Closes#121.
The Quick Deploy file was missing NETFLOW_BIND_PORT and the 2055/udp mapping, so
the collector bound inside the container and nothing reached it. NetFlow did
nothing, silently, with an empty traffic page and no error — for everyone
following the path the README tells new users to take.
The report was accurate and understated. docker-compose.ghcr.yml had drifted for
seven weeks, and three closed issues had never reached it:
* NETFLOW_BIND_PORT and the UDP port — as reported
* all five POLLER_* tunables — #114, whose fix was "pass the tunables through"
* the Redis memory ceiling and eviction policy — #116
* TZ on the postgres service, which nobody had noticed at all
The middle one is the uncomfortable part. Four days ago #114 was closed by
forwarding poller settings that were documented but inert, with a comment saying
setting them "did precisely nothing". On Quick Deploy that remained true, because
one compose file was fixed and the other was not — including the advice given to
that reporter about which knob to turn.
So patching the four gaps would have been treating the symptom. The two files
describe the same system and differ only in where images come from; maintaining
both by hand meant remembering every change twice, and the one forgotten was
always the file no maintainer runs.
docker-compose.ghcr.yml is now generated from docker-compose.yml by
scripts/generate-ghcr-compose.mjs, which performs the two build-to-image swaps
and nothing else. Substitution is textual rather than parse-and-reserialise so
comments survive — the reasoning about Redis eviction is worth more than the two
lines it explains. The file stays committed and browsable, because the README
tells people to curl it directly.
A --check mode runs as the first preflight gate and as its own CI job, both of
which fail when the committed file does not match what the generator produces.
Verified by deleting the NetFlow line and watching the guard reject it, with the
reason and the fix in the failure message.
Reported by @mamb1329, on their first issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two pieces of housekeeping that had gone quiet.
**A code-scanning alert nobody had looked at.** CodeQL flagged js/log-injection
in the preflight handler: a request value interpolated straight into a log line.
Log entries are newline-delimited, so a value containing a line break forges
additional entries — and an audit trail its own subject can write into is worse
than none, because it is believed.
The interesting part is that the risk had already been recognised. Two sites in
the clients routes strip carriage returns inline, ad hoc, and the third was
simply missed. That is what a shared helper is for, so there is now a `logSafe`
utility with tests, used at all three. It replaces control characters with a
visible marker rather than stripping them, so a tampered value reads as tampered
instead of being quietly tidied, and truncates absurd input so one field cannot
flood the log.
**Twelve Dependabot pull requests, the oldest six weeks old.** Nine had passing
checks, but those runs were from July against a main that has moved a long way,
so rather than merging stale branches serially the eight safe ones are applied
here as one change and verified together: bullmq, pg, helmet, @types/supertest,
tailwind-merge, vite, actions/setup-node and github/codeql-action.
Deliberately excluded, and left open:
* bcryptjs 2.4.3 to 3.0.3 (#79) — a major on the password-hashing path.
Dependabot groups it with routine bumps; it is not one, and it deserves
its own verification rather than riding along in a batch.
* typescript 5.9 to 7.0 (#81), tailwindcss 3.4 to 4.3 (#76) and
eslint-plugin-react-hooks (#78) — all three already fail their own checks.
Verified beyond the gates: the application was rebuilt and exercised on the new
dependencies — authentication, the BullMQ-backed poller, Postgres reads and
helmet's headers all behave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Security Audit job failed because new advisories dropped against existing
deps and `npm audit --audit-level=high` audits the whole tree (incl. dev/build
tooling that isn't shipped).
- Switch both audit steps to `audit-ci --high --skip-dev`, so the gate reflects
what's actually deployed (backend ships --omit=dev; frontend ships a static
build) while still failing on real high/critical production advisories.
- Allowlist GHSA-qwww-vcr4-c8h2 (React Router "RSC Mode CSRF") for the frontend:
this is a client-side SPA using BrowserRouter — RSC mode is not used — and
there is no forward-compatible fix for react-router-dom 7.x (only a downgrade).
- `npm audit fix` on both lockfiles to patch non-breaking transitive dev
advisories (js-yaml, postcss, brace-expansion, minimatch). No direct/prod
dependency versions changed; app runtime is unchanged.
Verified: backend 114 tests pass, frontend builds, and audit-ci passes for both
projects locally.
- SECURITY.md with vulnerability disclosure policy and self-hosting guidance
- Dependabot config for weekly dependency updates (npm, Docker, Actions)
- ESLint v9 flat config for frontend and backend, with eslint-plugin-security
- GitHub Actions CI: lint, typecheck, build, and npm audit on every push/PR
- CodeQL workflow for automated security scanning (runs on push and weekly)
2GT-RichandClaude Opus 5
dependabot[bot]