v0.23.17 stopped the poller creating an unbounded backlog but did nothing about
the one already there. A reporter with sixty devices upgraded and still had
752,318 jobs queued, nine stale devices, and an endpoint cheerfully reporting
1.59x headroom. Fair to call that not fixed.
Three faults, all mine.
**Retention never touched pending work.** cleanupJobHistory cleaned 'completed'
and 'failed' only. The queue of outstanding polls — the part the operator
actually feels — was out of scope, so an upgrade left it draining for days.
Stale pending jobs are now swept, at startup and every five minutes. The rule is
that a periodic poll which has waited longer than its own cadence is worthless:
running it yields a reading the next cycle would have taken anyway, while
occupying a worker the live fleet is waiting on. Discarding queued work is safe
precisely because it is periodic — the schedule re-enqueues within one interval.
**Deduplication failed in the case it existed for.** The in-flight claim was a
Redis key with a 135-second TTL. Under a large backlog a job waits hours, so the
claim lapsed long before it ran and the scheduler re-enqueued every cycle: the
guard worked only on a queue that was already short.
Replaced with a deterministic job id, which cannot lapse. While a job for a
device and kind exists in any state, adding it again is a no-op. That requires
finished jobs to be removed immediately or the id would stay taken and the
device would never be polled again — which costs nothing now that
device_poll_stats records every attempt, duration and error.
**The headroom metric lied.** It describes flow and is blind to accumulated
work, so it read "healthy" beside three-quarters of a million queued jobs. It
now reports backlog and drain ETA alongside, plus a single status verdict that
cannot say ok while a backlog exists. Verified by injecting 15,125 jobs: status
went to 'draining' with headroom still at 85x, which is exactly the case the old
metric got wrong.
Also added, because the reporter asked and was right to: an operator-triggered
drain (POST /api/system/poller/drain), and a Polling tab in Settings showing
queue depth, headroom, backlog, per-device staleness and the drain control. It
was all buried in an API response before. A dashboard insight fires when the
poller falls behind, so a starved poller announces itself rather than presenting
as a fleet of broken devices.
Two corrections found by testing rather than reasoning:
* BullMQ rejects ':' in a custom job id. `fast:2` threw on every enqueue and
killed the scheduler outright — three of four devices went unpolled for
eight minutes before it was caught. Hyphens now, and the dedup is exercised
directly: 500 enqueues of one device yield one queued job.
* Redis maxmemory-policy moves from volatile-lru to noeviction. I had reasoned
that only TTL-bearing keys are evicted and BullMQ job hashes carry none —
true, but its *control* keys do. Job locks and stalled-check markers both
expire, and evicting one causes duplicate processing or a stalled-job storm.
BullMQ warns about this on connect and was right.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two follow-ups left open by v0.23.17. One is a real fix; the other turned
out to need explaining rather than fixing.
**Redis had no memory ceiling.** v0.23.17 stopped the poller from growing Redis
without bound, but nothing stopped anything else from doing so, and the host had
no protection either way. Redis now runs with a 512 MB cap (REDIS_MAXMEMORY).
The eviction policy is the part worth care. `allkeys-lru` would be actively
dangerous here: BullMQ job data carries no TTL, so an LRU sweep across all keys
could discard queued work with no trace. `volatile-lru` evicts only keys that
set an expiry — which is exactly the poller's caches and in-flight claims, all
of which are safe to lose because losing one merely causes an earlier re-poll.
Verified rather than assumed: sampled BullMQ job keys report ttl=-1 and poller
cache keys 528-3408s. If pressure ever exhausts the volatile keys Redis refuses
writes instead of evicting queue state, which is loud and survivable.
**The 14% fast-poll failure rate is not a bug.** Current rate across all devices
and job kinds is 0% over 1,462 attempts. The historical 230,707 failures were
genuine device downtime: device_availability records 324 outages totalling ~1,003
hours across four lab devices, which at a 30-second cadence and two attempts per
cycle predicts ~240,700 failures — within 4% of what was recorded. Nothing to
fix; retention had simply been hoarding an accurate count.
It did expose real waste, though. Periodic polls no longer retry in-job, because
the schedule already is the retry: a device that did not answer is unlikely to
answer a second later, and each extra attempt occupies a worker for up to the
job timeout. On a fleet with several devices down that doubled the capacity they
consumed — the same capacity the rest of the fleet was short of in #114. It also
doubled the recorded failure count, which is how ~1,000 hours of downtime came
to look like 231k distinct faults. User-initiated full syncs keep their retries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the /terminal authorization fix: a full-codebase security
review surfaced several more issues, fixed here. All changes are designed
to roll out with no interruption to existing deployments — no forced
migration, no manual re-key, no boot failure.
Self-healing secret management (utils/secrets.ts):
- JWT_SECRET / ENCRYPTION_KEY auto-generate to strong values on first boot
and persist to the app_data volume (0600, outside the DB) when not set
to a strong value in the environment. Replaces the prior behavior of
running on the public repo defaults.
- decrypt() tries the current key plus every legacy/default key, so
existing device credentials keep decrypting after a key change; a
startup sweep re-encrypts stale rows forward (db/reencryptCredentials.ts).
- verifyToken() accepts the current signing secret plus prior *strong*
secrets (never the public defaults), so rotation doesn't invalidate live
sessions; sessions signed with a default secret require one re-login.
- Dockerfile pre-creates /app/data as the app user so the non-root
process can persist to a fresh named volume; app_data volume added to
both compose files; compose secret defaults changed to empty (auto-gen).
Authorization / input:
- Default Socket.IO namespace now requires a valid JWT (was unauthenticated
and broadcasting fleet-activity events); frontend sends the token and
drops the shared socket on logout.
- Webhook delivery blocks SSRF to loopback/private/link-local/CGNAT ranges
and pins the request to the validated IP (WebhookService.ts).
- Rate limit added to /auth/totp/verify; global mutation backstop on /api.
- Password policy (>=10 chars, letter+digit) enforced on set/change/create.
- system.ts used verifyToken as middleware (always 500); now requireAuth.
Hardening:
- CSP + HSTS/nosniff/frame-deny headers in nginx, scoped to allow the
OpenStreetMap tile/geocoding hosts the maps use.
Docs/tests:
- README secret section rewritten for the self-healing model.
- New unit tests for secret resolution, persistence, rotation, and
legacy-key decryption (97 tests pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* devices: hide discovered neighbors that are already managed
Discovered Devices showed every unresolved MikroTik neighbor, even when
the neighbor was obviously the same device a managed node is reporting
through a different link / MAC / alias. Since we already know every
managed device interface MAC, primary IP, and system identity, we can
flag those rows.
- /api/devices/discovered now annotates each row with duplicate_of_device_id
and duplicate_of_device_name when the neighbor matches a managed device
by interface MAC, primary IP, or system identity.
- Add a Hide duplicates of managed devices toggle (default on) above the
table, with a count of how many matches were found. When enabled, the
list hides matched rows; when disabled, matches stay visible but are
dimmed and tagged Already managed so the origin is clear.
- Suppress the Add to Manager action for rows that are already a
managed device, since adding them would create a second record for the
same hardware.
Co-authored-by: Denis <denis-ev@users.noreply.github.com>
* devices: safer duplicate handling, try-all safeguards, and timezone/firmware fixes
Co-authored-by: Denis <denis-ev@users.noreply.github.com>
* Non-blocking follow-ups: parsePort util, tests, bulk-add queue, preset rate limit
Co-authored-by: Denis <denis-ev@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(security): tighten CORS, Redis rate limits, and preset access controls
Require explicit CORS origins in production, align Socket.IO CORS with HTTP,
default Docker Compose to local HTTPS origins, and remove the in-memory
mutation limiter in favor of Redis. Also add operator-use flags for credential
presets in the UI and harden bulk-add job access and client error messages.
Co-authored-by: Denis <denis-ev@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Squash-merge of PR #28 from @denis-ev. All three review blockers addressed: encryption key management documented, string truncation replaced with skip+warn validation, and undefined return on duplicate merge fixed with proper 500. Local test stack verified against cloned prod DB — migrations, new features, and backend all clean.
2GT-RichandClaude Opus 5
DenisandCursor Agent