One universal Windows Agent package per version (agent_releases: version/
platform/architecture/sha256/status DRAFT|PUBLISHED|REVOKED; the binary
lives on a local release-storage volume, never in PostgreSQL). An operator
creates a pending installation (agent_enrollments) from Agents / Servidores
-> + Nova instalação, then either downloads it directly or generates a
one-time HTTPS link (short TTL, single use). Either path streams the
package plus a freshly minted enrollment.json whose token is never written
to storage in plaintext, only its SHA-256 hash. On the client host,
gti-agent.ps1 install-auto verifies the bundle's SHA-256, refuses a non-
HTTPS Hub, enrolls via POST /v1/agents/enroll (deleting the enrollment
token immediately after, success or failure), writes an ACL-restricted
.env with the newly issued permanent Agent token, and registers the
Windows Service without starting it (Firebird stays unconfigured on
purpose). Idempotent, replay-proof, rate-limited per IP, fully audited,
never logs a secret.
Migration 0022_agent_releases_enrollment (verified fresh-DB ==
upgrade-from-0021 by pg_dump diff). GTI_FISCAL_VERSION/AGENT_VERSION
bumped to 1.1.0 as the single source of truth across code, packages, the
release manifest and every published AgentRelease row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/sso/fiscal now requires the state that GTI Fiscal creates when the flow
starts and signs it as the "nonce" claim; GTI Fiscal checks it against
its own one-time cookie. Without a valid state the panel sends the
browser to GTI Fiscal's /login, so the flow always starts there. This
prevents someone from pushing an assertion for their own account into
another person's browser (login CSRF).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Collaborators logged into GTI Gerenciador open GTI Fiscal without a
second password. The panel signs a 60 s JWT (Ed25519; the Hub holds only
the public key); the Hub checks signature, iss/aud/exp/nbf, maximum
lifetime, nonce against a one-time state cookie set when the flow starts
at GET /login (login-CSRF protection) and a single-use jti
(sso_used_assertions). Collaborators are provisioned in admin_users with
auth_source=GTI_GERENCIADOR and no password; a CHECK constraint makes a
passwordless local account or a federated account with a password
impossible (migration 0021). Sessions last FEDERATED_SESSION_SECONDS
(1 h) and are renewed silently through the panel.
The local admin stays as break-glass at /login/local, audited. Logout ends
only the Hub session. Every SSO success/rejection (stable reason code),
logout and local login is audited with the real client IP, never the
token. verify_password now fails closed on a missing hash instead of
raising.
Visual identity: gti-theme.css is a verbatim copy of the panel's
design system (tokens, sidebar, light/dark theme) plus its tema.js,
sidebar.js and logo; control-panel.css keeps only Hub components, all
colours from the panel tokens. Page structure and features unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The sidebar "Fiscal" entry now goes to /sso/fiscal. For a logged-in,
active employee the panel issues a JWT signed with Ed25519 (the private
key exists only here; GTI Fiscal only holds the public key): iss/aud
fixed, sub = funcionario:<ID> (LOGIN is editable), 60 s lifetime, unique
jti that GTI Fiscal records to reject replays. No password, hash or panel
cookie leaves the panel.
The assertion is delivered in an auto-submitted POST, never in the URL,
so it stays out of proxy logs, browser history and Referer. That page
carries its own CSP allowing form-action only to the configured callback
origin; the security-headers middleware now keeps a route-defined CSP.
Without a session the employee goes through the normal login and comes
back; plain HTTP is redirected to the public HTTPS address; `next` only
accepts a relative path; the .env bootstrap account (no stable ID) is
refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GTI terminates TLS in its Nginx Proxy Manager (10.0.10.100), not on the
Hub host, so the Hub must be reachable on the LAN — by the proxy only.
- docker-compose.prod.yml passes FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS (uvicorn then trusts
X-Forwarded-For/-Proto from the proxy only: real client IPs in audit and
session records, https scheme) and WEB_COOKIE_SECURE. Defaults keep the
previous behaviour.
- restrict_hub_port.sh + gti-fiscal-hub-port.service: Docker-published
ports bypass UFW, so the source restriction lives in DOCKER-USER,
matched on the conntrack original destination with --ctdir ORIGINAL,
and is re-applied whenever docker.service starts (the chain is not
persisted across reboots).
- *.service forced to LF like *.sh; tests cover both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RELEASE_MANIFEST.json still said head 0011 (repo was at 0018, now 0020)
and RELEASE_CANDIDATE_V1.md said 0010. Updated both, plus
AI_PROJECT_STATE.md and PILOT_DEPLOYMENT.md, to head
0020_not_null_timestamps as applied in production.
scripts/release_manifest.py reported the 4-digit file prefix as the head
("0020" instead of "0020_not_null_timestamps") and always read the
applied revision from the dev container. It now asks Alembic for the real
head and revision count, and the Hub container is configurable
(HUB_CONTAINER); the source is recorded in the manifest.
tests/test_release_candidate.py now fails when the manifest head differs
from Alembic's head.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Audit of models vs fresh DB vs production (all at 0019): 20 columns are
NOT NULL in the models but nullable in the database, all timestamps with
DEFAULT now() created by 0011/0012/0014/0017 without nullable=False.
Classified DB_CONSTRAINT_MISSING: no application path writes NULL to
them (inserts omit them, updates set now; no raw SQL inserts), and there
were zero NULLs in production and in the development database (246,682
rows checked). The upgrade aborts without changing anything if any NULL
is present, instead of inventing a value.
After this revision a fresh database matches the models on nullability,
column types, PKs, FKs, uniqueness and checks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opens the GTI Fiscal Hub (https://gtifiscal.gtigrupo.com.br) in a new
tab. Link only: GTI Fiscal keeps its own login, the panel's
authentication is unchanged. Already deployed to production.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by running deploy/hub/backup.sh on the production VM:
- With core.autocrlf=true, `git archive` on the Windows release machine
shipped the .sh files with CRLF and `sh` aborted on line 4
("set: Illegal option -"): backup, restore and seed never ran.
.gitattributes now forces *.sh to LF.
- Docker creates the bind-mounted backups/ directory as root, so the
host-side retention `rm` would fail once the 15th dump existed.
Retention now runs inside the postgres container.
tests/test_deploy_scripts.py covers both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
0001 called Base.metadata.create_all(), building the schema from the
current models, so on a fresh PostgreSQL 0002 collided on
datasets.raw_sha256 and `alembic upgrade head` could never run from zero.
0001 is now an explicit, frozen baseline: the seven base tables exactly as
the real history created them, before 0002/0006 extended them. Databases
already past 0001 never re-run it. Proof: a fresh `upgrade head` produces a
schema identical (pg_dump --schema-only) to the long-lived dev database.
0019 repairs a latent bug found by that comparison: 0006 used
server_default="now()" as a string, which PostgreSQL froze at the instant
the column was created, so every Agent and Job got the same created_at.
It also adds three indexes the models declare but no migration created.
central/tests/test_migration_baseline.py guards (via AST) against
migrations importing the models or using string timestamp defaults.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
gti
GustavoandClaude Opus 5.5