Commit Graph
11 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
gtiandClaude Sonnet 5 8d6122c096 feat: Agent distribution with secure enrollment from the control panel
One universal Windows Agent package per version (agent_releases: version/
platform/architecture/sha256/status DRAFT|PUBLISHED|REVOKED; the binary
lives on a local release-storage volume, never in PostgreSQL). An operator
creates a pending installation (agent_enrollments) from Agents / Servidores
-> + Nova instalação, then either downloads it directly or generates a
one-time HTTPS link (short TTL, single use). Either path streams the
package plus a freshly minted enrollment.json whose token is never written
to storage in plaintext, only its SHA-256 hash. On the client host,
gti-agent.ps1 install-auto verifies the bundle's SHA-256, refuses a non-
HTTPS Hub, enrolls via POST /v1/agents/enroll (deleting the enrollment
token immediately after, success or failure), writes an ACL-restricted
.env with the newly issued permanent Agent token, and registers the
Windows Service without starting it (Firebird stays unconfigured on
purpose). Idempotent, replay-proof, rate-limited per IP, fully audited,
never logs a secret.

Migration 0022_agent_releases_enrollment (verified fresh-DB ==
upgrade-from-0021 by pg_dump diff). GTI_FISCAL_VERSION/AGENT_VERSION
bumped to 1.1.0 as the single source of truth across code, packages, the
release manifest and every published AgentRelease row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 13:19:31 -03:00
gtiandClaude Opus 5.5 64d3fc56e2 feat: SSO from GTI Gerenciador and the Gerenciador visual identity
Collaborators logged into GTI Gerenciador open GTI Fiscal without a
second password. The panel signs a 60 s JWT (Ed25519; the Hub holds only
the public key); the Hub checks signature, iss/aud/exp/nbf, maximum
lifetime, nonce against a one-time state cookie set when the flow starts
at GET /login (login-CSRF protection) and a single-use jti
(sso_used_assertions). Collaborators are provisioned in admin_users with
auth_source=GTI_GERENCIADOR and no password; a CHECK constraint makes a
passwordless local account or a federated account with a password
impossible (migration 0021). Sessions last FEDERATED_SESSION_SECONDS
(1 h) and are renewed silently through the panel.

The local admin stays as break-glass at /login/local, audited. Logout ends
only the Hub session. Every SSO success/rejection (stable reason code),
logout and local login is audited with the real client IP, never the
token. verify_password now fails closed on a missing hash instead of
raising.

Visual identity: gti-theme.css is a verbatim copy of the panel's
design system (tokens, sidebar, light/dark theme) plus its tema.js,
sidebar.js and logo; control-panel.css keeps only Hub components, all
colours from the panel tokens. Page structure and features unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:21:26 -03:00
gti 50254772e4 fix: clarify unavailable legacy blocker resolution 2026-09-22 21:42:24 -03:00
gti 0eeb7d159c fix: close operational panel page review findings 2026-09-22 20:34:03 -03:00
gti a4d837f151 feat: refine operational control panel pages 2026-09-22 20:11:18 -03:00
gti 516c71b932 fix: close task 3 resolution findings 2026-09-22 19:11:08 -03:00
gti 5180725238 feat: add safe blocker resolution workflow 2026-09-22 18:47:04 -03:00
gti e35417f044 fix: close task 2 operational review findings 2026-09-22 18:00:28 -03:00
gti 6bdac245b9 fix: validate control panel runtime paths 2026-09-22 16:23:51 -03:00
gti 66b5888d80 feat: add blocker resolution action to panel 2026-09-22 15:38:55 -03:00
gti 301aac112e feat: add autonomous fiscal control panel 2026-09-22 15:36:12 -03:00