Addresses #94, phases A and B. Write operations are deliberately out of scope.
An access point provisioned by CAPsMAN holds none of its own wireless
configuration, so /interface/wifi/print returns rows with the configuration.* and
security.* fields absent. normalizeWifiInterface mapped nothing, stored nulls, and
the UI rendered an AP with no SSID, security or band — indistinguishable from one
that is simply broken.
Phase A — stop showing blanks
Devices are classified standalone / cap / controller / controller_cap from
/interface/wifi/capsman and /interface/wifi/cap. Both toggles can be on: MikroTik
supports a controller that also runs its own radios under itself, and the issue
calls that case out, so it gets its own role.
Provisioned interfaces are marked and labelled in the Radios tab with the
controller's MAC and an explanation that the blank fields live on the controller.
SSID, mode and channel are recovered from RouterOS's status line where present,
so the AP is described rather than blank.
Role is the signal, not missing data: an AP whose SSID is empty because the
controller owns it looks identical to an unconfigured one, and only the toggle
distinguishes them. A CAP can still hold locally-configured interfaces alongside
provisioned ones, so per-interface state is checked rather than assuming the
whole device.
Phase B — read-only controller view
Controllers now collect the radios they manage, named configurations, and
provisioning rules, surfaced as a CAPsMAN panel on the Wireless page grouped by
the access point each radio physically lives on.
CAPs are matched to managed devices by radio MAC from the controller's own
/interface/wifi/radio list, not by resolving addresses through neighbours as the
issue proposed. A MAC is hardware identity and globally unique, so unlike an
address it cannot mean two devices on two segments — the failure fixed in
v0.20.1. A radio MAC often differs from the interface MAC in the final octet, so
lookup falls back to a five-octet prefix while keeping the OUI exact. A CAP that
is not a managed device is surfaced rather than hidden; that is usually the
reason an AP appears to be missing from the fleet.
The wireless section required device_type = 'wireless_ap' in five places, which
hid a dedicated controller — normally classified as a router — from every
wireless view. Collection was gated the same way. Both now include CAPsMAN roles,
and the collector probes an unknown device once, records the role, and skips
cheaply forever after.
Not included
Provisioning, config edits and interface enable/disable. A CAPsMAN configuration
applies to every AP bound to it simultaneously, which is the fleet-wide version
of the failure Change Guard exists to prevent. It needs the same prediction and
revert treatment rather than being bolted on. Legacy /caps-man (pre-RouterOS 7)
is a separate API tree and is not covered.
Verified: API shapes probed against RouterOS 7.23 rather than taken from docs.
24 unit tests on the pure parsing and matching. No CAPsMAN hardware here, so the
read path was exercised against a seeded controller with a local radio, a matched
two-radio CAP and an unmanaged CAP; grouping, provisioning and SSID resolution all
came out correct. Confirmed no regression on a fleet with no controller: roles
detected correctly, no interface falsely flagged, wireless views unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#93.
Routing push notifications through email ingestion was a workaround. ntfy is now
a first-class channel alongside Slack, Discord, Telegram and email, using the
same alert_channels row and the same dispatch switch.
Built to cover the whole plausible configuration space rather than waiting on the
reporter's answers, so no config migration is needed once they arrive:
- server_url is operator-supplied and defaults to https://ntfy.sh, so a
self-hosted instance works — the likely case for infrastructure alerting
- both of ntfy's auth schemes: an access token (preferred; scopable and
revocable) or username/password, with none required for an open topic
- optional click_url deep-links each notification to the device it refers to
Published as JSON to the server root rather than POST /{topic} with header
metadata: the header form is ASCII-only and these titles carry per-event emoji.
Severity maps onto ntfy's priority scale so the channel stays worth being woken
by — 4 (breaks through do-not-disturb) for device_offline, log_error and
CPU/memory pressure; 2 for recoveries and discoveries; 3 for everything else.
The event type is attached as a tag so a client can be filtered to wake only for
chosen events without needing a channel per event.
Secrets follow the existing pattern: token and password are added to
SENSITIVE_KEYS, so they are masked on read and the mask placeholder is restored
to the stored value on write rather than overwriting it.
The type column is a CHECK constraint rather than a lookup table, so widening it
means dropping and recreating the constraint; done idempotently for existing
installs.
Note on trust: server_url lets an admin point the channel at an internal address.
That is the same exposure the existing Slack and Discord webhook URLs already
have, and only an admin can configure any of them. Restricting it would break the
self-hosted case this feature is mostly for.
Verified against the real ntfy.sh — a test alert arrived with the correct title,
emoji, body, priority, tag and click URL; masking verified to hide the token on
read while preserving it across a save that did not retype it. 13 unit tests
cover priority mapping, both auth schemes, URL normalisation, and rejection of
a missing topic or non-http server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#90, #91, #92.
#90 — Spurious topology links
Topology treated IP addresses and system identities as unique across the whole
fleet. They are unique only within a broadcast domain, so an installation with
physically separate segments that each reuse 10.2.0.0/24 saw devices in one
segment joined to devices in another.
The reporter pointed at shared-segment detection, and that is one of four sites
with the same flaw — but not the first. Step 2 resolves a neighbour IP to a
managed device from a global first-wins map, so a reused address silently
resolves to whichever device was loaded first; the union-find in step 6 then
merges on the resulting device id, a correct-looking key derived from bad data.
Fixing only step 6 would have left the reported link in place.
Addresses and identities are now scoped to the device that reported them
wherever they name a neighbour, so they still collapse one device's duplicate
sightings but can never join two devices. Resolution and LLDP-coverage
suppression additionally require the address to be unambiguous fleet-wide.
MAC addresses and resolved device ids are unaffected — they identify hardware,
and genuinely shared segments still merge on them.
Ambiguity detection deliberately ignores MAC divergence. A switch assigns a MAC
per port, so a device with two uplinks is reported under several MACs; an
earlier version of this fix treated that as a conflict and refused to resolve
ordinary multi-port hardware. Caught on a live fleet, where three sightings of
one CRS510 disagreed on MAC but agreed on identity. The signals used instead are
an address claimed by two managed devices, or sightings that disagree about the
neighbour's identity.
The graph builder is extracted from the route into a pure module with 16 tests,
including a fixture of the reporter's five-device, three-segment network. It had
no test coverage before, which is why a flaw this systemic went unnoticed.
Verified against a live fleet: graph output is identical before and after, and
the ambiguity list is empty when addressing is clean.
#91 — CPU load not rounded
The devices table rendered the raw value from a 5-minute Influx mean, so a
device idling between 1% and 2% displayed as 1.3333333333333333%. Rounded for
display; the sparkline keeps the unrounded series so its curve stays smooth.
#92 — Serial number in the device table
Serials were already collected, stored, returned by the API and matched by
global search, so this is presentation only: a sortable SERIAL column, and
serial added to the table's filter predicate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the lockout-prevention work: a standing audit for configurations
RouterOS accepts but that do not work, an empirical answer on /system history
undo, and corrections to the VLAN cache the editors are built on.
Config Health (new)
Eleven rules over a live snapshot, encoding MikroTik's documented Layer2
misconfigurations plus the latent lockout cases: IP or VLAN interface on a
bridge slave port, a bridged VLAN interface, a bond slave that is also a
bridge port, MTU above L2MTU, a multi-VLAN entry with untagged ports,
bridges competing for hardware offload, a port in no VLAN on a filtering
bridge, a PVID that frame-type=admit-only-vlan-tagged makes inert, a VLAN
interface whose VLAN the bridge is not tagged in, duplicate addresses, and
management that survives only on a dynamic entry. Each finding names the
consequence, the fix, how long it has been present, and the vendor doc.
Runs hourly, surfaces on the Security tab and the dashboard.
Calibrated against hardware: RouterOS 7 relocates an address off a bridge
slave port onto the bridge (actual-interface), so the stock defconf layout
works. Reporting that as critical would have fired on a default install; it
is informational unless RouterOS did not relocate it.
Change Guard: severed-connection handling
Proven on a CRS by deleting its own management address — the switch locked
itself out and self-restored unattended in ~3 minutes, twice.
That test exposed a real defect. withSafeApply treated any exception from
the apply step as "the change failed", disarming the guard and rethrowing.
But the most dangerous changes sever the connection carrying them, so the
call times out even though the change applied. The guard was stripping the
safety net off a device that had just gone silent, and reporting HTTP 500
"Read timeout" instead of telling the user the device was restoring itself.
Only luck saved it: the disarm needed the same dead connection.
Reachability now decides, not the exception. Unreachable leaves the revert
armed and returns auto_reverting; still reachable means a genuine failure,
disarmed so nothing reboots for nothing. committed_at is no longer stamped
on failed or reverted guards; resolved_at records completion instead.
/system history undo probe
probeUndoCapability tests the device rather than assuming. On 7.23.x over
the binary API: /system/history/print works, /system/history/undo does not
exist, /undo numbers= rejects the parameter, bare /undo works. Undo is
therefore untargeted, and cannot replace auto-revert since a dead-man switch
must fire after contact is lost. Binary restore stays the default.
VLAN cache correctness
- vlans keyed on (device_id, bridge, vlan_id); the old key collapsed the
same VID on two bridges
- vlan-ids ranges expanded instead of parseInt truncating "10-20" to 10
- both VLAN tables pruned, but only when the device returned an
authoritative list, so a failed read leaves the cache stale not empty
- bridge_vlan_entries.vlan_ids written and .tagged derived rather than
hardcoded false, which had left the port editor unable to see a trunk
- removeBridgeVlan matched by expanded VIDs; the ?vlan-ids= server filter
compares raw strings, so deleting one VID of a range silently no-opped
while reporting success. Multi-VLAN entries are refused in the route,
before the guard arms, since a mid-apply failure would cost a reboot
- interfaces.vlan_filtering promoted to a column
Membership is deliberately the STATIC tagged/untagged, never current-*.
These tables back the editors and updateBridgeVlan is remove-then-add, so
whatever is shown is written back; the effective view baked RouterOS's
dynamic PVID entries into saved configuration on every save. Analysis that
needs the effective view reads the device live. Extracted to pure functions
with tests, because that path was previously untestable inline.
Verified on four devices; 195 backend tests; all CI gates green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The verdict dialog only reached the VLANs tab, so a predicted lockout on the other
guarded paths still surfaced as a generic "failed" message with the reasoning lost.
Every surface that can push a guarded change now explains the refusal:
- SwitchPortDiagram — port VLAN (PVID / tagged / untagged, the shape of the real
incident), bond create and destroy, and the bridge vlan-filtering toggle.
- RoutingTab — static route add and delete.
- SystemConfigTab — IP address add and remove.
- SecurityTab — /ip/service enable/disable. This route also has an older hard
refusal that returns 409 with a reason but no verdict; that text is now shown
instead of a generic error, where previously it was swallowed entirely.
Supporting changes: confirm_lockout threaded through the affected API methods
(DELETE routes send it as a request body), and deviceName threaded down to
SwitchPortDiagram, RoutingTab and SecurityTab so the typed confirmation can ask
for the actual device name.
Verified the shipped bundle contains the dialog and the typed-confirm prompt.
Full CI preflight green; 152 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend already refused a predicted lockout with 409 + a verdict, but the
frontend surfaced it as a generic "failed" message, so the reasoning never reached
the user.
- LockoutVerdictDialog renders the verdict properly: each violated invariant with
its plain-English consequence, and the resolved management path ("how the manager
reaches this device") so the user can verify the claim rather than take it on
trust. Critical verdicts require typing the device name to override; warnings
need only an acknowledgement, per the agreed friction levels.
- lockoutVerdictOf() extracts the 409 payload, mirroring the existing lockoutOf()
helper used by the firewall guard.
- VLAN add/update/delete now capture the verdict and re-send with confirm_lockout
when the user accepts, instead of showing an error banner.
Verified end to end on the production switch: changing the ingress port's PVID off
the management VLAN returns severity=critical with the ingress-port-pvid violation
and the hop chain (192.168.0.40/24 -> bridge -> sfp28-1), and the shipped bundle
contains the new dialog. Full CI preflight green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2a of the change-safety work. Change Guard could already rescue a device
after a bad change; this predicts the break beforehand and refuses it.
Rather than blocklisting "risky operations" — which is how deleting an *unused*
bond and a routine VLAN edit both slipped through — the engine derives the
invariants that must hold for the manager to keep reaching the device, simulates
the planned change against LIVE device state, and reports any invariant that flips
from satisfied to violated. Novel change shapes are covered for free, and each
invariant explains itself, so the warning names the real mechanism.
- pathModel.ts: captures a live snapshot over the API (no SSH) and resolves the
management path — which address, interface, bridge, VLAN and physical ingress
port the session depends on, each with the reason it is load-bearing.
- invariants.ts: nine checks drawn from MikroTik's documented behaviour, notably
that the bridge IS the CPU port and must be a member of the management VLAN.
- analyzeChange.ts: simulates the change and diffs invariants, returning
safe / warning / critical plus the path used to reach the verdict.
- withGuardedChange now runs the analysis first and returns 409 with the verdict
unless the caller passes confirm_lockout; analysis failures never block a change.
- New GET /:id/management-path and POST /:id/preflight (analyse without applying).
Three bugs were found by testing against the live switch rather than fixtures:
- Invariants read vlan-filtering from the frozen path instead of the snapshot under
evaluation, so "enable vlan-filtering" — the single most important case — was
invisible.
- VLAN membership is spread across BOTH a static row and a dynamic "added by pvid"
row. Simulating only the first match hid the danger; membership now tracks static
and effective separately, and a bridge left in the VLAN only by the dynamic row is
reported as a warning rather than silently safe.
- Requiring the ingress port to be UNTAGGED in the management VLAN flagged a healthy
tagged trunk. Because a pre-existing violation is (correctly) not reported as new,
that false positive silently suppressed real detections. Verdicts now also list
pre-existing violations so this can't hide again.
Verified on the production 100G switch: changing the ingress port's PVID off the
management VLAN is refused with 409 and the switch is left untouched (pvid still 1);
removing the bridge from VLAN 1 is correctly reported as a warning because a dynamic
PVID row would still cover it; unrelated VLAN edits stay safe. 29 changeGuard tests,
152 backend tests, full CI preflight green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Change Guard shipped covering only 4 routes (service toggle, bond create/delete,
bridge vlan-filtering). The most recent real incident — a VLAN change that removed
a switch from management — went through PUT /:id/ports/:name/vlan, which was NOT
guarded. Neither were the bridge-VLAN CRUD routes, IP address changes, or route
changes, all of which can sever the manager's own path.
Guarded routes go from 4 to 12, adding:
- port.vlan PUT /:id/ports/:name/vlan (PVID + tagged/untagged membership)
- vlan.add POST /:id/vlans
- vlan.update PUT /:id/vlans/:vlanDbId
- vlan.delete DELETE /:id/vlans/:vlanDbId
- ip.add POST /:id/ip-addresses
- ip.remove DELETE /:id/ip-addresses/:addrId
- route.add POST /:id/routing
- route.remove DELETE /:id/routing/:routeId
Each now takes a device-side restore point and arms a self-restore before applying,
disarming only once the device is proven still reachable.
Two correctness details while converting:
- vlan.delete removes the local DB row in afterConfirmed, so a change that
auto-reverts no longer leaves the UI claiming a VLAN was deleted when the device
restored it.
- The VLAN CRUD routes previously returned a bare array, which would have been
spread into the guard response object. They now return a message; the frontend
ignores these bodies and re-queries, so no client change is needed.
Verified live against the production 100G switch: a guarded VLAN add and delete
both returned protected/confirmed, were recorded in device_change_guards, and the
switch was left in its original state. 133 backend tests pass; full CI preflight green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend Lint job failed on the new createBond error path: ESLint's
preserve-caught-error rule (in effect since the eslint 10.7 bump) requires a
rethrown error to carry the original. Pass `{ cause: err }`, which also makes the
underlying RouterOS failure visible in the error chain instead of only inside the
message string.
No behavior change beyond the richer error. Verified with the exact CI commands:
`npm run lint` and `npm run build` both exit 0, 133 backend tests pass, and the
redeployed build still guards correctly (guarded change commits, disabling the
management service is refused with 409).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A user change can sever the manager's own path to a device with no warning and no
way back. Most recently, deleting an *unused* bond on a switch took the whole
switch offline. This adds a safety net, and fixes the bug that caused that
specific incident.
Root cause of the bond incident (DeviceCollector.deleteBond):
- Slaves were re-added to the bridge ONLY when the bond itself was a bridge
member. For an unbridged bond the restore loop never ran, so the member ports
were released from the bond and left in no bridge at all — the ports stopped
forwarding and the switch dropped off the network.
- The restore in both deleteBond and createBond was wrapped in `.catch(() => {})`,
so a failed restore was swallowed and the route still returned 200 OK.
- Restores also dropped PVID, silently returning tagged ports to VLAN 1.
Now: port settings (PVID, frame-types, ingress-filtering, edge, horizon) are
captured and carried over, and restore failures are reported instead of hidden.
Change Guard (services/changeGuard/ChangeGuard.ts):
Before a risky change the device saves a restore point and arms a scheduler that
restores it after N seconds. The change is applied, then reachability is proven
on a NEW connection; success disarms the scheduler, failure leaves the device to
restore itself and come back. Because the restore point is created before the
scheduler, a binary restore rolls back to a config containing neither the
scheduler nor the change — self-cleaning, with no revert loop.
- Works entirely over the RouterOS API. This matters: every recovery artifact
today requires SSH, so devices without SSH credentials had no rollback target
at all (cf. #86).
- Modes: `binary` (exact restore incl. deleted interfaces, reboots) or `script`
(/import, no reboot but additive). Configurable via change_guard_* settings.
- Per-device Redis lock, `device_change_guards` audit table, and startup
reconciliation for guards left pending by a manager restart.
- Degrades gracefully: if protection can't be armed the change still runs and the
response says it was unprotected.
Wired into bond create/delete, bridge vlan-filtering, and /ip/service. Disabling
the service the manager is connected through is now refused outright (409) — the
mgmt-service signal already existed but was confined to the read-only posture
endpoint.
Also: replaces the bare confirm() on "Destroy Bond" with a ChangeGuardDialog that
explains the risk and the protection, and reports the outcome (including "the
device is restoring itself"). Fixes getAppSettings omitting
config_snapshot_enabled/interval, which made the v0.17.4 snapshot toggle a no-op.
Verified on real hardware (hAP-class switch): capability probe confirmed
/system/backup/save and scheduler add/remove work over the API; a guarded change
armed, applied, verified and committed leaving zero schedulers and zero files on
the device; disabling the api service was refused with 409. 133 backend tests
pass, including 7 guard state-machine tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the decoder DoS fix (7e11115), closing the remaining hardening
items from the same adversarial-review triage.
Bounded template cache (was unbounded):
- Templates now carry a lastUsed timestamp, refreshed whenever one decodes data.
- New exported pruneTemplateCache() evicts templates idle past a TTL then
enforces a hard cap, least-recently-used first. The collector runs it on its
existing 60s map-refresh timer (30 min TTL, 10k entries) — no new timer.
Bounded per-source bookkeeping:
- unknownExporterIds is capped; sources beyond the cap share one overflow
pseudo-exporter instead of allocating a new id each (client attribution
doesn't depend on exporter identity, so only per-exporter stats coarsen).
- Pseudo ids now come from a monotonic counter rather than map size, so they
can't collide after eviction.
UDP ingress guards (the socket is unauthenticated by protocol design):
- Drop datagrams too small to carry a header before doing any parsing work.
- New PacketRateLimiter: fixed-window per-source cap (2000 pkt/s), with the
counter map cleared each window and a cap on distinct sources per window so
spoofed source IPs can't grow it.
- getStats() now reports packetsDropped and templatesCached.
Canonical IPv6 rendering:
- formatIPv6 applies RFC 5952 zero-compression (2001:db8::1, not the fully
expanded form) and unwraps IPv4-mapped addresses (::ffff:192.0.2.1 ->
192.0.2.1) so those flows match client/exporter IPs instead of appearing as
separate IPv6 endpoints.
Adds 7 tests (rate limiter windows//caps/isolation, cache TTL + LRU eviction,
lastUsed refresh, IPv6 canonical + mapped + no-run forms); 126 backend tests pass.
Verified live: flooding the collector with 3000 packets from one source dropped
614 once over the cap while the backend stayed healthy and served the API,
malicious templates were still refused (cache held only the 2 real ones), and
real exporter flows kept decoding right through it (260 -> 336).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A NetFlow v9/IPFIX template declaring a field of length 0 produced a template
with minLength 0. parseDataSet's loop condition (off + minLength <= setEnd) then
stayed true while the field pass advanced `off` by 0 — an infinite loop.
Impact: the collector socket is UDP and unauthenticated, so any host able to
reach the NetFlow port could hang the entire backend with a single 36-byte
packet — Node is single-threaded, so the event loop never yields again and the
API, poller, sockets and health checks all stop. Only reachable while NetFlow is
enabled (off by default).
Two layers of defense in decoder.ts:
- parseTemplates rejects any field with length 0 (meaningless in v9/IPFIX) and
refuses to cache a template whose computed minLength is 0.
- parseDataSet asserts forward progress: if a full field pass consumes no bytes,
break instead of spinning. Guards any future zero-width path.
Adds 5 regression tests covering the hang case, a zero-length field among valid
ones, a variable-length field whose length byte is 0, absurd/truncated field
lengths, and that valid v9/IPFIX traffic still decodes afterwards.
Verified: the exact packet that previously hung the process now returns
immediately with no template cached; 20 attack packets fired at the live
collector left the backend healthy and serving, and real exporter flows kept
decoding (102 -> 152 flows across the test). 119 backend tests pass.
Found via an adversarial review; the report identified the infinite loop but
attributed it to the variable-length branch, which provably terminates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#87 — virtual APs removed directly on the device (WinBox/WebFig) kept
showing in the radios/interface lists, and neither refresh button cleared them.
Two distinct bugs:
1. Stale rows. The collectors upsert every interface found on the device but
never removed rows for interfaces that disappeared, so deleted radios lingered
forever. Added a prune to collectWirelessInterfaces, collectInterfaces (same
bug for deleted VLANs/bridges/bonds) and collectSecurityProfiles, deleting
stored rows whose names are no longer present on the device.
Safety: the prune only runs when the device list was fetched successfully.
Fetches that previously swallowed errors into an empty array now return null
and skip the prune, so a transient API failure can never be mistaken for
"everything was deleted". /interface/print already throws on failure.
2. Full sync skipped wireless entirely. collectAll() — what POST /devices/:id/sync
runs — never called collectWirelessInterfaces/collectSecurityProfiles, so a
manual resync could not refresh radios or clear stale ones; only the 5-minute
slow poll touched them. collectAll now collects wireless data for wireless_ap
devices, making the fix reachable on demand.
Verified on a live hAP-class AP: injected a ghost virtual-AP row, ran a sync, and
the ghost was removed while all 7 real interfaces (and offline devices' rows)
were retained. 114 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves#86 — MikroTik Manager was attempting SSH connections to devices that
have no SSH credentials configured, flooding RouterOS logs with failed logins.
Cause: config snapshots (a separate feature from scheduled backups, enabled by
default, hourly) capture `/export` over SSH via BackupService.exportConfig, which
silently falls back to the API credentials for the SSH login. On devices where
SSH was never set up, that auth fails every interval (and on each restart), and
there was no UI switch to turn it off.
- PollerService.processConfigSnapJob now skips devices without SSH credentials,
so no SSH connection is attempted where SSH isn't configured. Manual "Capture
snapshot" / backup actions are unchanged (user-initiated, with error feedback).
- Add a "Configuration Snapshots" section to Settings → General: enable toggle,
interval, and retention (the feature was on-by-default with no UI control),
with a note that it runs over SSH and only on devices that have SSH creds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the actionable findings from an adversarial review:
- 2FA enrollment now requires the current password (/totp/setup), so a
hijacked session or XSS can't enable TOTP and lock the real user out.
SSO-only accounts (no local password) are told to set one first. Frontend
collects the password before starting setup.
- OIDC config rejects default_role='admin': auto-provisioning unmatched users
straight to admin is almost never intended — admin must come from an explicit
group → role mapping.
- Rate limiter no longer fails fully open on a Redis outage. Redis calls are
bounded by an 800ms timeout (the client uses maxRetriesPerRequest:null, so
commands would otherwise hang, not throw), and on failure a per-process
in-memory sliding-window fallback keeps /login and other limited endpoints
throttled. Verified with Redis stopped: attempts throttle (429) instead of
hanging or passing unlimited.
Findings intentionally not actioned: the "API-token auth is fire-and-forget"
report was a false positive (Express awaits next(), which is called inside the
promise), and the webhook DB-pool and JWT-revocation items are either
overstated or a separate architectural decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the open CodeQL code-scanning alerts:
- guestWifi voucher codes now use rejection sampling so the character
distribution is uniform (fixes js/biased-cryptographic-random).
- Scheduled-report recipient validation replaced the backtracking email regex
with a linear split-based check (fixes js/polynomial-redos).
- Add .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml excluding js/missing-rate-limiting:
rate limiting is applied globally via app.use('/api', rateLimitRedis) plus
per-route limiters, which CodeQL can't attribute to individual handlers, so
that rule fired ~38 false positives.
Remaining alerts are dismissed as accepted/false-positive (RouterOS MD5 API
login and self-signed cert acceptance are protocol-mandated; log sites already
strip CRLF).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add OpenID Connect single sign-on so the platform can authenticate against
any standards-compliant provider (Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace, Keycloak,
Authentik, …) alongside local accounts. Resolves the feature request in #73.
Flow (backend-driven Authorization Code + PKCE):
- GET /api/auth/oidc/login builds the authorize URL and stores the PKCE/nonce
transaction in Redis (single-use, 10m TTL); the callback validates the ID
token via openid-client (JWKS signature, iss/aud/exp/nonce), resolves the
identity to a local user, and mints the platform's normal session JWT —
handed to the SPA via URL fragment. No sessions/cookies introduced.
Identity mapping (users table gains email/oidc_subject/oidc_issuer/
auth_provider; password_hash now nullable; partial unique indexes):
- First sign-in auto-provisions a user, or links to an existing local account
when the IdP email is verified and matches.
- Roles derive from a configurable IdP group -> role map with a default
fallback; existing users are never auto-demoted on a groupless login.
Configuration (admin-only, no env/redeploy needed):
- Stored as an app_settings row with the client secret encrypted at rest
(utils/crypto); masked in responses and excluded from GET /api/settings.
- New UI: Settings -> SSO / OIDC panel (issuer/client, claim + group->role
mapping, provisioning toggles, discovery test, copyable redirect URI), a
login-page SSO button, and an SSO badge in Users & Roles.
Security: local break-glass login preserved; PKCE + single-use state; email
linking requires email_verified; same-site-only post-login redirect.
Adds openid-client@^5 (CommonJS). 17 new unit tests (claim/role mapping,
username derivation, config secret round-trip/masking); 114 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The v0.16.11 update-notice text used a raw apostrophe in JSX ("You're"),
which trips react/no-unescaped-entities and failed the frontend lint job.
Escape it as '. No visual change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update-availability fixes:
- The backend read its version from npm_package_version, which is unset
when the container runs `node dist/index.js` directly, so current was
always "0.0.0" and every release looked newer — the "update available"
banner never cleared. Read the bundled package.json instead
(routes/system.ts), falling back to npm_package_version.
- Move the update notification out of the top-of-app banner into the
Operations dashboard (a dedicated notice under the network-status hero),
shown only when genuinely behind and cleared once up to date.
Security banner:
- Replace the now-dead jwt_secret_default / encryption_key_default checks
with the current secrets_not_persisted warning (auto-generated secrets
that couldn't be persisted), matching the self-healing secrets model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the /terminal authorization fix: a full-codebase security
review surfaced several more issues, fixed here. All changes are designed
to roll out with no interruption to existing deployments — no forced
migration, no manual re-key, no boot failure.
Self-healing secret management (utils/secrets.ts):
- JWT_SECRET / ENCRYPTION_KEY auto-generate to strong values on first boot
and persist to the app_data volume (0600, outside the DB) when not set
to a strong value in the environment. Replaces the prior behavior of
running on the public repo defaults.
- decrypt() tries the current key plus every legacy/default key, so
existing device credentials keep decrypting after a key change; a
startup sweep re-encrypts stale rows forward (db/reencryptCredentials.ts).
- verifyToken() accepts the current signing secret plus prior *strong*
secrets (never the public defaults), so rotation doesn't invalidate live
sessions; sessions signed with a default secret require one re-login.
- Dockerfile pre-creates /app/data as the app user so the non-root
process can persist to a fresh named volume; app_data volume added to
both compose files; compose secret defaults changed to empty (auto-gen).
Authorization / input:
- Default Socket.IO namespace now requires a valid JWT (was unauthenticated
and broadcasting fleet-activity events); frontend sends the token and
drops the shared socket on logout.
- Webhook delivery blocks SSRF to loopback/private/link-local/CGNAT ranges
and pins the request to the validated IP (WebhookService.ts).
- Rate limit added to /auth/totp/verify; global mutation backstop on /api.
- Password policy (>=10 chars, letter+digit) enforced on set/change/create.
- system.ts used verifyToken as middleware (always 500); now requireAuth.
Hardening:
- CSP + HSTS/nosniff/frame-deny headers in nginx, scoped to allow the
OpenStreetMap tile/geocoding hosts the maps use.
Docs/tests:
- README secret section rewritten for the self-healing model.
- New unit tests for secret resolution, persistence, rotation, and
legacy-key decryption (97 tests pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Socket.IO /terminal namespace validated the JWT but discarded the
role, so a read-only viewer (403'd on every REST write) could connect
and open an interactive SSH shell on any managed device using the
device's stored router-admin credentials — a full bypass of the role
model (reported CVSS 9.6).
- Gate the namespace handshake by role: only admin/operator may connect;
viewers are rejected with "Console access denied for this role".
- Re-check the role at the start handler (defense in depth) and attach
the verified payload to socket.data.
- Audit-log terminal session opens (and rate-limit hits) to audit_log.
- Rate-limit shell starts per user (5 / 60s, in-memory sliding window).
- Frontend: gate the Terminal button (DeviceDetailPage) and dashboard
"Open terminal" quick action behind canWrite so viewers don't see it.
Validated on the local docker stack: viewer rejected from /terminal,
admin still connects; viewer remains 403 on POST /api/devices.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Firmware actions on the device Config tab (check/install RouterOS,
check/install RouterBOOT) and Firmware-page actions now invalidate the
shared react-query caches on success — devices list, device header,
firmware overview, dashboard "Things to handle", and Security Center
findings. Previously they only updated local component state, so other
screens showed stale "update available" data for up to 30s until their
own background refetch fired, even though the backend had already
persisted the new state.
Browser-verified: after a firmware check on the Config tab, /api/devices
refetches within the same second (sidebar observer) and the Devices page
fetches fresh data on mount; both screens agree immediately.
- New GET /api/firmware/changelog/:version proxies MikroTik's official
per-version release notes (download.mikrotik.com/routeros/<ver>/CHANGELOG)
with strict version validation and process-lifetime caching
- ChangelogModal: "What's new in X.Y.Z" on the device Config tab's
update box and on the Firmware page's latest-version cells opens the
changelog in-app, with an external mikrotik.com link and graceful
fallback when the CDN is unreachable
- Security posture: a pending RouterOS update is now a medium-severity
finding and a pending RouterBOOT upgrade a low-severity one; titles
are version-free so Common Findings aggregates the fleet into one row
- chore(deps): npm audit fix bumps morgan (GHSA-4vj7-5mj6-jm8m); both
workspaces audit clean
Validation: backend tsc/lint/92 tests, frontend tsc/lint/build/11 tests,
endpoint tested (valid/invalid/unknown versions), browser-verified on
Firmware page, device Config tab, Security Center, and device Security
tab; security review of the diff found no findings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
UI/UX consolidation pass to reduce nav sprawl (~24 destinations -> ~17):
- Merge Router Settings + Switch Settings (copy-paste duplicates) into one
Network Services > Discovery & SNMP page with an All/Routers/Switches
scope selector; LLDP + SNMP status tables merge both fleets with a
type pill, apply fans out per scope
- Retire Routers/Switches overview pages; the Devices type filter now
lives in the URL (?type=AP|SW|RTR) and legacy routes redirect to the
pre-filtered view. Wireless overview kept (RF Health / Rogue APs are
unique content)
- Fold Wireless Clients into Clients: All/Wired/Wireless segmented
filter (URL-synced); wireless view swaps the Type column for SSID +
signal quality columns
- Regroup sidebar into Monitor / Network / Services / Operations
sections; Devices and Wireless are collapsible groups (auto-open on
active section, manual collapse always wins); Wireless group renders
only when wireless APs exist
- Rename Syslog -> Logging with a cross-link to live Events; group the
Settings tabs into Platform / My Account / Fleet sections
- Legacy routes (/routers, /switches, /routers/settings,
/switches/settings, /wireless/clients) redirect so bookmarks keep
working
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guest WiFi (Hotspot): one-click captive-portal wizard that creates the guest
SSID (virtual AP per radio), VLAN/bridge segregation + L3 VLAN interface, pool,
DHCP, portal, rate-limited guest profile, and masquerade; vouchers with limits +
printable sheets; live guest sessions; walled garden.
Network intelligence: per-client device fingerprinting (vendor/hostname →
category) with a persisted per-client override on the detail page; rogue/neighbor
AP detection from stored AP scans (evil-twin flagging); Mist-style anomaly
insights (client-count/CPU vs same-hour 14-day baseline + error bursts) in the
Operations engine.
Firmware orchestration: staged wave-based RouterOS rollouts (canary first) with
pre-upgrade backup, reboot-ride-out, version verification, halt-on-failure, and
scheduling; live per-device progress + cancel.
Platform & automation: scoped API tokens (mtm_, read/write, hashed at rest,
Bearer auth in requireAuth); outbound webhooks (12 events, HMAC-signed) fired
from the alert pipeline + firmware orchestrator; scheduled email reports.
api-ssl: RouterOSClient negotiates TLS on port 8729 and accepts RouterOS's
default self-signed certs (rejectUnauthorized:false), so SSL-secured API devices
connect without manual cert trust. Fixes#57.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Global search:
- Clicking/Enter on a client result now opens that client's detail page
(/clients/<mac>) instead of dumping to the clients list.
Operations dashboard (new backend route /api/operations):
- GET /insights: server-side attention engine (offline, updates, CPU/memory
pressure, missing backups, recent outages, weak WiFi clients, co-channel
overlap, high TX retries, error events) + per-device capacity + merged
activity feed (config changes, audit actions, alerts; login noise filtered).
- POST /backup-all and /sync-all: fleet-wide actions over online devices.
- Quick Actions now execute: Run discovery, Backup all, Sync config, and
Open terminal (device picker -> live SSH TerminalModal); inline status.
- New cards: Capacity & health meters, Security posture rollup (reuses
per-device posture, cached), Recent activity feed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wireless RF Health (fleet Wireless page + per-AP Radios tab):
- Channel usage map across 2.4/5/6 GHz with co-channel overlap; operating
channel resolved live from /interface/wifi/monitor on the wifi package
(auto-channel radios report no frequency in /print).
- AP deployment density: client RSSI distribution on the -90..-30 dBm scale
with a coverage-gap warning.
- AP radio TX retries histogram (0%->35%+) with band selector, derived from
per-client CCQ (new wireless_radio_quality InfluxDB series).
- WiFi connectivity success funnel (Association/Auth/DHCP) derived from logs.
Per-port connected clients (Ports tab):
- New card lists clients physically connected to a selected port (host/MAC/
IP/VLAN/connection time, linked to client pages).
- Distinguishes physical clients from the raw MAC table: uplink/trunk ports
are auto-detected (topology neighbor, multi-VLAN MAC spread, or high MAC
count) and show an uplink explainer + "view MAC table" disclosure instead
of every reachable MAC.
- Added clients.first_seen ("connected since"); set once, preserved across polls.
Clients:
- Replace Previous/Next buttons with a "Show N entries" dropdown
(25/50/100/200, persisted to localStorage) and numbered page selection
with prev/next chevrons and ellipses for long ranges.
Syslog (Network Services):
- Drop the Single Device / All Devices mode toggle; always show the
fleet-aggregated view with coverage badges.
- Add a per-section device dropdown + "Add to device" button beside
"Add to All Devices" for targeting a single device (direct save).
- Edit / enable-disable / remove remain coverage-scoped, so single-device
management is preserved without the separate mode.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Traffic by Application: donut + legend side-by-side, larger donut with
center total label, percentage in tooltip; card now sizes to its content
- New Inbound Packets area chart below the throughput chart (packets field
now summed per direction in /traffic/timeseries)
- New Flow Sources & Data Health card: collector listening state, packets
received, flows attributed, attribution rate, per-exporter flow/packet
counts and last-seen; low-attribution hint for NAT-in-path exporters
- /traffic/apps now returns per-app packets alongside bytes
- Restructured bottom row: Top Talkers (left) | Application + Data Health
stacked (right) for alignment
- Tightened Top Talkers row spacing
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
UI/UX refinements on top of v0.14.0-beta, all validated on the test server:
- Logo: new theme-aware compass iconmark (light/dark SVGs swapped via the
dark class), sized to 45px; favicon updated to match. Wordmark casing
corrected to "MikroTik Manager" (font size unchanged).
- Navigation icons enlarged 15 -> 17px.
- Dashboard: "Connected clients" line chart converted to a bar chart with a
category axis + light downsampling so bars stay readably thick across ranges.
- Clients: sorting is now server-side across the whole dataset (was sorting
only the current page, so Type/others appeared to do nothing on a uniform
page); table uses a fixed column layout + keepPreviousData so columns no
longer jump or blank out when sorting/paging. Backend clients route gains
whitelisted sort/dir params (safe numeric IP sort, deterministic tiebreaker).
- Connections tab: surfaces the live /ip/firewall/connection/tracking state
(on/auto/off pill) and clearer empty-state copy explaining auto-mode.
Lint/typecheck/build/jest green in both workspaces; npm audit --audit-level=high
clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A dedicated top-level Security section plus a Meraki/UniFi-grade firewall built
on the full RouterOS feature set.
Security Center (new /security page)
- Fleet hardening scores, per-device posture list, and a "Common Findings"
rollup aggregating identical issues across the fleet
- "Manage" deep-links into the device's Security tab (?tab= support added)
Firewall & NAT (per device + in Security Center)
- Friendly rule builder: Allow/Drop/Reject chips, Any/Address/Address-List
pickers, port presets, connection-state chips, logging, live plain-English
preview
- Address lists as reusable objects, referenced from rules
- Rule reordering (/ip/firewall/{filter,nat}/move); per-rule hit counters
(print stats) with dead-rule highlighting + reset
- NAT wizards: Port Forward / Masquerade / 1:1 NAT + Custom
- Safe-apply lockout guard: backend 409 on an unscoped input drop/reject that
would sever management; UI confirms before forcing (detectLockoutRisk, tested)
Access & security
- Security posture audit: graduated, de-duplicated scoring that never proposes
disabling the management service the platform connects through (no self-
lockout); switch-aware input-firewall severity; service hardening table
- Bandwidth: simple-queue CRUD + one-click "Limit this client" on client detail
- Active connections viewer
These L3 features are available on all managed RouterOS devices (routers,
switches, APs), not gated by device type.
Backend: DeviceCollector address-list/move/stats/connections/queues/service
methods; device routes for all of the above; firewallSafety + firewallSummary
utils with unit tests (19 new).
Security: bump nodemailer 8 -> 9.0.1 to clear GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f (our
createTransport/sendMail usage is unaffected by the advisory's raw-option path).
Verified live against RouterOS devices; lint/typecheck/build/jest green in both
workspaces; npm audit --audit-level=high clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI Security Audit (npm audit --audit-level=high) was failing. Resolved all
high-severity advisories via non-breaking transitive bumps (npm audit fix,
no --force, no direct-dependency or source changes):
- frontend: form-data, ws (via socket.io-client), @babel/core,
react-router-dom, js-yaml — now 0 vulnerabilities
- backend: form-data, ws (via socket.io) — 0 high-severity remaining
Only package-lock.json files changed plus the version bump. Verified both
workspaces: npm ci, lint, type-check, build, and backend jest (73 tests)
all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two per-client usage charts exposed different time windows: "Wireless
Usage" offered 2h/24h/7d while "App Traffic (NetFlow)" offered 1h/24h/7d/30d.
Worse, selecting 1h (or any range with no flows in window) made the whole
App Traffic card unmount — including its range buttons, so it couldn't be
recovered without reloading.
- AppTrafficCard now uses 2h/24h/7d (default 24h), matching Wireless Usage
- Card visibility latches on first non-empty result, so switching to an
empty range shows an inline "No traffic data yet for this range" state
instead of unmounting the card (latch derived via guarded setState in
render — no effect)
- Backend /api/traffic/* now accepts the '2h' range (rangeToFlux +
windowForRange: 2h -> 2m buckets); previously '2h' silently fell back to 24h
Verified in the live stack with Playwright: ranges render as 2h/24h/7d (no
1h/30d), and clicking 2h on a client with data only outside the 2h window
keeps the card mounted with an empty-state and recovers on switching back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Dashboard "Top talkers" card and the Traffic page previously used
different data sources: the card ranked clients by device-reported
since-connection byte counters (wireless-centric, reset on reconnect, no
time window), while the Traffic page uses NetFlow-measured bytes.
The card now prefers the NetFlow top-clients data (last 24h — identical
numbers to the Traffic page) and falls back to the legacy counters only
when the collector has no data, with the source labeled in the card
header ("by bytes · 24h" vs "since connection"). Rows now click through
to the client detail page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Configuration History:
- Per-device snapshots from the full RouterOS /export (.rsc) — config-only, so
counters/operational state no longer cause phantom changes; deduped by content hash
- New Config History tab: snapshot timeline, readable line diff, on-demand Capture
(with honest 'no changes' feedback), one-click rollback via the linked .rsc backup
- Snapshot and its backup are one artifact: badged 'Config Snapshot' on the Backups
page, FK ON DELETE CASCADE keeps them in lockstep; delete is gated by a warning modal
- New config_drift alert event (off by default); periodic snapshot poll with
configurable cadence/retention (config_snapshot_interval_min/_retention)
- New endpoints under /api/config-history (list/get/diff/capture/rollback/delete)
Scheduled Backups:
- Replaced the raw cron textbox in Settings with Frequency (Daily/Weekly/Monthly)
+ time + day pickers; cron is generated/parsed behind the scenes
- Fixed cronMatchesNow to evaluate day-of-month/month/day-of-week (it previously
only checked minute/hour, so weekly/monthly schedules ran every day)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: backend filtered switches by status='online', so a mid-poll-cycle
device (briefly 'unknown') caused the endpoint to return [] — and the frontend
rendered nothing when the array was empty.
- Backend: query ALL switch devices (not just online ones); unreachable devices
already fall through to the Promise.allSettled error path and render with an
error badge, so no data is lost
- Frontend: replace silent `length > 0 &&` guard with a three-way ternary that
shows a "No managed switches found" message when the array is empty, so the
user always sees feedback instead of a blank section
- Frontend: add staleTime: 60_000 to the SNMP query to prevent the hair-trigger
background refetch that raced with the poller on every navigation
Backend: GET /api/system/version-check fetches frontend/package.json from
the main branch on GitHub, caches result in app_settings for 24 hours,
and compares semver against the running version. Fails silently (no banner)
for air-gapped or firewalled deployments.
Frontend: dismissible blue update banner in SecurityBanners (rendered
between TopBar and main content) — only visible when a newer version is
detected. Shows target version and docker compose update command.
- Packet capture: RouterOS sniffer + SFTP download to PCAP for Wireshark analysis
- Bandwidth test: RouterOS /tool/bandwidth-test with TX/RX Mbps result display
- Both exposed in the Tools tab on device detail pages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2GT-RichandClaude Opus 5
dependabot[bot]