fix(security): enforce role auth on /terminal SSH namespace (v0.16.8-beta)
The Socket.IO /terminal namespace validated the JWT but discarded the role, so a read-only viewer (403'd on every REST write) could connect and open an interactive SSH shell on any managed device using the device's stored router-admin credentials — a full bypass of the role model (reported CVSS 9.6). - Gate the namespace handshake by role: only admin/operator may connect; viewers are rejected with "Console access denied for this role". - Re-check the role at the start handler (defense in depth) and attach the verified payload to socket.data. - Audit-log terminal session opens (and rate-limit hits) to audit_log. - Rate-limit shell starts per user (5 / 60s, in-memory sliding window). - Frontend: gate the Terminal button (DeviceDetailPage) and dashboard "Open terminal" quick action behind canWrite so viewers don't see it. Validated on the local docker stack: viewer rejected from /terminal, admin still connects; viewer remains 403 on POST /api/devices. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
79e97e14cc
commit
27560fa1d6
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "mikrotik-manager-backend",
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"version": "0.16.7-beta",
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"version": "0.16.8-beta",
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"description": "Mikrotik Network Management Platform - Backend API",
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"main": "dist/index.js",
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"scripts": {
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+50
-2
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import {
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stopBulkAddWorker,
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} from './services/DeviceBulkAddWorker';
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import { netflowCollector } from './services/netflow/NetflowCollector';
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import { verifyToken } from './middleware/auth';
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import { verifyToken, type AuthPayload } from './middleware/auth';
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import { decrypt } from './utils/crypto';
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import { corsMiddlewareOptions, socketIoCorsOptions } from './utils/corsOrigins';
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@@ -81,11 +81,46 @@ io.on('connection', (socket) => {
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// ─── SSH Terminal namespace ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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const terminalNs = io.of('/terminal');
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// Roles allowed to open an interactive device shell. The stored SSH account is
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// the router admin, so console access mirrors requireWrite: viewers are rejected.
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const TERMINAL_ROLES = new Set(['admin', 'operator']);
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// Per-user rate limit on shell starts (in-memory; sliding window).
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const TERMINAL_START_LIMIT = 5;
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const TERMINAL_START_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
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const terminalStartHistory = new Map<number, number[]>();
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function terminalStartAllowed(userId: number): boolean {
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const now = Date.now();
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const recent = (terminalStartHistory.get(userId) ?? []).filter(
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(t) => now - t < TERMINAL_START_WINDOW_MS
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);
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if (recent.length >= TERMINAL_START_LIMIT) {
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terminalStartHistory.set(userId, recent);
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return false;
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}
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recent.push(now);
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terminalStartHistory.set(userId, recent);
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return true;
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}
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function auditTerminal(user: AuthPayload, ip: string, summary: string, deviceId?: number): void {
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query(
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`INSERT INTO audit_log (user_id, username, method, path, entity_type, entity_id, summary, ip_address, status_code)
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VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9)`,
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[user.userId, user.username, 'SSH', '/terminal', 'device', deviceId ?? null, summary, ip, 200]
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).catch(() => {});
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}
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terminalNs.use((socket, next) => {
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const token = (socket.handshake.auth as { token?: string })?.token;
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if (!token) return next(new Error('No token'));
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try {
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verifyToken(token);
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const payload = verifyToken(token);
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if (!TERMINAL_ROLES.has(payload.role)) {
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return next(new Error('Console access denied for this role'));
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}
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socket.data.user = payload;
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next();
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} catch {
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next(new Error('Invalid or expired token'));
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@@ -95,10 +130,22 @@ terminalNs.use((socket, next) => {
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terminalNs.on('connection', (socket) => {
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let sshClient: SshClient | null = null;
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let shellStream: ClientChannel | null = null;
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const user = socket.data.user as AuthPayload;
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const clientIp = (socket.handshake.address ?? '').replace(/^::ffff:/, '');
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socket.on('start', async (payload: { deviceId: number; cols?: number; rows?: number }) => {
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const { deviceId, cols = 80, rows = 24 } = payload;
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try {
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// Defense in depth: re-check the connection's role at the sink, not just at handshake.
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if (!user || !TERMINAL_ROLES.has(user.role)) {
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socket.emit('error', 'Console access denied for this role');
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return;
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}
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if (!terminalStartAllowed(user.userId)) {
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auditTerminal(user, clientIp, `terminal start rate-limited for device ${deviceId}`, deviceId);
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socket.emit('error', 'Too many terminal sessions started. Please wait a moment and try again.');
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return;
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}
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const device = await queryOne<{
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ip_address: string;
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ssh_port: number | null;
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@@ -124,6 +171,7 @@ terminalNs.on('connection', (socket) => {
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(err, stream) => {
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if (err) { socket.emit('error', err.message); return; }
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shellStream = stream;
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auditTerminal(user, clientIp, `opened SSH shell on device ${deviceId} (${device.ip_address})`, deviceId);
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socket.emit('ready');
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stream.on('data', (data: Buffer) => {
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