gtiandClaude Sonnet 5
8f3dcaada9
Z.1: KB conflict counts were reported as ROW counts (kb_knowledge rows), not DISTINCT GTIN counts - a single conflicted product with 2 competing NCM candidates produces 2 rows, doubling the apparent conflict count. Real number, measured directly in production: 262 distinct GTINs in CONFLICT (all under knowledge_key=ncm), matching the ~264 baseline closely - no real growth, just a row-vs-GTIN counting mismatch in the earlier report. Z.3: corrected the Missão 4 claim that NFCE_ITENS was the "fonte encontrada" for what PIS/COFINS was actually transmitted - that overstated certainty. Relabeled PISCOFINS_FONTE_TRANSMITIDA = NÃO_CONCLUSIVO in docs/PISCOFINS_TRANSMITTED_SOURCE_V1.md and both dossiê copies: a blank NFCE_ITENS column is equally consistent with "nothing was transmitted" and "the SGV transmitted a value in the XML but never wrote it back to that column" - we cannot tell without the actual XML. Z.4: docs/AUTOFILL_SAFE_3_CELULAS_V1.md - table of the 3 real AUTO_FILL_SAFE cells (000801/000802 CFOP, 000697 IPPT) with proposed value, field_contract rule and concrete evidence for each. Z.5: docs/NCM_27_BLOCKED_PRODUCTS_V1.md now marks the 15 test/garbage-named products as "produto de teste" in the kb.attest queue (still counted in coverage, just lower priority); the 3 legacy + 5 out-of-table NCMs are flagged for reclassification once the official NCM catalog (Fase 2 of this mission) is loaded and approved. Z.6: CLAUDE.md records independent Hub/Agent versioning (docs/VERSIONING.md) as the adopted standard going forward. No schema/migration change. No Firebird write anywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
121 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
121 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
# GTI Discovery
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This project is strictly read-only. Discovery code must use a database-level
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read-only account or transaction/driver mode; lexical SQL validation is only
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defense-in-depth. Discovery code must not perform DML or DDL,
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modify database objects or permissions, or store credentials and other secrets.
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Run the offline tests with:
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```text
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python -m pytest tests -q
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```
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## Firebird write policy
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Default policy:
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- All client/production Firebird databases are STRICTLY READ-ONLY.
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- Never perform INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, DDL, permission changes, or destructive operations
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against any client/production ERP database unless explicitly authorized in a future policy change.
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Explicit development exception:
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The following database is a disposable TEST DATABASE and is explicitly authorized for writes:
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```
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D:\PROJETOS\GTISISTEMAS\Projeto\TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB
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```
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For this exact file only, the agent MAY perform:
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- SELECT
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- INSERT
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- UPDATE
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- DELETE
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- DDL
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- transactional tests
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- rollback/recovery tests
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- destructive development experiments when necessary
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This database has external intact backups and can be restored.
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Safety requirement:
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Before ANY Firebird write, the code must verify that the canonical absolute database path is exactly:
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```
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D:\PROJETOS\GTISISTEMAS\Projeto\TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB
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```
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If the path differs in any way, writes must fail closed.
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Never infer write authorization from filename alone.
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Never enable writes to other Firebird databases.
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Secrets:
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- credentials remain local in ignored environment files;
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- never log, commit, or expose passwords.
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Development priority:
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- TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB may be modified freely as needed to validate the MVP.
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- Do not over-engineer rollback protections for this disposable test database unless they are part
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of the product behavior being validated.
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## GTI Fiscal write-target rule
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The SGV keeps its fiscal defaults in the canonical product record (`C000025`); every other routine consumes them.
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GTI Fiscal therefore writes ONLY to the canonical product record, and only fields whose mapping is proven
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(`docs/SGV_PRODUCT_FISCAL_UI_MAP_V1.json`, `write_target=true`). It never writes to NFCE, NFCE_ITENS, item tables,
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issued documents or any other transactional/historical table; those are read-only evidence for validation.
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Company context (UF, CRT) is read from `C000004` at run time — never hardcoded.
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## Local completion mission — exact write allowlist (operator-authorized)
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For the "GTI FISCAL LOCAL COMPLETION V1" mission the operator explicitly authorized writes to the disposable COPIES listed, by exact canonical path, in
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`docs/LOCAL_WRITE_ALLOWLIST_V1.json` (CONSTRUCAO, MMMODAS, RINCAO, UNIAO under `Projeto\Banco\`, plus TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB). Authorization is by exact
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path only — never by directory or `.FDB` extension. Any other Firebird under `D:\PROJETOS\GTISISTEMAS` stays strictly READ-ONLY. Writes go through the
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guarded executor (path allowlist, company-context guard, schema/type/length guard, compare-before-write, rowcount, transaction, audit) and only to
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`C000025` fields whose contract in `docs/FISCAL_FIELD_CONTRACT_V1.json` has `WRITE_ALLOWED=true`. This authorization does not extend to production or client databases.
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## Production deploy rule (Hub)
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Normal deploy = `powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\scripts\deploy_hub.ps1 [-PublishAgent -Version X]` (docs/DEPLOY_HUB.md). Do not recreate ad-hoc deploy scripts (deploy115.py etc.) and do not improvise SSH/docker against 10.0.10.117. The script handles VPN/SSH retry, backup, upload, migrations, rebuild, health, release publish, download verification, and automatic rollback; the real error is in `logs/last_deploy_result.json` and the log.
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## Versioning (adopted standard, see docs/VERSIONING.md)
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Hub and Agent are versioned and released independently — never assume they share a version
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number, and never make the Hub's `GTI_FISCAL_VERSION` bump touch the Agent's own version files
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(`agent/pyproject.toml`, the `AGENT_VERSION` defaults) or vice versa. The panel's "Atualização
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disponível" already compares an Agent's reported version against the highest **PUBLISHED**
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Windows `AgentRelease`, never against the Hub's version — see `docs/VERSIONING.md` for the exact
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mechanism and the current (informal) compatibility matrix.
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## Permanent mission rules (fiscal completion missions, recorded 2026-09-28)
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- No AI/LLM/embeddings, no paid API, no scraping — every rule/decision is derived from real ERP
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evidence or an explicit, audited operator/ADMIN decision (`FiscalContextEntry`), never inferred
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or guessed.
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- No Firebird triggers or schema changes, ever, for any discovery/completion mission. All queries
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against any Firebird database (client, lab copy, or disposable test DB) are read-only unless the
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exact path is on an explicit, mission-scoped write allowlist (see above) — writes still go only
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through the guarded executor.
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- Deploy only via `scripts\deploy_hub.ps1` (see "Production deploy rule" above) — never ad-hoc
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SSH/docker/psql against 10.0.10.117.
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- If the Agent (agent/) changes in a way that affects its runtime behavior: bump the single-source
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version, build a new installer, validate it in a fresh Windows Sandbox (install, upgrade in-place,
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identity preserved), and never overwrite an already-published release. A pure version-label sync
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bump (release/VERSION, pyproject.toml files, the `AGENT_VERSION` default string) that changes no
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Agent behavior is not itself an "Agent change" requiring a new installer.
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- Never reenroll an existing installation (never mint a new `installation_id`/token for a machine
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that already has one) — an in-place upgrade always preserves identity and local SQLite state.
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- No remote-execution channel to any client's Agent host, ever (by design — see
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`docs/rtc_auto_apply.md`). An Agent version upgrade on a real client machine is always performed
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by a human operator on-site; the assistant never attempts RDP/WinRM/SSH/PowerShell-remoting into
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a client host, and never asks for or accepts a production `AGENT_TOKEN`/admin session credential
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pasted in chat to work around that — live validation of a real installation, when needed, comes
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from the operator (a panel screenshot, or a value they read and paste themselves).
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- No real client/production data (CNPJ, razão social, product names/descriptions, per-product NCM)
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is ever published in a location a non-admin can reach (e.g. `central/static/`). Any evidence
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artifact referenced from a UI card must either be served through an authenticated ADMIN-only
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route, or be anonymized (generic client labels, no names/documents/descriptions) before being
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published as a static file.
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