feat(wireless): CAPsMAN awareness and read-only controller view (v0.22.0-beta)
Addresses #94, phases A and B. Write operations are deliberately out of scope. An access point provisioned by CAPsMAN holds none of its own wireless configuration, so /interface/wifi/print returns rows with the configuration.* and security.* fields absent. normalizeWifiInterface mapped nothing, stored nulls, and the UI rendered an AP with no SSID, security or band — indistinguishable from one that is simply broken. Phase A — stop showing blanks Devices are classified standalone / cap / controller / controller_cap from /interface/wifi/capsman and /interface/wifi/cap. Both toggles can be on: MikroTik supports a controller that also runs its own radios under itself, and the issue calls that case out, so it gets its own role. Provisioned interfaces are marked and labelled in the Radios tab with the controller's MAC and an explanation that the blank fields live on the controller. SSID, mode and channel are recovered from RouterOS's status line where present, so the AP is described rather than blank. Role is the signal, not missing data: an AP whose SSID is empty because the controller owns it looks identical to an unconfigured one, and only the toggle distinguishes them. A CAP can still hold locally-configured interfaces alongside provisioned ones, so per-interface state is checked rather than assuming the whole device. Phase B — read-only controller view Controllers now collect the radios they manage, named configurations, and provisioning rules, surfaced as a CAPsMAN panel on the Wireless page grouped by the access point each radio physically lives on. CAPs are matched to managed devices by radio MAC from the controller's own /interface/wifi/radio list, not by resolving addresses through neighbours as the issue proposed. A MAC is hardware identity and globally unique, so unlike an address it cannot mean two devices on two segments — the failure fixed in v0.20.1. A radio MAC often differs from the interface MAC in the final octet, so lookup falls back to a five-octet prefix while keeping the OUI exact. A CAP that is not a managed device is surfaced rather than hidden; that is usually the reason an AP appears to be missing from the fleet. The wireless section required device_type = 'wireless_ap' in five places, which hid a dedicated controller — normally classified as a router — from every wireless view. Collection was gated the same way. Both now include CAPsMAN roles, and the collector probes an unknown device once, records the role, and skips cheaply forever after. Not included Provisioning, config edits and interface enable/disable. A CAPsMAN configuration applies to every AP bound to it simultaneously, which is the fleet-wide version of the failure Change Guard exists to prevent. It needs the same prediction and revert treatment rather than being bolted on. Legacy /caps-man (pre-RouterOS 7) is a separate API tree and is not covered. Verified: API shapes probed against RouterOS 7.23 rather than taken from docs. 24 unit tests on the pure parsing and matching. No CAPsMAN hardware here, so the read path was exercised against a seeded controller with a local radio, a matched two-radio CAP and an unmanaged CAP; grouping, provisioning and SSID resolution all came out correct. Confirmed no regression on a fleet with no controller: roles detected correctly, no interface falsely flagged, wireless views unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude Opus 5
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A self-hosted, full-stack network management platform for MikroTik devices. Monitor, configure, and manage your entire MikroTik infrastructure — routers, switches, and wireless access points — from a single web interface.
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@@ -237,6 +237,31 @@ Configure under **Settings → Change Guard** (`change_guard_enabled`, `change_g
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- **WiFi connectivity success** funnel (Association / Authentication / DHCP) derived from device logs
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- **Rogue & neighbor AP detection** — cross-references stored AP-scan results against your own SSIDs and radio MACs. A foreign BSSID broadcasting one of *your* SSIDs is flagged as a **rogue / evil-twin** (and raised in Operations → Things to handle); everything else is a ranked neighbor-network inventory
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### CAPsMAN
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Access points provisioned centrally by CAPsMAN hold none of their own wireless configuration — the
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controller owns it — so reading an AP directly returns blank SSID, security and band. The platform
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now recognises that instead of showing an access point that looks broken:
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- **Role detection** — each device is classified as standalone, CAP, controller, or controller-with-
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local-radios (a supported MikroTik arrangement) from `/interface/wifi/capsman` and `/interface/wifi/cap`
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- **Provisioned interfaces are labelled** — a CAPsMAN badge on the Radios tab, and an explanation that
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the blank fields live on the controller, with the controller's MAC. SSID, mode and channel are
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recovered from RouterOS's status line where present
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- **CAPsMAN panel on the Wireless page** — every controller with the access points it provisions,
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grouped per AP: radios, hardware type, live channel, provisioned SSIDs with client counts, named
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configurations, and the provisioning rules that bind them
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- **CAPs are matched to managed devices by radio MAC**, taken from the controller's own
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`/interface/wifi/radio` list. A MAC is hardware identity and globally unique, so unlike an IP it
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cannot mean two devices on two segments. A CAP that is *not* in the fleet is surfaced rather than
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hidden, since that is usually why an AP appears to be missing
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- **Controllers are no longer excluded** — the wireless section previously required
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`device_type = 'wireless_ap'`, which hid a dedicated controller (normally classified as a router)
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**Read-only for now.** Editing a CAPsMAN configuration applies it to every access point bound to it
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at once, so provisioning and config edits are deliberately not exposed until they carry the same
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prediction-and-revert protection that device changes do. Legacy `/caps-man` (the pre-RouterOS 7
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controller) is a separate API tree and is not covered yet.
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### Guest WiFi (Hotspot)
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A one-click captive-portal guest network on RouterOS Hotspot, under **Wireless → Guest WiFi**:
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- **Guided setup wizard** — creates the whole guest network in one pass: a new **guest SSID** (a virtual AP on every physical radio), **VLAN segregation** (guest SSIDs tagged onto the bridge with an L3 VLAN interface for the portal — or a dedicated guest bridge when no VLAN is given), IP pool, DHCP, hotspot profile, portal server, a bandwidth-limited guest user profile, and an optional masquerade NAT rule. Idempotent, with honest warnings (e.g. bridge VLAN-filtering disabled). Can also target an existing interface.
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