backup.sh now also streams the fiscal-hub container's release binaries
(dist tarball, never in Postgres) into BACKUP_DIR alongside the pg_dump,
with the same 14-backup retention; restore_releases.sh is the companion
restore. Verified with a real restore smoke test in production: the
restored dump's agent_releases row and the restored tarball's exe both
match the published sha256 exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tenant gains source (LOCAL|GTI_GERENCIADOR), external_client_id, external_code,
active and synced_at (migration 0024). central/app/client_sync.py fetches from
the panel's new GET /internal/fiscal/clients (dedicated bearer token, never
MySQL credentials) and upserts Tenant rows, never touching a LOCAL row.
/agents/new now offers only active GTI_GERENCIADOR tenants, with a client-side
search box; the POST validates the same rule server-side, not just in the
dropdown. central/scripts/sync_clients_from_gerenciador.py is the operator-run
sync + reconciliation report.
GTI_FISCAL_VERSION/AGENT_VERSION bumped to 1.1.2 (release/VERSION single
source of truth), incorporating the installation_id persistence fix. Rebuilt
the EXE installer trio at 1.1.2 (scripts/build_windows_installer.ps1).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One universal Windows Agent package per version (agent_releases: version/
platform/architecture/sha256/status DRAFT|PUBLISHED|REVOKED; the binary
lives on a local release-storage volume, never in PostgreSQL). An operator
creates a pending installation (agent_enrollments) from Agents / Servidores
-> + Nova instalação, then either downloads it directly or generates a
one-time HTTPS link (short TTL, single use). Either path streams the
package plus a freshly minted enrollment.json whose token is never written
to storage in plaintext, only its SHA-256 hash. On the client host,
gti-agent.ps1 install-auto verifies the bundle's SHA-256, refuses a non-
HTTPS Hub, enrolls via POST /v1/agents/enroll (deleting the enrollment
token immediately after, success or failure), writes an ACL-restricted
.env with the newly issued permanent Agent token, and registers the
Windows Service without starting it (Firebird stays unconfigured on
purpose). Idempotent, replay-proof, rate-limited per IP, fully audited,
never logs a secret.
Migration 0022_agent_releases_enrollment (verified fresh-DB ==
upgrade-from-0021 by pg_dump diff). GTI_FISCAL_VERSION/AGENT_VERSION
bumped to 1.1.0 as the single source of truth across code, packages, the
release manifest and every published AgentRelease row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Collaborators logged into GTI Gerenciador open GTI Fiscal without a
second password. The panel signs a 60 s JWT (Ed25519; the Hub holds only
the public key); the Hub checks signature, iss/aud/exp/nbf, maximum
lifetime, nonce against a one-time state cookie set when the flow starts
at GET /login (login-CSRF protection) and a single-use jti
(sso_used_assertions). Collaborators are provisioned in admin_users with
auth_source=GTI_GERENCIADOR and no password; a CHECK constraint makes a
passwordless local account or a federated account with a password
impossible (migration 0021). Sessions last FEDERATED_SESSION_SECONDS
(1 h) and are renewed silently through the panel.
The local admin stays as break-glass at /login/local, audited. Logout ends
only the Hub session. Every SSO success/rejection (stable reason code),
logout and local login is audited with the real client IP, never the
token. verify_password now fails closed on a missing hash instead of
raising.
Visual identity: gti-theme.css is a verbatim copy of the panel's
design system (tokens, sidebar, light/dark theme) plus its tema.js,
sidebar.js and logo; control-panel.css keeps only Hub components, all
colours from the panel tokens. Page structure and features unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GTI terminates TLS in its Nginx Proxy Manager (10.0.10.100), not on the
Hub host, so the Hub must be reachable on the LAN — by the proxy only.
- docker-compose.prod.yml passes FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS (uvicorn then trusts
X-Forwarded-For/-Proto from the proxy only: real client IPs in audit and
session records, https scheme) and WEB_COOKIE_SECURE. Defaults keep the
previous behaviour.
- restrict_hub_port.sh + gti-fiscal-hub-port.service: Docker-published
ports bypass UFW, so the source restriction lives in DOCKER-USER,
matched on the conntrack original destination with --ctdir ORIGINAL,
and is re-applied whenever docker.service starts (the chain is not
persisted across reboots).
- *.service forced to LF like *.sh; tests cover both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by running deploy/hub/backup.sh on the production VM:
- With core.autocrlf=true, `git archive` on the Windows release machine
shipped the .sh files with CRLF and `sh` aborted on line 4
("set: Illegal option -"): backup, restore and seed never ran.
.gitattributes now forces *.sh to LF.
- Docker creates the bind-mounted backups/ directory as root, so the
host-side retention `rm` would fail once the 15th dump existed.
Retention now runs inside the postgres container.
tests/test_deploy_scripts.py covers both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
gtiandClaude Sonnet 5
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