fix(security): self-healing secrets + auth/SSRF/header hardening (v0.16.10-beta)

Follow-up to the /terminal authorization fix: a full-codebase security
review surfaced several more issues, fixed here. All changes are designed
to roll out with no interruption to existing deployments — no forced
migration, no manual re-key, no boot failure.

Self-healing secret management (utils/secrets.ts):
- JWT_SECRET / ENCRYPTION_KEY auto-generate to strong values on first boot
  and persist to the app_data volume (0600, outside the DB) when not set
  to a strong value in the environment. Replaces the prior behavior of
  running on the public repo defaults.
- decrypt() tries the current key plus every legacy/default key, so
  existing device credentials keep decrypting after a key change; a
  startup sweep re-encrypts stale rows forward (db/reencryptCredentials.ts).
- verifyToken() accepts the current signing secret plus prior *strong*
  secrets (never the public defaults), so rotation doesn't invalidate live
  sessions; sessions signed with a default secret require one re-login.
- Dockerfile pre-creates /app/data as the app user so the non-root
  process can persist to a fresh named volume; app_data volume added to
  both compose files; compose secret defaults changed to empty (auto-gen).

Authorization / input:
- Default Socket.IO namespace now requires a valid JWT (was unauthenticated
  and broadcasting fleet-activity events); frontend sends the token and
  drops the shared socket on logout.
- Webhook delivery blocks SSRF to loopback/private/link-local/CGNAT ranges
  and pins the request to the validated IP (WebhookService.ts).
- Rate limit added to /auth/totp/verify; global mutation backstop on /api.
- Password policy (>=10 chars, letter+digit) enforced on set/change/create.
- system.ts used verifyToken as middleware (always 500); now requireAuth.

Hardening:
- CSP + HSTS/nosniff/frame-deny headers in nginx, scoped to allow the
  OpenStreetMap tile/geocoding hosts the maps use.

Docs/tests:
- README secret section rewritten for the self-healing model.
- New unit tests for secret resolution, persistence, rotation, and
  legacy-key decryption (97 tests pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 A self-hosted, full-stack network management platform for MikroTik devices. Monitor, configure, and manage your entire MikroTik infrastructure — routers, switches, and wireless access points — from a single web interface.
 
-![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-0.16.8_Beta-blue)
+![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-0.16.10_Beta-blue)
 ![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-AGPLv3-blue)
 ![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/docker-compose-2496ED?logo=docker&logoColor=white)
 ![TypeScript](https://img.shields.io/badge/TypeScript-5.3-3178C6?logo=typescript&logoColor=white)
@@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ All configuration is done via environment variables in `.env`:
 
 | Variable | Default | Description |
 |---|---|---|
-| `JWT_SECRET` | `changeme_use_a_long_random_secret_at_least_32_chars` | Secret for signing JWT tokens. **Change this.** |
+| `JWT_SECRET` | *(auto-generated & persisted if unset)* | Secret for signing JWT tokens. Leave unset to have a strong one generated on first boot; set it to pin your own value. |
-| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | `changeme32byteslongencryptionkey` | 32-character key for encrypting device passwords at rest. **Change this.** |
+| `ENCRYPTION_KEY` | *(auto-generated & persisted if unset)* | Key for encrypting device passwords at rest. Leave unset to auto-generate; set it to pin your own value. |
 | `CORS_ORIGIN` | *(localhost defaults set by Docker Compose)* | Comma-separated list of browser origins allowed to call the API (e.g. `https://manager.example.com`). **Required in production** — set this to your domain. |
 | `DB_PASSWORD` | `mikrotik_secure_pw` | PostgreSQL password |
 | `INFLUXDB_TOKEN` | `mytoken123456789` | InfluxDB admin token |
@@ -459,18 +459,16 @@ All configuration is done via environment variables in `.env`:
 | `HTTP_PORT` | `80` | Host port for HTTP (redirects to HTTPS) |
 | `HTTPS_PORT` | `443` | Host port for HTTPS |
 
-### Credential encryption (`ENCRYPTION_KEY`)
+### Secret management (self-healing)
 
-Device API and SSH passwords stored in PostgreSQL are encrypted at rest using **AES-256-GCM** (`backend/src/utils/crypto.ts`). The key material comes from the **`ENCRYPTION_KEY` environment variable** (see table above). If the value is exactly 32 bytes long it is used as-is; otherwise the implementation derives a 32-byte key with SHA-256 (still driven by that env var).
+`JWT_SECRET` (session signing) and `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (AES-256-GCM credential encryption, `backend/src/utils/crypto.ts`) are managed automatically:
 
-**If the key is lost:** ciphertext cannot be decrypted; you must re-enter credentials on each device (or restore a database backup that was encrypted with the old key).
+- **If set to a strong value in the environment**, that value is used — you stay in control.
+- **If unset or left at an old default**, the backend generates a strong secret **once**, persists it to the `app_data` volume (`SECRETS_DIR`, default `/app/data`), and reuses it on every boot. Secrets live outside the database so a DB dump alone can't reveal the key protecting the credentials in it.
 
-**If the key is rotated (compromise or policy):** there is no automatic bulk re-encryption in the app today. Operational recovery is:
+Upgrades are non-breaking: on startup, existing ciphertext is decrypted via a **legacy-key fallback** (including previous defaults) and transparently **re-encrypted under the current key** by a background sweep. When rotating the JWT secret off a public default, sessions signed with that default are no longer accepted — users simply log in again once.
 
-1. Set a new `ENCRYPTION_KEY` and restart the backend.
+**Key rotation:** set a new `ENCRYPTION_KEY` (or delete the persisted secret to force regeneration) and restart. Old rows keep decrypting via the legacy fallback and are re-encrypted forward automatically. **If the persisted secret and any prior key are both lost**, ciphertext under that key cannot be recovered — re-enter device credentials or restore a backup.
-2. For each managed device, update API/SSH credentials via the UI (or API) so the server stores new ciphertext under the new key. Old rows still hold ciphertext from the previous key until updated.
-
-For a planned rotation with many devices, restore from backup or script updates against the API using plaintext passwords from your vault.
 
 ---
 

backend/Dockerfile

@@ -27,8 +27,10 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache arp-scan libcap openssl \
 # Copy built files
 COPY --from=builder /app/dist ./dist
 
-# Create backups directory
+# Create writable data directories. Pre-creating them (owned by appuser after
-RUN mkdir -p /app/backups
+# the chown below) means a fresh named volume mounted here inherits appuser
+# ownership, so the non-root process can persist backups and secrets.
+RUN mkdir -p /app/backups /app/data
 
 # Create non-root user
 RUN addgroup -S appgroup && adduser -S appuser -G appgroup

backend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mikrotik-manager-backend",
-  "version": "0.16.8-beta",
+  "version": "0.16.10-beta",
   "description": "Mikrotik Network Management Platform - Backend API",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "scripts": {

backend/src/db/reencryptCredentials.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/**
+ * One-shot forward migration of encrypted credentials.
+ *
+ * After a key rotation (including the automatic self-heal off a default key),
+ * existing ciphertext still decrypts via the legacy-key fallback in crypto.ts,
+ * but we want it re-encrypted under the current key so the legacy key can
+ * eventually be retired. This sweep decrypts any stale value and rewrites it.
+ * It is idempotent and best-effort — failures are logged, never fatal.
+ */
+import { query } from '../config/database';
+import { encrypt, decrypt, needsReencryption } from '../utils/crypto';
+
+interface EncryptedRow {
+  id: number;
+  api_password_encrypted: string | null;
+  ssh_password_encrypted: string | null;
+}
+
+const TABLES = ['devices', 'credential_presets'] as const;
+const COLUMNS = ['api_password_encrypted', 'ssh_password_encrypted'] as const;
+
+export async function reencryptStaleCredentials(): Promise<number> {
+  let rewritten = 0;
+
+  for (const table of TABLES) {
+    const rows = await query<EncryptedRow>(
+      `SELECT id, ${COLUMNS.join(', ')} FROM ${table}`
+    ).catch(() => [] as EncryptedRow[]);
+
+    for (const row of rows) {
+      const updates: Record<string, string> = {};
+      for (const col of COLUMNS) {
+        const value = row[col];
+        if (!value || !needsReencryption(value)) continue;
+        try {
+          updates[col] = encrypt(decrypt(value));
+        } catch {
+          // Can't decrypt with any known key — leave it untouched.
+        }
+      }
+      const keys = Object.keys(updates);
+      if (keys.length === 0) continue;
+
+      const sets = keys.map((k, i) => `${k} = $${i + 2}`).join(', ');
+      await query(
+        `UPDATE ${table} SET ${sets} WHERE id = $1`,
+        [row.id, ...keys.map((k) => updates[k])]
+      ).catch(() => {});
+      rewritten += keys.length;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (rewritten > 0) {
+    console.log(`[secrets] re-encrypted ${rewritten} credential value(s) under the current key`);
+  }
+  return rewritten;
+}

backend/src/index.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ import {
 } from './services/DeviceBulkAddWorker';
 import { netflowCollector } from './services/netflow/NetflowCollector';
 import { verifyToken, type AuthPayload } from './middleware/auth';
+import { rateLimitRedis } from './middleware/rateLimitRedis';
+import { initSecrets } from './utils/secrets';
+import { reencryptStaleCredentials } from './db/reencryptCredentials';
 import { decrypt } from './utils/crypto';
 import { corsMiddlewareOptions, socketIoCorsOptions } from './utils/corsOrigins';
 
@@ -59,6 +62,27 @@ import credentialPresetsRoutes from './routes/credentialPresets';
 import systemRoutes from './routes/system';
 import { auditMiddleware } from './middleware/auditMiddleware';
 
+// ─── Secret hygiene ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Self-healing: if JWT_SECRET / ENCRYPTION_KEY aren't set to strong values, we
+// auto-generate strong ones and persist them, so a deployment is never left on
+// the public repo defaults and never breaks on upgrade. See utils/secrets.ts.
+function provisionSecrets(): void {
+  const info = initSecrets();
+  const sourceLine = `secrets: jwt=${info.jwtSource}, encryption=${info.encSource}`;
+  if (info.jwtSource === 'generated' || info.encSource === 'generated') {
+    console.log(`[secrets] auto-generated strong secret(s) (${sourceLine})`);
+  } else {
+    console.log(`[secrets] ${sourceLine}`);
+  }
+  if (info.ephemeral) {
+    console.error(
+      '[secrets] WARNING: generated secrets could not be persisted (SECRETS_DIR not writable). ' +
+      'They will change on restart — users will be logged out and credentials written now may not ' +
+      'decrypt later. Mount a writable volume at SECRETS_DIR (default /app/data) or set JWT_SECRET/ENCRYPTION_KEY.'
+    );
+  }
+}
+
 const app = express();
 // nginx sits exactly one hop in front; trust its X-Forwarded-For so req.ip is the real client IP
 app.set('trust proxy', 1);
@@ -71,6 +95,19 @@ const io = new SocketServer(httpServer, {
   path: '/socket.io',
 });
 
+// The default namespace broadcasts fleet-activity events (device/client/event
+// updates); require a valid JWT so unauthenticated clients can't subscribe.
+io.use((socket, next) => {
+  const token = (socket.handshake.auth as { token?: string })?.token;
+  if (!token) return next(new Error('No token'));
+  try {
+    socket.data.user = verifyToken(token);
+    next();
+  } catch {
+    next(new Error('Invalid or expired token'));
+  }
+});
+
 io.on('connection', (socket) => {
   console.log(`Socket connected: ${socket.id}`);
   socket.on('disconnect', () => {
@@ -249,6 +286,10 @@ if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'test') {
 }
 app.use(auditMiddleware);
 
+// Global backstop rate limit on mutating API requests (per user, falling back to
+// per IP before auth runs). Endpoints with stricter needs add their own limiter.
+app.use('/api', rateLimitRedis({ windowSec: 60, max: 120, keyPrefix: 'api-global' }));
+
 // ─── Health Check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 app.get('/api/health', (_req, res) => {
   res.json({ status: 'ok', timestamp: new Date().toISOString() });
@@ -288,6 +329,8 @@ app.use(errorHandler);
 
 // ─── Startup ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 async function start(): Promise<void> {
+  provisionSecrets();
+
   // Wait for DB to be ready
   for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
     try {
@@ -303,6 +346,12 @@ async function start(): Promise<void> {
   // Run migrations
   await runMigrations();
 
+  // Migrate any credentials still encrypted under a legacy/default key forward
+  // to the current key (runs in the background; safe to skip on failure).
+  reencryptStaleCredentials().catch((e) =>
+    console.warn('[secrets] credential re-encryption sweep skipped:', (e as Error).message)
+  );
+
   // Reset vendor entries that were previously set to '' due to API rate-limiting,
   // so they get re-resolved by the new local OUI database.
   await query(`UPDATE clients SET vendor = NULL WHERE vendor = ''`).catch(() => {});

backend/src/middleware/auth.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
 import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import { createHash } from 'crypto';
 import { query } from '../config/database';
+import { jwtSigningSecret, jwtVerifierSecrets } from '../utils/secrets';
 
 export interface AuthPayload {
   userId: number;
@@ -20,14 +21,42 @@ declare global {
   }
 }
 
-const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'changeme';
-
 export function signToken(payload: AuthPayload): string {
-  return jwt.sign(payload, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '24h' });
+  return jwt.sign(payload, jwtSigningSecret(), { expiresIn: '24h' });
 }
 
 export function verifyToken(token: string): AuthPayload {
-  return jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET) as AuthPayload;
+  // Accept the current signing secret plus any prior strong secret, so a secret
+  // rotation doesn't invalidate sessions already issued under the previous one.
+  const secrets = jwtVerifierSecrets();
+  let lastErr: unknown;
+  for (const secret of secrets) {
+    try {
+      return jwt.verify(token, secret) as AuthPayload;
+    } catch (e) {
+      lastErr = e;
+    }
+  }
+  throw lastErr instanceof Error ? lastErr : new Error('invalid token');
+}
+
+/** Sign a short-lived token (e.g. the partial 2FA token) with the current secret. */
+export function signRawToken(payload: object, options: jwt.SignOptions): string {
+  return jwt.sign(payload, jwtSigningSecret(), options);
+}
+
+/** Verify a token that was signed with signRawToken, honoring rotated secrets. */
+export function verifyRawToken<T>(token: string): T {
+  const secrets = jwtVerifierSecrets();
+  let lastErr: unknown;
+  for (const secret of secrets) {
+    try {
+      return jwt.verify(token, secret) as T;
+    } catch (e) {
+      lastErr = e;
+    }
+  }
+  throw lastErr instanceof Error ? lastErr : new Error('invalid token');
 }
 
 // API tokens ("mtm_…") are hashed at rest; scope maps onto the existing role

backend/src/routes/auth.ts

@@ -2,18 +2,14 @@ import { Router, Request, Response } from 'express';
 import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
 import * as OTPAuth from 'otpauth';
 import * as qrcode from 'qrcode';
-import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
 import { query, queryOne } from '../config/database';
-import { signToken, requireAuth } from '../middleware/auth';
+import { signToken, signRawToken, verifyRawToken, requireAuth } from '../middleware/auth';
+import { getSecretsInfo } from '../utils/secrets';
 import { loginRateLimit, rateLimitRedis } from '../middleware/rateLimitRedis';
-
+import { validatePassword } from '../utils/passwordPolicy';
-const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'changeme';
 
 const router = Router();
 
-const DEFAULT_JWT_SECRET = 'changeme';
-const DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_KEY = 'defaultkey32byteslongencryptkey!';
-
 router.get(
   '/security-status',
   requireAuth,
@@ -21,11 +17,12 @@ router.get(
   async (_req: Request, res: Response) => {
     const warnings: string[] = [];
 
-    if (!process.env.JWT_SECRET || process.env.JWT_SECRET === DEFAULT_JWT_SECRET) {
+    // Secrets self-heal to strong auto-generated values, so the only remaining
-      warnings.push('jwt_secret_default');
+    // risk is an auto-generated secret that couldn't be persisted (it would
-    }
+    // churn on restart) — surface that rather than "default".
-    if (!process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY === DEFAULT_ENCRYPTION_KEY) {
+    const secrets = getSecretsInfo();
-      warnings.push('encryption_key_default');
+    if (secrets.ephemeral) {
+      warnings.push('secrets_not_persisted');
     }
 
     const adminUser = await queryOne<{ password_hash: string }>(
@@ -60,7 +57,7 @@ router.post('/login', loginRateLimit(), async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
   }
 
   if (user.totp_enabled) {
-    const totpToken = jwt.sign({ userId: user.id, partial: true }, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: '5m' });
+    const totpToken = signRawToken({ userId: user.id, partial: true }, { expiresIn: '5m' });
     return res.json({ requires_totp: true, totp_token: totpToken });
   }
 
@@ -69,14 +66,14 @@ router.post('/login', loginRateLimit(), async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
 });
 
 // Exchange partial TOTP token + code for a full session token
-router.post('/totp/verify', async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
+router.post('/totp/verify', rateLimitRedis({ windowSec: 60, max: 5, keyPrefix: 'totp-verify', allMethods: true }), async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
   const { totp_token, code } = req.body as { totp_token?: string; code?: string };
   if (!totp_token || !code) {
     return res.status(400).json({ error: 'totp_token and code are required' });
   }
   let payload: { userId: number; partial: boolean };
   try {
-    payload = jwt.verify(totp_token, JWT_SECRET) as typeof payload;
+    payload = verifyRawToken<{ userId: number; partial: boolean }>(totp_token);
   } catch {
     return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid or expired TOTP token' });
   }
@@ -178,6 +175,10 @@ router.put('/password', requireAuth, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
   if (!currentPassword || !newPassword) {
     return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Current and new password required' });
   }
+  const pwError = validatePassword(newPassword);
+  if (pwError) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: pwError });
+  }
 
   const user = await queryOne<{ id: number; password_hash: string }>(
     `SELECT id, password_hash FROM users WHERE id = $1`,

backend/src/routes/settings.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
 import { query, queryOne } from '../config/database';
 import { requireAuth, requireAdmin } from '../middleware/auth';
 import { netflowCollector } from '../services/netflow/NetflowCollector';
+import { validatePassword } from '../utils/passwordPolicy';
 
 const router = Router();
 router.use(requireAuth);
@@ -49,6 +50,10 @@ router.post('/users', requireAdmin, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
   if (!username || !password) {
     return res.status(400).json({ error: 'username and password required' });
   }
+  const pwError = validatePassword(password);
+  if (pwError) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: pwError });
+  }
   const validRoles = ['admin', 'operator', 'viewer'];
   if (!validRoles.includes(role)) {
     return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid role. Must be admin, operator, or viewer' });
@@ -94,8 +99,9 @@ router.put('/users/:id', requireAdmin, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
     await query(`UPDATE users SET role = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [role, userId]);
   }
   if (password) {
-    if (password.length < 6) {
+    const pwError = validatePassword(password);
-      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Password must be at least 6 characters' });
+    if (pwError) {
+      return res.status(400).json({ error: pwError });
     }
     const hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 12);
     await query(`UPDATE users SET password_hash = $1 WHERE id = $2`, [hash, userId]);

backend/src/routes/system.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import { Router } from 'express';
 import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
-import { verifyToken } from '../middleware/auth';
+import { requireAuth } from '../middleware/auth';
 import { query } from '../config/database';
 
 const router = Router();
-router.use(verifyToken);
+router.use(requireAuth);
 
 const CURRENT_VERSION = process.env.npm_package_version || '0.0.0';
 const RAW_URL = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/2GT-Media-Group-LLC/mikrotik-manager/main/frontend/package.json';

backend/src/services/WebhookService.ts

@@ -5,9 +5,63 @@
 import { createHmac } from 'crypto';
 import * as https from 'https';
 import * as http from 'http';
+import * as dns from 'dns';
+import { isIP } from 'net';
 import { URL } from 'url';
 import { query } from '../config/database';
 
+const dnsLookup = dns.promises.lookup;
+
+/**
+ * True if an IP literal is in a range we must never let a webhook reach —
+ * loopback, private, link-local (incl. cloud metadata 169.254.169.254), CGNAT,
+ * or unspecified. Guards against SSRF to internal services.
+ */
+export function isBlockedAddress(ip: string): boolean {
+  const v = isIP(ip);
+  if (v === 4) {
+    const o = ip.split('.').map(Number);
+    if (o.length !== 4 || o.some((n) => Number.isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return true;
+    const [a, b] = o;
+    if (a === 0 || a === 10 || a === 127) return true;               // this-net, private, loopback
+    if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;                          // link-local + metadata
+    if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;                 // private
+    if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;                         // private
+    if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true;               // CGNAT
+    if (a >= 224) return true;                                        // multicast/reserved/broadcast
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (v === 6) {
+    const lower = ip.toLowerCase();
+    if (lower === '::1' || lower === '::') return true;
+    // IPv4-mapped (::ffff:1.2.3.4) — validate the embedded IPv4
+    const mapped = lower.match(/::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$/);
+    if (mapped) return isBlockedAddress(mapped[1]);
+    const head = lower.split(':')[0];
+    if (head.startsWith('fe8') || head.startsWith('fe9') || head.startsWith('fea') || head.startsWith('feb')) return true; // fe80::/10
+    if (head.startsWith('fc') || head.startsWith('fd')) return true; // fc00::/7 unique-local
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true; // not a valid IP literal → refuse
+}
+
+async function assertPublicHost(hostname: string): Promise<string> {
+  // Already an IP literal — check directly.
+  if (isIP(hostname)) {
+    if (isBlockedAddress(hostname)) throw new Error('URL resolves to a blocked (private/internal) address');
+    return hostname;
+  }
+  const results = await dnsLookup(hostname, { all: true }).catch(() => {
+    throw new Error('Could not resolve webhook host');
+  });
+  if (results.length === 0) throw new Error('Could not resolve webhook host');
+  for (const r of results) {
+    if (isBlockedAddress(r.address)) throw new Error('URL resolves to a blocked (private/internal) address');
+  }
+  // Pin to the validated address so a re-resolve can't swap in an internal IP.
+  return results[0].address;
+}
+
 export const WEBHOOK_EVENTS = [
   'device_offline', 'device_online', 'log_error', 'log_warning',
   'high_cpu', 'high_memory', 'cert_expiry', 'device_discovered',
@@ -21,15 +75,30 @@ interface WebhookRow {
   events: string[]; enabled: boolean;
 }
 
-function postJson(urlStr: string, body: string, headers: Record<string, string>): Promise<number> {
+async function postJson(urlStr: string, body: string, headers: Record<string, string>): Promise<number> {
+  let u: URL;
+  try { u = new URL(urlStr); } catch { throw new Error('Invalid URL'); }
+  if (u.protocol !== 'http:' && u.protocol !== 'https:') throw new Error('URL must be http(s)');
+
+  const isHttps = u.protocol === 'https:';
+  const pinnedAddress = await assertPublicHost(u.hostname);
+  const port = u.port ? Number(u.port) : (isHttps ? 443 : 80);
+
   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    let u: URL;
+    const lib = isHttps ? https : http;
-    try { u = new URL(urlStr); } catch { reject(new Error('Invalid URL')); return; }
+    const req = lib.request({
-    if (u.protocol !== 'http:' && u.protocol !== 'https:') { reject(new Error('URL must be http(s)')); return; }
+      host: pinnedAddress,            // connect to the validated IP, not a re-resolved host
-    const lib = u.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+      port,
-    const req = lib.request(u, {
+      path: `${u.pathname}${u.search}`,
       method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body), ...headers },
+      // Preserve virtual-host routing and TLS cert validation against the real name.
+      servername: isHttps ? u.hostname : undefined,
+      headers: {
+        'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+        'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
+        Host: u.host,
+        ...headers,
+      },
       timeout: 10_000,
     }, (res) => {
       res.resume(); // drain

backend/src/utils/__tests__/secrets.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+import * as os from 'os';
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+import * as path from 'path';
+import * as nodeCrypto from 'crypto';
+
+// Reproduce ciphertext exactly as legacy code produced it under a given key.
+function legacyEncrypt(plain: string, material: string): string {
+  const key = material.length === 32
+    ? Buffer.from(material, 'utf8')
+    : nodeCrypto.createHash('sha256').update(material).digest();
+  const iv = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(16);
+  const cipher = nodeCrypto.createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv);
+  const enc = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plain, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+  return [iv.toString('hex'), cipher.getAuthTag().toString('hex'), enc.toString('hex')].join(':');
+}
+
+describe('self-healing secrets', () => {
+  const OLD_ENV = process.env;
+  let tmpDir: string;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.resetModules();
+    tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'mtm-secrets-'));
+    process.env = { ...OLD_ENV, SECRETS_DIR: tmpDir };
+    delete process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+    delete process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env = OLD_ENV;
+    fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('auto-generates and persists strong secrets when none are set', async () => {
+    const secrets = await import('../secrets');
+    const info = secrets.initSecrets();
+    expect(info.jwtSource).toBe('generated');
+    expect(info.encSource).toBe('generated');
+    expect(info.persisted).toBe(true);
+    expect(info.ephemeral).toBe(false);
+    expect(secrets.jwtSigningSecret().length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(32);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'secrets.json'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('reuses the persisted secret across reloads (stable across restarts)', async () => {
+    const first = await import('../secrets');
+    first.initSecrets();
+    const jwt1 = first.jwtSigningSecret();
+
+    jest.resetModules();
+    const second = await import('../secrets');
+    second.initSecrets();
+    expect(second.jwtSigningSecret()).toBe(jwt1);
+    expect(second.getSecretsInfo().jwtSource).toBe('persisted');
+  });
+
+  it('prefers a strong env secret over generating one', async () => {
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'a'.repeat(40);
+    const secrets = await import('../secrets');
+    const info = secrets.initSecrets();
+    expect(info.jwtSource).toBe('env');
+    expect(secrets.jwtSigningSecret()).toBe('a'.repeat(40));
+  });
+
+  it('never accepts a known-default JWT secret as strong', async () => {
+    process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'changeme_use_a_long_random_secret';
+    const secrets = await import('../secrets');
+    const info = secrets.initSecrets();
+    expect(info.jwtSource).toBe('generated');
+    expect(secrets.jwtVerifierSecrets()).not.toContain('changeme_use_a_long_random_secret');
+  });
+
+  it('decrypts ciphertext written under the old default key after self-heal', async () => {
+    // Legacy data on disk: encrypted under the old built-in default key.
+    const legacyCipher = legacyEncrypt('router-admin-pw', 'changeme32byteslongencryptionkey');
+
+    // Boot with no env key → auto-generate a new current key.
+    const crypto = await import('../crypto');
+    expect(crypto.decrypt(legacyCipher)).toBe('router-admin-pw');    // legacy fallback works
+    expect(crypto.needsReencryption(legacyCipher)).toBe(true);        // flagged for forward migration
+    expect(crypto.needsReencryption(crypto.encrypt('x'))).toBe(false); // current-key data is not
+  });
+});

backend/src/utils/crypto.ts

@@ -7,22 +7,13 @@
  * "Credential encryption (ENCRYPTION_KEY)".
  */
 import * as crypto from 'crypto';
+import { encryptionKey, decryptionKeys } from './secrets';
 
 const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
 const IV_LENGTH = 16;
-const TAG_LENGTH = 16;
-
-function getKey(): Buffer {
-  const key = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || 'defaultkey32byteslongencryptkey!';
-  // Ensure exactly 32 bytes via SHA-256 hash if needed
-  if (key.length === 32) {
-    return Buffer.from(key, 'utf8');
-  }
-  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(key).digest();
-}
 
 export function encrypt(text: string): string {
-  const key = getKey();
+  const key = encryptionKey();
   const iv = crypto.randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
   const cipher = crypto.createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
 
@@ -33,20 +24,45 @@ export function encrypt(text: string): string {
   return [iv.toString('hex'), tag.toString('hex'), encrypted.toString('hex')].join(':');
 }
 
+function decryptWith(key: Buffer, iv: Buffer, tag: Buffer, encrypted: Buffer): string {
+  const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+  return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(encrypted), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
+}
+
 export function decrypt(encryptedText: string): string {
-  const key = getKey();
   const parts = encryptedText.split(':');
   if (parts.length !== 3) {
     throw new Error('Invalid encrypted text format');
   }
-
   const iv = Buffer.from(parts[0], 'hex');
   const tag = Buffer.from(parts[1], 'hex');
   const encrypted = Buffer.from(parts[2], 'hex');
 
-  const decipher = crypto.createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
+  // Try the current key first, then every legacy key, so ciphertext written
-  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+  // under an older (or default) key keeps decrypting after a key rotation.
-
+  let lastErr: unknown;
-  const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(encrypted), decipher.final()]);
+  for (const key of decryptionKeys()) {
-  return decrypted.toString('utf8');
+    try {
+      return decryptWith(key, iv, tag, encrypted);
+    } catch (e) {
+      lastErr = e;
+    }
+  }
+  throw lastErr instanceof Error ? lastErr : new Error('Unable to decrypt');
+}
+
+/**
+ * True if the ciphertext does NOT decrypt under the current key (i.e. it was
+ * written with a legacy key and should be re-encrypted forward).
+ */
+export function needsReencryption(encryptedText: string): boolean {
+  const parts = encryptedText.split(':');
+  if (parts.length !== 3) return false;
+  try {
+    decryptWith(encryptionKey(), Buffer.from(parts[0], 'hex'), Buffer.from(parts[1], 'hex'), Buffer.from(parts[2], 'hex'));
+    return false;
+  } catch {
+    return true;
+  }
 }

backend/src/utils/passwordPolicy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/**
+ * Minimum password policy applied wherever a password is set or changed.
+ * Returns an error message if the password is unacceptable, or null if it's OK.
+ */
+export function validatePassword(password: unknown): string | null {
+  if (typeof password !== 'string') return 'Password must be a string';
+  if (password.length < 10) return 'Password must be at least 10 characters long';
+  if (password.length > 200) return 'Password must be at most 200 characters long';
+  if (!/[A-Za-z]/.test(password)) return 'Password must contain at least one letter';
+  if (!/[0-9]/.test(password)) return 'Password must contain at least one number';
+  return null;
+}

backend/src/utils/secrets.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/**
+ * Self-healing secret management for JWT signing and credential encryption.
+ *
+ * Goal: a deployment must never break on upgrade or require a manual migration.
+ *  - If JWT_SECRET / ENCRYPTION_KEY are set to strong values in the environment,
+ *    those win (operator stays in control).
+ *  - Otherwise (unset or a well-known repo default), we auto-generate a strong
+ *    secret ONCE and persist it to a file on a durable volume, reusing it on
+ *    every subsequent boot so it's stable (no session/credential churn).
+ *  - Old data keeps working: decryption tries the current key plus every legacy
+ *    key (including the old built-in defaults), and JWTs verify against the
+ *    current secret plus any prior *strong* secret. The public defaults are
+ *    never accepted as a JWT verifier — that would keep the forgery hole open.
+ *
+ * Secrets live outside the database (in SECRETS_DIR) so a DB dump alone can't
+ * reveal the key that protects the credentials stored in it.
+ */
+import * as crypto from 'crypto';
+import * as fs from 'fs';
+import * as path from 'path';
+
+// Publicly known defaults shipped in this repo / compose files.
+const KNOWN_DEFAULT_JWT = ['changeme', 'changeme_use_a_long_random_secret'];
+const KNOWN_DEFAULT_ENC = ['defaultkey32byteslongencryptkey!', 'changeme32byteslongencryptionkey'];
+
+interface PersistedSecrets {
+  jwtSecret?: string;
+  encryptionKey?: string;
+  prevJwtSecrets?: string[];
+  prevEncryptionKeys?: string[];
+}
+
+export interface SecretsInfo {
+  jwtSource: 'env' | 'persisted' | 'generated';
+  encSource: 'env' | 'persisted' | 'generated';
+  persisted: boolean;
+  /** True if a secret was generated but could NOT be persisted (won't survive restart). */
+  ephemeral: boolean;
+}
+
+interface ResolvedSecrets {
+  jwtCurrent: string;
+  jwtVerifiers: string[];
+  encCurrent: Buffer;
+  encDecryptors: Buffer[];
+  info: SecretsInfo;
+}
+
+let resolved: ResolvedSecrets | null = null;
+
+function isStrongJwt(v: string | undefined): v is string {
+  return !!v && !KNOWN_DEFAULT_JWT.includes(v) && v.length >= 32;
+}
+
+function deriveKey(material: string): Buffer {
+  return material.length === 32
+    ? Buffer.from(material, 'utf8')
+    : crypto.createHash('sha256').update(material).digest();
+}
+
+function dedupeKeys(materials: string[]): Buffer[] {
+  const seen = new Set<string>();
+  const out: Buffer[] = [];
+  for (const m of materials) {
+    if (!m) continue;
+    const key = deriveKey(m);
+    const h = key.toString('hex');
+    if (seen.has(h)) continue;
+    seen.add(h);
+    out.push(key);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function secretsDir(): string {
+  return process.env.SECRETS_DIR || '/app/data';
+}
+
+function secretsFile(): string {
+  return path.join(secretsDir(), 'secrets.json');
+}
+
+function loadPersisted(): PersistedSecrets {
+  try {
+    const raw = fs.readFileSync(secretsFile(), 'utf8');
+    return JSON.parse(raw) as PersistedSecrets;
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+
+/** Persist secrets with owner-only permissions. Returns whether it succeeded. */
+function savePersisted(p: PersistedSecrets): boolean {
+  try {
+    const dir = secretsDir();
+    fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    const file = secretsFile();
+    fs.writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify(p, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
+    try { fs.chmodSync(file, 0o600); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+export function initSecrets(): SecretsInfo {
+  if (resolved) return resolved.info;
+
+  const persisted = loadPersisted();
+  const history: PersistedSecrets = {
+    prevJwtSecrets: persisted.prevJwtSecrets ? [...persisted.prevJwtSecrets] : [],
+    prevEncryptionKeys: persisted.prevEncryptionKeys ? [...persisted.prevEncryptionKeys] : [],
+  };
+
+  // ── JWT secret ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const envJwt = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+  let jwtCurrent: string;
+  let jwtSource: SecretsInfo['jwtSource'];
+  let generatedJwt = false;
+  if (isStrongJwt(envJwt)) {
+    jwtCurrent = envJwt;
+    jwtSource = 'env';
+  } else if (persisted.jwtSecret) {
+    jwtCurrent = persisted.jwtSecret;
+    jwtSource = 'persisted';
+  } else {
+    jwtCurrent = crypto.randomBytes(48).toString('base64url');
+    jwtSource = 'generated';
+    generatedJwt = true;
+  }
+  // Verifiers: current + any prior *strong* secrets (never the public defaults).
+  const jwtVerifiers = [
+    jwtCurrent,
+    ...(persisted.jwtSecret ? [persisted.jwtSecret] : []),
+    ...(history.prevJwtSecrets || []),
+  ].filter((v, i, a) => isStrongJwt(v) && a.indexOf(v) === i);
+
+  // ── Encryption key ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const envEnc = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY;
+  let encMaterial: string;
+  let encSource: SecretsInfo['encSource'];
+  let generatedEnc = false;
+  if (envEnc && !KNOWN_DEFAULT_ENC.includes(envEnc)) {
+    encMaterial = envEnc;
+    encSource = 'env';
+  } else if (persisted.encryptionKey) {
+    encMaterial = persisted.encryptionKey;
+    encSource = 'persisted';
+  } else {
+    encMaterial = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex'); // 32 chars, used verbatim
+    encSource = 'generated';
+    generatedEnc = true;
+  }
+  // Decryptors: current + prior keys + the known defaults, so any legacy
+  // ciphertext still decrypts. Legacy defaults for decrypt-only are safe.
+  const encDecryptors = dedupeKeys([
+    encMaterial,
+    ...(persisted.encryptionKey ? [persisted.encryptionKey] : []),
+    ...(history.prevEncryptionKeys || []),
+    ...KNOWN_DEFAULT_ENC,
+  ]);
+
+  // ── Persist auto-managed secrets so they're stable across restarts ───────────
+  let persistedOk = true;
+  if (generatedJwt || generatedEnc) {
+    // Record any superseded auto-managed secret in history for continuity.
+    if (persisted.jwtSecret && persisted.jwtSecret !== jwtCurrent && isStrongJwt(persisted.jwtSecret)) {
+      history.prevJwtSecrets = [...new Set([...(history.prevJwtSecrets || []), persisted.jwtSecret])];
+    }
+    if (persisted.encryptionKey && persisted.encryptionKey !== encMaterial) {
+      history.prevEncryptionKeys = [...new Set([...(history.prevEncryptionKeys || []), persisted.encryptionKey])];
+    }
+    const toSave: PersistedSecrets = {
+      // Only store secrets we manage ourselves — never write an env-provided secret to disk.
+      jwtSecret: jwtSource === 'env' ? persisted.jwtSecret : jwtCurrent,
+      encryptionKey: encSource === 'env' ? persisted.encryptionKey : encMaterial,
+      prevJwtSecrets: history.prevJwtSecrets,
+      prevEncryptionKeys: history.prevEncryptionKeys,
+    };
+    persistedOk = savePersisted(toSave);
+  }
+
+  const info: SecretsInfo = {
+    jwtSource,
+    encSource,
+    persisted: persistedOk,
+    ephemeral: (generatedJwt || generatedEnc) && !persistedOk,
+  };
+
+  resolved = {
+    jwtCurrent,
+    jwtVerifiers,
+    encCurrent: deriveKey(encMaterial),
+    encDecryptors,
+    info,
+  };
+  return info;
+}
+
+function ensure(): ResolvedSecrets {
+  if (!resolved) initSecrets();
+  return resolved!;
+}
+
+/** Current secret used to SIGN new JWTs. */
+export function jwtSigningSecret(): string {
+  return ensure().jwtCurrent;
+}
+
+/** Secrets a JWT may be verified against (current + prior strong secrets). */
+export function jwtVerifierSecrets(): string[] {
+  return ensure().jwtVerifiers;
+}
+
+/** Current key used to ENCRYPT new data. */
+export function encryptionKey(): Buffer {
+  return ensure().encCurrent;
+}
+
+/** All keys a ciphertext may be decrypted with (current + legacy). */
+export function decryptionKeys(): Buffer[] {
+  return ensure().encDecryptors;
+}
+
+export function getSecretsInfo(): SecretsInfo {
+  return ensure().info;
+}
+
+/** Test seam: forget resolved secrets so the next call re-reads env/disk. */
+export function _resetSecretsForTest(): void {
+  resolved = null;
+}

docker-compose.ghcr.yml

@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ services:
       INFLUXDB_TOKEN: ${INFLUXDB_TOKEN:-mytoken123456789}
       INFLUXDB_ORG: ${INFLUXDB_ORG:-mikrotik-manager}
       INFLUXDB_BUCKET: ${INFLUXDB_BUCKET:-metrics}
-      JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-changeme_use_a_long_random_secret}
+      # Leave unset to auto-generate & persist strong secrets on first boot
-      ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-changeme32byteslongencryptionkey}
+      # (stored in the app_data volume). Set them to pin your own values.
+      JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-}
+      ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
       CORS_ORIGIN: ${CORS_ORIGIN:-https://localhost,http://localhost,https://127.0.0.1,http://127.0.0.1}
       PORT: 3001
     depends_on:
@@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ services:
     volumes:
       - backups_data:/app/backups
       - certs_data:/certs
+      - app_data:/app/data
     cap_add:
       - NET_RAW
     restart: unless-stopped
@@ -114,6 +117,7 @@ volumes:
   influxdb_data:
   backups_data:
   certs_data:
+  app_data:
 
 networks:
   app-network:

docker-compose.yml

@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ services:
       INFLUXDB_TOKEN: ${INFLUXDB_TOKEN:-mytoken123456789}
       INFLUXDB_ORG: ${INFLUXDB_ORG:-mikrotik-manager}
       INFLUXDB_BUCKET: ${INFLUXDB_BUCKET:-metrics}
-      JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-changeme_use_a_long_random_secret}
+      # Leave unset to auto-generate & persist strong secrets on first boot
-      ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-changeme32byteslongencryptionkey}
+      # (stored in the app_data volume). Set them to pin your own values.
+      JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-}
+      ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
       CORS_ORIGIN: ${CORS_ORIGIN:-https://localhost,http://localhost,https://127.0.0.1,http://127.0.0.1}
       PORT: 3001
       NETFLOW_BIND_PORT: 2055
@@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ services:
     volumes:
       - backups_data:/app/backups
       - certs_data:/certs
+      - app_data:/app/data
     cap_add:
       - NET_RAW
     restart: unless-stopped
@@ -121,6 +124,7 @@ volumes:
   influxdb_data:
   backups_data:
   certs_data:
+  app_data:
 
 networks:
   app-network:

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "mikrotik-manager-frontend",
-  "version": "0.16.8-beta",
+  "version": "0.16.10-beta",
   "private": true,
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {

frontend/src/hooks/useSocket.ts

@@ -16,11 +16,19 @@ export function useSocket(
   useLayoutEffect(() => { eventsRef.current = events; });
 
   useEffect(() => {
-    if (!isAuthenticated) return;
+    if (!isAuthenticated) {
+      // Drop the shared socket on logout so a later login reconnects with a fresh token.
+      if (globalSocket) {
+        globalSocket.disconnect();
+        globalSocket = null;
+      }
+      return;
+    }
 
     if (!globalSocket) {
       globalSocket = io('/', {
         path: '/socket.io',
+        auth: { token: useAuthStore.getState().token },
         transports: ['websocket'],
         reconnection: true,
         reconnectionDelay: 2000,

frontend/src/version.ts

@@ -1 +1 @@
-export const APP_VERSION = 'v0.16.8 Beta';
+export const APP_VERSION = 'v0.16.10 Beta';

nginx/nginx.conf

@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ server {
     ssl_session_cache   shared:SSL:10m;
     ssl_session_timeout 1d;
 
+    # Security headers. CSP allows self, inline styles (React style props +
+    # runtime-injected stylesheets), data/blob images (QR codes), and the
+    # OpenStreetMap tile + Nominatim geocoding hosts the maps use.
+    add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://*.tile.openstreetmap.org; connect-src 'self' https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org; font-src 'self' data:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
+    add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
+    add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
+    add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
+    add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
+
     # Gzip compression
     gzip on;
     gzip_vary on;
@@ -56,10 +65,17 @@ server {
         proxy_read_timeout 86400;
     }
 
-    # React SPA - serve index.html for all non-API routes
+    # React SPA - serve index.html for all non-API routes.
+    # Security headers are repeated here because an add_header in a location
+    # block suppresses inheritance of the server-level ones.
     location / {
         try_files $uri $uri/ /index.html;
         add_header Cache-Control "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate";
+        add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://*.tile.openstreetmap.org; connect-src 'self' https://nominatim.openstreetmap.org; font-src 'self' data:; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; form-action 'self'" always;
+        add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
+        add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
+        add_header Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" always;
+        add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
     }
 
     # Cache static assets