's
dynamic PVID entries into saved configuration on every save. Analysis that
needs the effective view reads the device live. Extracted to pure functions
with tests, because that path was previously untestable inline.
Verified on four devices; 195 backend tests; all CI gates green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The verdict dialog only reached the VLANs tab, so a predicted lockout on the other
guarded paths still surfaced as a generic "failed" message with the reasoning lost.
Every surface that can push a guarded change now explains the refusal:
- SwitchPortDiagram — port VLAN (PVID / tagged / untagged, the shape of the real
incident), bond create and destroy, and the bridge vlan-filtering toggle.
- RoutingTab — static route add and delete.
- SystemConfigTab — IP address add and remove.
- SecurityTab — /ip/service enable/disable. This route also has an older hard
refusal that returns 409 with a reason but no verdict; that text is now shown
instead of a generic error, where previously it was swallowed entirely.
Supporting changes: confirm_lockout threaded through the affected API methods
(DELETE routes send it as a request body), and deviceName threaded down to
SwitchPortDiagram, RoutingTab and SecurityTab so the typed confirmation can ask
for the actual device name.
Verified the shipped bundle contains the dialog and the typed-confirm prompt.
Full CI preflight green; 152 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend already refused a predicted lockout with 409 + a verdict, but the
frontend surfaced it as a generic "failed" message, so the reasoning never reached
the user.
- LockoutVerdictDialog renders the verdict properly: each violated invariant with
its plain-English consequence, and the resolved management path ("how the manager
reaches this device") so the user can verify the claim rather than take it on
trust. Critical verdicts require typing the device name to override; warnings
need only an acknowledgement, per the agreed friction levels.
- lockoutVerdictOf() extracts the 409 payload, mirroring the existing lockoutOf()
helper used by the firewall guard.
- VLAN add/update/delete now capture the verdict and re-send with confirm_lockout
when the user accepts, instead of showing an error banner.
Verified end to end on the production switch: changing the ingress port's PVID off
the management VLAN returns severity=critical with the ingress-port-pvid violation
and the hop chain (192.168.0.40/24 -> bridge -> sfp28-1), and the shipped bundle
contains the new dialog. Full CI preflight green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2a of the change-safety work. Change Guard could already rescue a device
after a bad change; this predicts the break beforehand and refuses it.
Rather than blocklisting "risky operations" — which is how deleting an *unused*
bond and a routine VLAN edit both slipped through — the engine derives the
invariants that must hold for the manager to keep reaching the device, simulates
the planned change against LIVE device state, and reports any invariant that flips
from satisfied to violated. Novel change shapes are covered for free, and each
invariant explains itself, so the warning names the real mechanism.
- pathModel.ts: captures a live snapshot over the API (no SSH) and resolves the
management path — which address, interface, bridge, VLAN and physical ingress
port the session depends on, each with the reason it is load-bearing.
- invariants.ts: nine checks drawn from MikroTik's documented behaviour, notably
that the bridge IS the CPU port and must be a member of the management VLAN.
- analyzeChange.ts: simulates the change and diffs invariants, returning
safe / warning / critical plus the path used to reach the verdict.
- withGuardedChange now runs the analysis first and returns 409 with the verdict
unless the caller passes confirm_lockout; analysis failures never block a change.
- New GET /:id/management-path and POST /:id/preflight (analyse without applying).
Three bugs were found by testing against the live switch rather than fixtures:
- Invariants read vlan-filtering from the frozen path instead of the snapshot under
evaluation, so "enable vlan-filtering" — the single most important case — was
invisible.
- VLAN membership is spread across BOTH a static row and a dynamic "added by pvid"
row. Simulating only the first match hid the danger; membership now tracks static
and effective separately, and a bridge left in the VLAN only by the dynamic row is
reported as a warning rather than silently safe.
- Requiring the ingress port to be UNTAGGED in the management VLAN flagged a healthy
tagged trunk. Because a pre-existing violation is (correctly) not reported as new,
that false positive silently suppressed real detections. Verdicts now also list
pre-existing violations so this can't hide again.
Verified on the production 100G switch: changing the ingress port's PVID off the
management VLAN is refused with 409 and the switch is left untouched (pvid still 1);
removing the bridge from VLAN 1 is correctly reported as a warning because a dynamic
PVID row would still cover it; unrelated VLAN edits stay safe. 29 changeGuard tests,
152 backend tests, full CI preflight green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Change Guard shipped covering only 4 routes (service toggle, bond create/delete,
bridge vlan-filtering). The most recent real incident — a VLAN change that removed
a switch from management — went through PUT /:id/ports/:name/vlan, which was NOT
guarded. Neither were the bridge-VLAN CRUD routes, IP address changes, or route
changes, all of which can sever the manager's own path.
Guarded routes go from 4 to 12, adding:
- port.vlan PUT /:id/ports/:name/vlan (PVID + tagged/untagged membership)
- vlan.add POST /:id/vlans
- vlan.update PUT /:id/vlans/:vlanDbId
- vlan.delete DELETE /:id/vlans/:vlanDbId
- ip.add POST /:id/ip-addresses
- ip.remove DELETE /:id/ip-addresses/:addrId
- route.add POST /:id/routing
- route.remove DELETE /:id/routing/:routeId
Each now takes a device-side restore point and arms a self-restore before applying,
disarming only once the device is proven still reachable.
Two correctness details while converting:
- vlan.delete removes the local DB row in afterConfirmed, so a change that
auto-reverts no longer leaves the UI claiming a VLAN was deleted when the device
restored it.
- The VLAN CRUD routes previously returned a bare array, which would have been
spread into the guard response object. They now return a message; the frontend
ignores these bodies and re-queries, so no client change is needed.
Verified live against the production 100G switch: a guarded VLAN add and delete
both returned protected/confirmed, were recorded in device_change_guards, and the
switch was left in its original state. 133 backend tests pass; full CI preflight green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security Audit failed on a newly-published advisory, GHSA-2m8v-j782-fhvr
(socket.io-parser "Zero-attachment Memory Exhaustion", high). It affected both
projects transitively via socket.io / socket.io-client. Patched to 4.2.7 in both
lockfiles; no direct dependency versions changed.
Also adds the gate that should have caught the previous two CI failures before
they reached GitHub:
- scripts/ci-preflight.sh runs every gate from .github/workflows/ci.yml
(frontend and backend lint/type-check/build, plus both prod-dependency audits
with the same audit-ci flags and allowlist) and additionally the backend Jest
suite, which CI does not currently run. It runs all gates rather than failing
fast, so one invocation surfaces every problem. ~35s.
- scripts/claude-push-gate.sh wires that into a Claude Code PreToolUse hook so a
`git push` is refused while any gate fails, with the failure detail returned
inline. Non-push commands and --dry-run pass straight through.
Verified: with the fix reverted, the gate correctly denied the push and reported
"backend: lint FAIL"; with it restored, all 9 gates pass and both audit-ci
invocations exit 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend Lint job failed on the new createBond error path: ESLint's
preserve-caught-error rule (in effect since the eslint 10.7 bump) requires a
rethrown error to carry the original. Pass `{ cause: err }`, which also makes the
underlying RouterOS failure visible in the error chain instead of only inside the
message string.
No behavior change beyond the richer error. Verified with the exact CI commands:
`npm run lint` and `npm run build` both exit 0, 133 backend tests pass, and the
redeployed build still guards correctly (guarded change commits, disabling the
management service is refused with 409).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A user change can sever the manager's own path to a device with no warning and no
way back. Most recently, deleting an *unused* bond on a switch took the whole
switch offline. This adds a safety net, and fixes the bug that caused that
specific incident.
Root cause of the bond incident (DeviceCollector.deleteBond):
- Slaves were re-added to the bridge ONLY when the bond itself was a bridge
member. For an unbridged bond the restore loop never ran, so the member ports
were released from the bond and left in no bridge at all — the ports stopped
forwarding and the switch dropped off the network.
- The restore in both deleteBond and createBond was wrapped in `.catch(() => {})`,
so a failed restore was swallowed and the route still returned 200 OK.
- Restores also dropped PVID, silently returning tagged ports to VLAN 1.
Now: port settings (PVID, frame-types, ingress-filtering, edge, horizon) are
captured and carried over, and restore failures are reported instead of hidden.
Change Guard (services/changeGuard/ChangeGuard.ts):
Before a risky change the device saves a restore point and arms a scheduler that
restores it after N seconds. The change is applied, then reachability is proven
on a NEW connection; success disarms the scheduler, failure leaves the device to
restore itself and come back. Because the restore point is created before the
scheduler, a binary restore rolls back to a config containing neither the
scheduler nor the change — self-cleaning, with no revert loop.
- Works entirely over the RouterOS API. This matters: every recovery artifact
today requires SSH, so devices without SSH credentials had no rollback target
at all (cf. #86).
- Modes: `binary` (exact restore incl. deleted interfaces, reboots) or `script`
(/import, no reboot but additive). Configurable via change_guard_* settings.
- Per-device Redis lock, `device_change_guards` audit table, and startup
reconciliation for guards left pending by a manager restart.
- Degrades gracefully: if protection can't be armed the change still runs and the
response says it was unprotected.
Wired into bond create/delete, bridge vlan-filtering, and /ip/service. Disabling
the service the manager is connected through is now refused outright (409) — the
mgmt-service signal already existed but was confined to the read-only posture
endpoint.
Also: replaces the bare confirm() on "Destroy Bond" with a ChangeGuardDialog that
explains the risk and the protection, and reports the outcome (including "the
device is restoring itself"). Fixes getAppSettings omitting
config_snapshot_enabled/interval, which made the v0.17.4 snapshot toggle a no-op.
Verified on real hardware (hAP-class switch): capability probe confirmed
/system/backup/save and scheduler add/remove work over the API; a guarded change
armed, applied, verified and committed leaving zero schedulers and zero files on
the device; disabling the api service was refused with 409. 133 backend tests
pass, including 7 guard state-machine tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the decoder DoS fix (7e11115), closing the remaining hardening
items from the same adversarial-review triage.
Bounded template cache (was unbounded):
- Templates now carry a lastUsed timestamp, refreshed whenever one decodes data.
- New exported pruneTemplateCache() evicts templates idle past a TTL then
enforces a hard cap, least-recently-used first. The collector runs it on its
existing 60s map-refresh timer (30 min TTL, 10k entries) — no new timer.
Bounded per-source bookkeeping:
- unknownExporterIds is capped; sources beyond the cap share one overflow
pseudo-exporter instead of allocating a new id each (client attribution
doesn't depend on exporter identity, so only per-exporter stats coarsen).
- Pseudo ids now come from a monotonic counter rather than map size, so they
can't collide after eviction.
UDP ingress guards (the socket is unauthenticated by protocol design):
- Drop datagrams too small to carry a header before doing any parsing work.
- New PacketRateLimiter: fixed-window per-source cap (2000 pkt/s), with the
counter map cleared each window and a cap on distinct sources per window so
spoofed source IPs can't grow it.
- getStats() now reports packetsDropped and templatesCached.
Canonical IPv6 rendering:
- formatIPv6 applies RFC 5952 zero-compression (2001:db8::1, not the fully
expanded form) and unwraps IPv4-mapped addresses (::ffff:192.0.2.1 ->
192.0.2.1) so those flows match client/exporter IPs instead of appearing as
separate IPv6 endpoints.
Adds 7 tests (rate limiter windows//caps/isolation, cache TTL + LRU eviction,
lastUsed refresh, IPv6 canonical + mapped + no-run forms); 126 backend tests pass.
Verified live: flooding the collector with 3000 packets from one source dropped
614 once over the cap while the backend stayed healthy and served the API,
malicious templates were still refused (cache held only the 2 real ones), and
real exporter flows kept decoding right through it (260 -> 336).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A NetFlow v9/IPFIX template declaring a field of length 0 produced a template
with minLength 0. parseDataSet's loop condition (off + minLength <= setEnd) then
stayed true while the field pass advanced `off` by 0 — an infinite loop.
Impact: the collector socket is UDP and unauthenticated, so any host able to
reach the NetFlow port could hang the entire backend with a single 36-byte
packet — Node is single-threaded, so the event loop never yields again and the
API, poller, sockets and health checks all stop. Only reachable while NetFlow is
enabled (off by default).
Two layers of defense in decoder.ts:
- parseTemplates rejects any field with length 0 (meaningless in v9/IPFIX) and
refuses to cache a template whose computed minLength is 0.
- parseDataSet asserts forward progress: if a full field pass consumes no bytes,
break instead of spinning. Guards any future zero-width path.
Adds 5 regression tests covering the hang case, a zero-length field among valid
ones, a variable-length field whose length byte is 0, absurd/truncated field
lengths, and that valid v9/IPFIX traffic still decodes afterwards.
Verified: the exact packet that previously hung the process now returns
immediately with no template cached; 20 attack packets fired at the live
collector left the backend healthy and serving, and real exporter flows kept
decoding (102 -> 152 flows across the test). 119 backend tests pass.
Found via an adversarial review; the report identified the infinite loop but
attributed it to the variable-length branch, which provably terminates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#87 — virtual APs removed directly on the device (WinBox/WebFig) kept
showing in the radios/interface lists, and neither refresh button cleared them.
Two distinct bugs:
1. Stale rows. The collectors upsert every interface found on the device but
never removed rows for interfaces that disappeared, so deleted radios lingered
forever. Added a prune to collectWirelessInterfaces, collectInterfaces (same
bug for deleted VLANs/bridges/bonds) and collectSecurityProfiles, deleting
stored rows whose names are no longer present on the device.
Safety: the prune only runs when the device list was fetched successfully.
Fetches that previously swallowed errors into an empty array now return null
and skip the prune, so a transient API failure can never be mistaken for
"everything was deleted". /interface/print already throws on failure.
2. Full sync skipped wireless entirely. collectAll() — what POST /devices/:id/sync
runs — never called collectWirelessInterfaces/collectSecurityProfiles, so a
manual resync could not refresh radios or clear stale ones; only the 5-minute
slow poll touched them. collectAll now collects wireless data for wireless_ap
devices, making the fix reachable on demand.
Verified on a live hAP-class AP: injected a ghost virtual-AP row, ran a sync, and
the ghost was removed while all 7 real interfaces (and offline devices' rows)
were retained. 114 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Security Audit job failed because new advisories dropped against existing
deps and `npm audit --audit-level=high` audits the whole tree (incl. dev/build
tooling that isn't shipped).
- Switch both audit steps to `audit-ci --high --skip-dev`, so the gate reflects
what's actually deployed (backend ships --omit=dev; frontend ships a static
build) while still failing on real high/critical production advisories.
- Allowlist GHSA-qwww-vcr4-c8h2 (React Router "RSC Mode CSRF") for the frontend:
this is a client-side SPA using BrowserRouter — RSC mode is not used — and
there is no forward-compatible fix for react-router-dom 7.x (only a downgrade).
- `npm audit fix` on both lockfiles to patch non-breaking transitive dev
advisories (js-yaml, postcss, brace-expansion, minimatch). No direct/prod
dependency versions changed; app runtime is unchanged.
Verified: backend 114 tests pass, frontend builds, and audit-ci passes for both
projects locally.
Resolves#86 — MikroTik Manager was attempting SSH connections to devices that
have no SSH credentials configured, flooding RouterOS logs with failed logins.
Cause: config snapshots (a separate feature from scheduled backups, enabled by
default, hourly) capture `/export` over SSH via BackupService.exportConfig, which
silently falls back to the API credentials for the SSH login. On devices where
SSH was never set up, that auth fails every interval (and on each restart), and
there was no UI switch to turn it off.
- PollerService.processConfigSnapJob now skips devices without SSH credentials,
so no SSH connection is attempted where SSH isn't configured. Manual "Capture
snapshot" / backup actions are unchanged (user-initiated, with error feedback).
- Add a "Configuration Snapshots" section to Settings → General: enable toggle,
interval, and retention (the feature was on-by-default with no UI control),
with a note that it runs over SSH and only on devices that have SSH creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the actionable findings from an adversarial review:
- 2FA enrollment now requires the current password (/totp/setup), so a
hijacked session or XSS can't enable TOTP and lock the real user out.
SSO-only accounts (no local password) are told to set one first. Frontend
collects the password before starting setup.
- OIDC config rejects default_role='admin': auto-provisioning unmatched users
straight to admin is almost never intended — admin must come from an explicit
group → role mapping.
- Rate limiter no longer fails fully open on a Redis outage. Redis calls are
bounded by an 800ms timeout (the client uses maxRetriesPerRequest:null, so
commands would otherwise hang, not throw), and on failure a per-process
in-memory sliding-window fallback keeps /login and other limited endpoints
throttled. Verified with Redis stopped: attempts throttle (429) instead of
hanging or passing unlimited.
Findings intentionally not actioned: the "API-token auth is fire-and-forget"
report was a false positive (Express awaits next(), which is called inside the
promise), and the webhook DB-pool and JWT-revocation items are either
overstated or a separate architectural decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the open CodeQL code-scanning alerts:
- guestWifi voucher codes now use rejection sampling so the character
distribution is uniform (fixes js/biased-cryptographic-random).
- Scheduled-report recipient validation replaced the backtracking email regex
with a linear split-based check (fixes js/polynomial-redos).
- Add .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml excluding js/missing-rate-limiting:
rate limiting is applied globally via app.use('/api', rateLimitRedis) plus
per-route limiters, which CodeQL can't attribute to individual handlers, so
that rule fired ~38 false positives.
Remaining alerts are dismissed as accepted/false-positive (RouterOS MD5 API
login and self-signed cert acceptance are protocol-mandated; log sites already
strip CRLF).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add OpenID Connect single sign-on so the platform can authenticate against
any standards-compliant provider (Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, Keycloak,
Authentik, …) alongside local accounts. Resolves the feature request in #73.
Flow (backend-driven Authorization Code + PKCE):
- GET /api/auth/oidc/login builds the authorize URL and stores the PKCE/nonce
transaction in Redis (single-use, 10m TTL); the callback validates the ID
token via openid-client (JWKS signature, iss/aud/exp/nonce), resolves the
identity to a local user, and mints the platform's normal session JWT —
handed to the SPA via URL fragment. No sessions/cookies introduced.
Identity mapping (users table gains email/oidc_subject/oidc_issuer/
auth_provider; password_hash now nullable; partial unique indexes):
- First sign-in auto-provisions a user, or links to an existing local account
when the IdP email is verified and matches.
- Roles derive from a configurable IdP group -> role map with a default
fallback; existing users are never auto-demoted on a groupless login.
Configuration (admin-only, no env/redeploy needed):
- Stored as an app_settings row with the client secret encrypted at rest
(utils/crypto); masked in responses and excluded from GET /api/settings.
- New UI: Settings -> SSO / OIDC panel (issuer/client, claim + group->role
mapping, provisioning toggles, discovery test, copyable redirect URI), a
login-page SSO button, and an SSO badge in Users & Roles.
Security: local break-glass login preserved; PKCE + single-use state; email
linking requires email_verified; same-site-only post-login redirect.
Adds openid-client@^5 (CommonJS). 17 new unit tests (claim/role mapping,
username derivation, config secret round-trip/masking); 114 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The v0.16.11 update-notice text used a raw apostrophe in JSX ("You're"),
which trips react/no-unescaped-entities and failed the frontend lint job.
Escape it as '. No visual change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update-availability fixes:
- The backend read its version from npm_package_version, which is unset
when the container runs `node dist/index.js` directly, so current was
always "0.0.0" and every release looked newer — the "update available"
banner never cleared. Read the bundled package.json instead
(routes/system.ts), falling back to npm_package_version.
- Move the update notification out of the top-of-app banner into the
Operations dashboard (a dedicated notice under the network-status hero),
shown only when genuinely behind and cleared once up to date.
Security banner:
- Replace the now-dead jwt_secret_default / encryption_key_default checks
with the current secrets_not_persisted warning (auto-generated secrets
that couldn't be persisted), matching the self-healing secrets model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the /terminal authorization fix: a full-codebase security
review surfaced several more issues, fixed here. All changes are designed
to roll out with no interruption to existing deployments — no forced
migration, no manual re-key, no boot failure.
Self-healing secret management (utils/secrets.ts):
- JWT_SECRET / ENCRYPTION_KEY auto-generate to strong values on first boot
and persist to the app_data volume (0600, outside the DB) when not set
to a strong value in the environment. Replaces the prior behavior of
running on the public repo defaults.
- decrypt() tries the current key plus every legacy/default key, so
existing device credentials keep decrypting after a key change; a
startup sweep re-encrypts stale rows forward (db/reencryptCredentials.ts).
- verifyToken() accepts the current signing secret plus prior *strong*
secrets (never the public defaults), so rotation doesn't invalidate live
sessions; sessions signed with a default secret require one re-login.
- Dockerfile pre-creates /app/data as the app user so the non-root
process can persist to a fresh named volume; app_data volume added to
both compose files; compose secret defaults changed to empty (auto-gen).
Authorization / input:
- Default Socket.IO namespace now requires a valid JWT (was unauthenticated
and broadcasting fleet-activity events); frontend sends the token and
drops the shared socket on logout.
- Webhook delivery blocks SSRF to loopback/private/link-local/CGNAT ranges
and pins the request to the validated IP (WebhookService.ts).
- Rate limit added to /auth/totp/verify; global mutation backstop on /api.
- Password policy (>=10 chars, letter+digit) enforced on set/change/create.
- system.ts used verifyToken as middleware (always 500); now requireAuth.
Hardening:
- CSP + HSTS/nosniff/frame-deny headers in nginx, scoped to allow the
OpenStreetMap tile/geocoding hosts the maps use.
Docs/tests:
- README secret section rewritten for the self-healing model.
- New unit tests for secret resolution, persistence, rotation, and
legacy-key decryption (97 tests pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Socket.IO /terminal namespace validated the JWT but discarded the
role, so a read-only viewer (403'd on every REST write) could connect
and open an interactive SSH shell on any managed device using the
device's stored router-admin credentials — a full bypass of the role
model (reported CVSS 9.6).
- Gate the namespace handshake by role: only admin/operator may connect;
viewers are rejected with "Console access denied for this role".
- Re-check the role at the start handler (defense in depth) and attach
the verified payload to socket.data.
- Audit-log terminal session opens (and rate-limit hits) to audit_log.
- Rate-limit shell starts per user (5 / 60s, in-memory sliding window).
- Frontend: gate the Terminal button (DeviceDetailPage) and dashboard
"Open terminal" quick action behind canWrite so viewers don't see it.
Validated on the local docker stack: viewer rejected from /terminal,
admin still connects; viewer remains 403 on POST /api/devices.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Firmware actions on the device Config tab (check/install RouterOS,
check/install RouterBOOT) and Firmware-page actions now invalidate the
shared react-query caches on success — devices list, device header,
firmware overview, dashboard "Things to handle", and Security Center
findings. Previously they only updated local component state, so other
screens showed stale "update available" data for up to 30s until their
own background refetch fired, even though the backend had already
persisted the new state.
Browser-verified: after a firmware check on the Config tab, /api/devices
refetches within the same second (sidebar observer) and the Devices page
fetches fresh data on mount; both screens agree immediately.
- New GET /api/firmware/changelog/:version proxies MikroTik's official
per-version release notes (download.mikrotik.com/routeros/<ver>/CHANGELOG)
with strict version validation and process-lifetime caching
- ChangelogModal: "What's new in X.Y.Z" on the device Config tab's
update box and on the Firmware page's latest-version cells opens the
changelog in-app, with an external mikrotik.com link and graceful
fallback when the CDN is unreachable
- Security posture: a pending RouterOS update is now a medium-severity
finding and a pending RouterBOOT upgrade a low-severity one; titles
are version-free so Common Findings aggregates the fleet into one row
- chore(deps): npm audit fix bumps morgan (GHSA-4vj7-5mj6-jm8m); both
workspaces audit clean
Validation: backend tsc/lint/92 tests, frontend tsc/lint/build/11 tests,
endpoint tested (valid/invalid/unknown versions), browser-verified on
Firmware page, device Config tab, Security Center, and device Security
tab; security review of the diff found no findings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
UI/UX consolidation pass to reduce nav sprawl (~24 destinations -> ~17):
- Merge Router Settings + Switch Settings (copy-paste duplicates) into one
Network Services > Discovery & SNMP page with an All/Routers/Switches
scope selector; LLDP + SNMP status tables merge both fleets with a
type pill, apply fans out per scope
- Retire Routers/Switches overview pages; the Devices type filter now
lives in the URL (?type=AP|SW|RTR) and legacy routes redirect to the
pre-filtered view. Wireless overview kept (RF Health / Rogue APs are
unique content)
- Fold Wireless Clients into Clients: All/Wired/Wireless segmented
filter (URL-synced); wireless view swaps the Type column for SSID +
signal quality columns
- Regroup sidebar into Monitor / Network / Services / Operations
sections; Devices and Wireless are collapsible groups (auto-open on
active section, manual collapse always wins); Wireless group renders
only when wireless APs exist
- Rename Syslog -> Logging with a cross-link to live Events; group the
Settings tabs into Platform / My Account / Fleet sections
- Legacy routes (/routers, /switches, /routers/settings,
/switches/settings, /wireless/clients) redirect so bookmarks keep
working
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add docker/setup-qemu-action and platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64 to
both the backend and nginx build-push steps so GHCR images run natively
on arm64 (ARMv8) hosts instead of amd64-only. Refs #56.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guest WiFi (Hotspot): one-click captive-portal wizard that creates the guest
SSID (virtual AP per radio), VLAN/bridge segregation + L3 VLAN interface, pool,
DHCP, portal, rate-limited guest profile, and masquerade; vouchers with limits +
printable sheets; live guest sessions; walled garden.
Network intelligence: per-client device fingerprinting (vendor/hostname →
category) with a persisted per-client override on the detail page; rogue/neighbor
AP detection from stored AP scans (evil-twin flagging); Mist-style anomaly
insights (client-count/CPU vs same-hour 14-day baseline + error bursts) in the
Operations engine.
Firmware orchestration: staged wave-based RouterOS rollouts (canary first) with
pre-upgrade backup, reboot-ride-out, version verification, halt-on-failure, and
scheduling; live per-device progress + cancel.
Platform & automation: scoped API tokens (mtm_, read/write, hashed at rest,
Bearer auth in requireAuth); outbound webhooks (12 events, HMAC-signed) fired
from the alert pipeline + firmware orchestrator; scheduled email reports.
api-ssl: RouterOSClient negotiates TLS on port 8729 and accepts RouterOS's
default self-signed certs (rejectUnauthorized:false), so SSL-secured API devices
connect without manual cert trust. Fixes#57.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Global search:
- Clicking/Enter on a client result now opens that client's detail page
(/clients/<mac>) instead of dumping to the clients list.
Operations dashboard (new backend route /api/operations):
- GET /insights: server-side attention engine (offline, updates, CPU/memory
pressure, missing backups, recent outages, weak WiFi clients, co-channel
overlap, high TX retries, error events) + per-device capacity + merged
activity feed (config changes, audit actions, alerts; login noise filtered).
- POST /backup-all and /sync-all: fleet-wide actions over online devices.
- Quick Actions now execute: Run discovery, Backup all, Sync config, and
Open terminal (device picker -> live SSH TerminalModal); inline status.
- New cards: Capacity & health meters, Security posture rollup (reuses
per-device posture, cached), Recent activity feed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wireless RF Health (fleet Wireless page + per-AP Radios tab):
- Channel usage map across 2.4/5/6 GHz with co-channel overlap; operating
channel resolved live from /interface/wifi/monitor on the wifi package
(auto-channel radios report no frequency in /print).
- AP deployment density: client RSSI distribution on the -90..-30 dBm scale
with a coverage-gap warning.
- AP radio TX retries histogram (0%->35%+) with band selector, derived from
per-client CCQ (new wireless_radio_quality InfluxDB series).
- WiFi connectivity success funnel (Association/Auth/DHCP) derived from logs.
Per-port connected clients (Ports tab):
- New card lists clients physically connected to a selected port (host/MAC/
IP/VLAN/connection time, linked to client pages).
- Distinguishes physical clients from the raw MAC table: uplink/trunk ports
are auto-detected (topology neighbor, multi-VLAN MAC spread, or high MAC
count) and show an uplink explainer + "view MAC table" disclosure instead
of every reachable MAC.
- Added clients.first_seen ("connected since"); set once, preserved across polls.
Clients:
- Replace Previous/Next buttons with a "Show N entries" dropdown
(25/50/100/200, persisted to localStorage) and numbered page selection
with prev/next chevrons and ellipses for long ranges.
Syslog (Network Services):
- Drop the Single Device / All Devices mode toggle; always show the
fleet-aggregated view with coverage badges.
- Add a per-section device dropdown + "Add to device" button beside
"Add to All Devices" for targeting a single device (direct save).
- Edit / enable-disable / remove remain coverage-scoped, so single-device
management is preserved without the separate mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Traffic by Application: donut + legend side-by-side, larger donut with
center total label, percentage in tooltip; card now sizes to its content
- New Inbound Packets area chart below the throughput chart (packets field
now summed per direction in /traffic/timeseries)
- New Flow Sources & Data Health card: collector listening state, packets
received, flows attributed, attribution rate, per-exporter flow/packet
counts and last-seen; low-attribution hint for NAT-in-path exporters
- /traffic/apps now returns per-app packets alongside bytes
- Restructured bottom row: Top Talkers (left) | Application + Data Health
stacked (right) for alignment
- Tightened Top Talkers row spacing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
UI/UX refinements on top of v0.14.0-beta, all validated on the test server:
- Logo: new theme-aware compass iconmark (light/dark SVGs swapped via the
dark class), sized to 45px; favicon updated to match. Wordmark casing
corrected to "MikroTik Manager" (font size unchanged).
- Navigation icons enlarged 15 -> 17px.
- Dashboard: "Connected clients" line chart converted to a bar chart with a
category axis + light downsampling so bars stay readably thick across ranges.
- Clients: sorting is now server-side across the whole dataset (was sorting
only the current page, so Type/others appeared to do nothing on a uniform
page); table uses a fixed column layout + keepPreviousData so columns no
longer jump or blank out when sorting/paging. Backend clients route gains
whitelisted sort/dir params (safe numeric IP sort, deterministic tiebreaker).
- Connections tab: surfaces the live /ip/firewall/connection/tracking state
(on/auto/off pill) and clearer empty-state copy explaining auto-mode.
Lint/typecheck/build/jest green in both workspaces; npm audit --audit-level=high
clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated top-level Security section plus a Meraki/UniFi-grade firewall built
on the full RouterOS feature set.
Security Center (new /security page)
- Fleet hardening scores, per-device posture list, and a "Common Findings"
rollup aggregating identical issues across the fleet
- "Manage" deep-links into the device's Security tab (?tab= support added)
Firewall & NAT (per device + in Security Center)
- Friendly rule builder: Allow/Drop/Reject chips, Any/Address/Address-List
pickers, port presets, connection-state chips, logging, live plain-English
preview
- Address lists as reusable objects, referenced from rules
- Rule reordering (/ip/firewall/{filter,nat}/move); per-rule hit counters
(print stats) with dead-rule highlighting + reset
- NAT wizards: Port Forward / Masquerade / 1:1 NAT + Custom
- Safe-apply lockout guard: backend 409 on an unscoped input drop/reject that
would sever management; UI confirms before forcing (detectLockoutRisk, tested)
Access & security
- Security posture audit: graduated, de-duplicated scoring that never proposes
disabling the management service the platform connects through (no self-
lockout); switch-aware input-firewall severity; service hardening table
- Bandwidth: simple-queue CRUD + one-click "Limit this client" on client detail
- Active connections viewer
These L3 features are available on all managed RouterOS devices (routers,
switches, APs), not gated by device type.
Backend: DeviceCollector address-list/move/stats/connections/queues/service
methods; device routes for all of the above; firewallSafety + firewallSummary
utils with unit tests (19 new).
Security: bump nodemailer 8 -> 9.0.1 to clear GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f (our
createTransport/sendMail usage is unaffected by the advisory's raw-option path).
Verified live against RouterOS devices; lint/typecheck/build/jest green in both
workspaces; npm audit --audit-level=high clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI Security Audit (npm audit --audit-level=high) was failing. Resolved all
high-severity advisories via non-breaking transitive bumps (npm audit fix,
no --force, no direct-dependency or source changes):
- frontend: form-data, ws (via socket.io-client), @babel/core,
react-router-dom, js-yaml — now 0 vulnerabilities
- backend: form-data, ws (via socket.io) — 0 high-severity remaining
Only package-lock.json files changed plus the version bump. Verified both
workspaces: npm ci, lint, type-check, build, and backend jest (73 tests)
all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two per-client usage charts exposed different time windows: "Wireless
Usage" offered 2h/24h/7d while "App Traffic (NetFlow)" offered 1h/24h/7d/30d.
Worse, selecting 1h (or any range with no flows in window) made the whole
App Traffic card unmount — including its range buttons, so it couldn't be
recovered without reloading.
- AppTrafficCard now uses 2h/24h/7d (default 24h), matching Wireless Usage
- Card visibility latches on first non-empty result, so switching to an
empty range shows an inline "No traffic data yet for this range" state
instead of unmounting the card (latch derived via guarded setState in
render — no effect)
- Backend /api/traffic/* now accepts the '2h' range (rangeToFlux +
windowForRange: 2h -> 2m buckets); previously '2h' silently fell back to 24h
Verified in the live stack with Playwright: ranges render as 2h/24h/7d (no
1h/30d), and clicking 2h on a client with data only outside the 2h window
keeps the card mounted with an empty-state and recovers on switching back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Dashboard "Top talkers" card and the Traffic page previously used
different data sources: the card ranked clients by device-reported
since-connection byte counters (wireless-centric, reset on reconnect, no
time window), while the Traffic page uses NetFlow-measured bytes.
The card now prefers the NetFlow top-clients data (last 24h — identical
numbers to the Traffic page) and falls back to the legacy counters only
when the collector has no data, with the source labeled in the card
header ("by bytes · 24h" vs "since connection"). Rows now click through
to the client detail page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Configuration History:
- Per-device snapshots from the full RouterOS /export (.rsc) — config-only, so
counters/operational state no longer cause phantom changes; deduped by content hash
- New Config History tab: snapshot timeline, readable line diff, on-demand Capture
(with honest 'no changes' feedback), one-click rollback via the linked .rsc backup
- Snapshot and its backup are one artifact: badged 'Config Snapshot' on the Backups
page, FK ON DELETE CASCADE keeps them in lockstep; delete is gated by a warning modal
- New config_drift alert event (off by default); periodic snapshot poll with
configurable cadence/retention (config_snapshot_interval_min/_retention)
- New endpoints under /api/config-history (list/get/diff/capture/rollback/delete)
Scheduled Backups:
- Replaced the raw cron textbox in Settings with Frequency (Daily/Weekly/Monthly)
+ time + day pickers; cron is generated/parsed behind the scenes
- Fixed cronMatchesNow to evaluate day-of-month/month/day-of-week (it previously
only checked minute/hour, so weekly/monthly schedules ran every day)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The CI Security Audit (npm audit --audit-level=high) started failing on all
new PRs after a critical advisory was published against vitest <4.1.0
(GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp — Vitest UI server arbitrary file read/exec). The
remediation chain also requires vite to move off the vulnerable esbuild range.
These are devDependencies (test/build tooling) and do not ship in the
production image, so there was no runtime exposure to deployed users — but the
audit gate blocks the pipeline, so bump them:
- vite ^5.0.11 -> ^8.0.16
- vitest ^3.0.5 -> ^4.1.8
- @vitejs/plugin-react ^4.2.1 -> ^5.2.0 (vite 8 peer compatibility)
Vite 8 ships the rolldown bundler, which requires rollupOptions.output
.manualChunks to be a function rather than an object — converted accordingly,
with explicit precedence so @xyflow/react (whose name contains the substring
"react") lands in the `flow` chunk instead of being pulled into `vendor`.
Verified locally: npm ci, npm run lint, tsc --noEmit, npm run build, and
npm test (vitest 4.1.8, 3/3 passing) all pass; npm audit reports 0
vulnerabilities.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Topology page crashed on load with React error #185 ("Maximum update
depth exceeded"), thrown from inside React Flow's setNodes.
Root cause: handleDeleteManual depended on the whole TanStack Query
useMutation result object, which is recreated on every render. That made
handleDeleteManual unstable, which made the `graph` useMemo recompute every
render, which made the node/edge sync effect fire every render — calling
setNodes/setEdges in a loop until React aborted.
Fix: depend on the referentially-stable `.mutate` function instead of the
whole mutation object, so handleDeleteManual stays stable and `graph` only
rebuilds when the underlying data or connectMode actually change.
Verified: tsc --noEmit clean, eslint clean, vite build succeeds, and the
Topology page renders without #185 in a local Docker build.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: backend filtered switches by status='online', so a mid-poll-cycle
device (briefly 'unknown') caused the endpoint to return [] — and the frontend
rendered nothing when the array was empty.
- Backend: query ALL switch devices (not just online ones); unreachable devices
already fall through to the Promise.allSettled error path and render with an
error badge, so no data is lost
- Frontend: replace silent `length > 0 &&` guard with a three-way ternary that
shows a "No managed switches found" message when the array is empty, so the
user always sees feedback instead of a blank section
- Frontend: add staleTime: 60_000 to the SNMP query to prevent the hair-trigger
background refetch that raced with the poller on every navigation
Backend: GET /api/system/version-check fetches frontend/package.json from
the main branch on GitHub, caches result in app_settings for 24 hours,
and compares semver against the running version. Fails silently (no banner)
for air-gapped or firewalled deployments.
Frontend: dismissible blue update banner in SecurityBanners (rendered
between TopBar and main content) — only visible when a newer version is
detected. Shows target version and docker compose update command.
Backend: accept target_device_id — connect to target, enable btest
server, run test from source using target credentials, disable server
in finally (even on failure). Manual IP mode preserved as fallback.
Frontend: device picker dropdown (all managed devices except self) as
default mode; toggle to Manual IP for non-managed targets with a warning
that the server must be pre-enabled. Results show target IP in labels.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After sniffer stops, poll /file/print every 500ms (up to 10s) until
RouterOS reports the capture file, then use the exact 'name' field as
the SFTP path. Falls back to stripping the leading slash if the first
attempt gets "No such file". Eliminates the hardcoded path assumption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Frontend: blob error responses (from responseType:'blob' calls) are now
decoded back to text/JSON so the actual backend error message surfaces
in the UI instead of generic "Request failed with status code 500"
- Backend: step-by-step console.log through capture flow so the exact
failure point is visible in server logs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RouterOS SFTP root maps to the device filesystem root, not /flash/.
Capture file is written as /<name>.pcap, not /flash/<name>.pcap.
Also stop any in-progress capture before reconfiguring, add a 2s
flush delay between sniffer stop and SFTP download, improve error
messages to expose exact failure point, and delete remote file after download.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Packet capture: RouterOS sniffer + SFTP download to PCAP for Wireshark analysis
- Bandwidth test: RouterOS /tool/bandwidth-test with TX/RX Mbps result display
- Both exposed in the Tools tab on device detail pages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- aggregateRules/aggregateActions: deduplicate coverage per device using a per-device seenKeys set,
preventing a device with duplicate topic|action rules from inflating the coverage count above total
- executePush (add path): skip devices that already have an identical rule/action before pushing to
all devices, preventing duplicate RouterOS logging entries from being created in the first place
- TopBar: remove hardcoded decorative 'live' indicator that had no backend connection logic
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add 'Copy VLANs from Another Switch' — a 3-step modal available on the
VLANs tab of any switch device. Step 1 selects a source switch and which
VLAN IDs to copy (VLAN 1 deselected by default with a management risk
warning). Step 2 lets the user assign interfaces on the target device
per VLAN: clicking a port chip cycles it through None → Tagged → Untagged
→ None, with a live summary and bridge picker per VLAN. Conflict detection
identifies VLANs already present on the target and offers per-VLAN
Skip/Overwrite with the port grid disabling itself when Skip is active.
Step 3 shows the full plan before a single apply call executes all
operations over one device connection and reports per-VLAN results.
Also fix CPU load display on the Devices page for hardware switches that
report 0% CPU via ASIC offloading — the previous filter (v > 0) silently
dropped all valid zero readings; now filters on field presence instead.
- DevicesPage: add statusFilter + typeFilter to filtered useMemo deps (was a real bug — filter chips had no effect until unrelated re-render)
- DevicesPage: refactor cpuHistories useMemo to pure Object.fromEntries form
- DashboardPage: suppress react-hooks/purity for intentional Date.now() chart domain
- Sidebar: move GroupHeader from inline arrow fn to module-scope named function (fixes react-hooks/static-components)
- axios: bump ^1.6.5 → ^1.16.0 to clear high-severity CVEs (prototype pollution, CRLF injection, NO_PROXY bypass)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New Syslog page under Network Services exposes RouterOS logging actions
and routing rules with full CRUD. Logging actions define destinations
(remote syslog server, memory, disk, echo); logging rules define which
topics route to which action.
Single Device and All Devices modes are functionally identical — All
Devices applies changes across every online device in parallel and
shows per-entry coverage badges indicating which devices have each
action or rule. Toggle enable/disable works in both modes.
Remote actions display address:port with facility/severity in a single
Destination column; memory/disk/echo rows show no irrelevant remote
fields. Syslog KPI card added to the Network Services overview.
Add a right-justified refresh interval dropdown above the client table
with options for Not Updating, 30 s, 1 min, and 3 min. The chosen
interval controls both React Query polling and WebSocket-triggered
invalidations — selecting Not Updating fully freezes the list until
page reload. Preference persists via localStorage.
RouterOS vs RouterBOOT distinction:
- Rename "Firmware Updates" → "RouterOS Updates" everywhere (Config tab,
dashboard banner, devices list tooltip) to accurately reflect what is
being updated
- Add RouterBOOT bootloader upgrade support as a distinct operation:
new DeviceCollector methods checkRouterboardUpgrade() and
installRouterboardUpgrade() using /system/routerboard/print and
/system/routerboard/upgrade
- New API endpoints: POST /api/devices/:id/check-routerboard and
POST /api/devices/:id/install-routerboard
- Daily poller now also checks RouterBOOT upgrade status while already
connected during firmware check cycle, with first-discovery alerts
Config tab update panel:
- Combine RouterOS and RouterBOOT into a single "Software & Firmware
Updates" card with two subsections separated by a divider
- Pre-populate both sections from stored DB state on load — no longer
requires a manual "Check" click to see a known pending update
- Enforce update order: when both are pending, show a blue info banner
explaining RouterOS must be installed first, and disable the
RouterBOOT "Upgrade & Reboot" button until the RouterOS update clears
- Fix GET /api/devices/:id to include firmware_update_available,
latest_ros_version, routerboard_upgrade_available, upgrade_firmware_version
(these were missing from the detail endpoint)
Dashboard & devices list:
- Combined amber banner now shows two distinct rows: RouterOS (N) with
device links and RouterBOOT (N) with device links — one dismiss for both
- Devices list: amber ArrowUpCircle = RouterOS update, blue Cpu icon =
RouterBOOT upgrade, each with distinct tooltips
- Fix GET /api/devices (list) to include routerboard_upgrade_available and
upgrade_firmware_version (these were missing, causing RouterBOOT
notifications to never appear on the dashboard)
DB migration:
- Add routerboard_upgrade_available BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE
- Add upgrade_firmware_version VARCHAR(20)
Discovery system fixes:
- Fix duplicate entries: replace single-key (mac || ip || identity) dedup
with three cross-referenced indexes so a neighbor seen via LLDP by one
device and via MNDP by another always merges into one row
- Fix offline devices persisting: handleDeviceFailure now deletes
topology_links for the offline device (same pattern as clients)
- Add periodic stale-link sweep every 15 min that removes topology_links
rows older than 20 min as a safety net for devices that go offline
without cleanly triggering handleDeviceFailure
Documents CORS_ORIGIN env var, credential preset operator access control,
and server-side bulk device add job in README. Bumps version across all
four locations.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a 'Built with Claude AI' badge to the README header and an
'AI Assistance' section acknowledging that the project was designed
and built with Claude by Anthropic. Updates SECURITY.md with an
'AI-Assisted Security Infrastructure' section detailing the specific
security work that was AI-generated — linting rules, unit tests,
CI pipeline, and credential handling design.
docker/build-push-action@v6 renamed the parameter from 'dockerfile' to
'file'. The backend succeeded by luck (default Dockerfile matched), but
nginx failed because the Dockerfile isn't in the root context directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a GitHub Actions workflow that builds and pushes backend and nginx
images to GitHub Container Registry on every merge to main and on
releases. Adds docker-compose.ghcr.yml for end users who want to deploy
without cloning the repo, and updates the README with Quick Deploy
instructions alongside the existing build-from-source guide.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sets up Jest + ts-jest for the backend and adds 47 tests across 5
suites covering crypto utilities, OUI vendor lookup, auth middleware,
AlertService dispatch/cooldown logic, and DeviceCollector uptime parsing.
2GT-RichandClaude Opus 5