feat(safety): Change Guard — device-side auto-revert for risky config changes (v0.18.0-beta)
A user change can sever the manager's own path to a device with no warning and no
way back. Most recently, deleting an *unused* bond on a switch took the whole
switch offline. This adds a safety net, and fixes the bug that caused that
specific incident.
Root cause of the bond incident (DeviceCollector.deleteBond):
- Slaves were re-added to the bridge ONLY when the bond itself was a bridge
member. For an unbridged bond the restore loop never ran, so the member ports
were released from the bond and left in no bridge at all — the ports stopped
forwarding and the switch dropped off the network.
- The restore in both deleteBond and createBond was wrapped in `.catch(() => {})`,
so a failed restore was swallowed and the route still returned 200 OK.
- Restores also dropped PVID, silently returning tagged ports to VLAN 1.
Now: port settings (PVID, frame-types, ingress-filtering, edge, horizon) are
captured and carried over, and restore failures are reported instead of hidden.
Change Guard (services/changeGuard/ChangeGuard.ts):
Before a risky change the device saves a restore point and arms a scheduler that
restores it after N seconds. The change is applied, then reachability is proven
on a NEW connection; success disarms the scheduler, failure leaves the device to
restore itself and come back. Because the restore point is created before the
scheduler, a binary restore rolls back to a config containing neither the
scheduler nor the change — self-cleaning, with no revert loop.
- Works entirely over the RouterOS API. This matters: every recovery artifact
today requires SSH, so devices without SSH credentials had no rollback target
at all (cf. #86).
- Modes: `binary` (exact restore incl. deleted interfaces, reboots) or `script`
(/import, no reboot but additive). Configurable via change_guard_* settings.
- Per-device Redis lock, `device_change_guards` audit table, and startup
reconciliation for guards left pending by a manager restart.
- Degrades gracefully: if protection can't be armed the change still runs and the
response says it was unprotected.
Wired into bond create/delete, bridge vlan-filtering, and /ip/service. Disabling
the service the manager is connected through is now refused outright (409) — the
mgmt-service signal already existed but was confined to the read-only posture
endpoint.
Also: replaces the bare confirm() on "Destroy Bond" with a ChangeGuardDialog that
explains the risk and the protection, and reports the outcome (including "the
device is restoring itself"). Fixes getAppSettings omitting
config_snapshot_enabled/interval, which made the v0.17.4 snapshot toggle a no-op.
Verified on real hardware (hAP-class switch): capability probe confirmed
/system/backup/save and scheduler add/remove work over the API; a guarded change
armed, applied, verified and committed leaving zero schedulers and zero files on
the device; disabling the api service was refused with 409. 133 backend tests
pass, including 7 guard state-machine tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
5895e905b7
commit
3a18cb1d91
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import { verifyToken, type AuthPayload } from './middleware/auth';
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import { rateLimitRedis } from './middleware/rateLimitRedis';
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import { initSecrets } from './utils/secrets';
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import { reencryptStaleCredentials } from './db/reencryptCredentials';
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import { reconcileStaleGuards } from './services/changeGuard/ChangeGuard';
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import { decrypt } from './utils/crypto';
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import { corsMiddlewareOptions, socketIoCorsOptions } from './utils/corsOrigins';
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@@ -354,6 +355,10 @@ async function start(): Promise<void> {
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console.warn('[secrets] credential re-encryption sweep skipped:', (e as Error).message)
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);
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// Guards left 'pending' belong to a manager that stopped mid-change; the device
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// has since restored itself, so settle those rows.
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reconcileStaleGuards().catch(() => {});
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// Reset vendor entries that were previously set to '' due to API rate-limiting,
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// so they get re-resolved by the new local OUI database.
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await query(`UPDATE clients SET vendor = NULL WHERE vendor = ''`).catch(() => {});
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