# GTI Discovery

**Primeira leitura obrigatória, antes de qualquer missão fiscal nova**: `docs/PROJECT_STATE.md`
(versões Hub/Agent, migration head de cada branch, status do Reference Data Registry, decisões
ADMIN pendentes, o que já foi feito e o que falta, riscos abertos). Mantê-lo atualizado ao final
de cada missão que mude esse estado.

This project is strictly read-only. Discovery code must use a database-level
read-only account or transaction/driver mode; lexical SQL validation is only
defense-in-depth. Discovery code must not perform DML or DDL,
modify database objects or permissions, or store credentials and other secrets.

Run the offline tests with:

```text
# Suíte completa canônica (1160+ testes: raiz + Hub + Agent):
python -m pytest tests central/tests agent/tests -q

# Apenas testes unitários offline da raiz:
python -m pytest tests -q
```


## Firebird write policy

Default policy:
- All client/production Firebird databases are STRICTLY READ-ONLY.
- Never perform INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, DDL, permission changes, or destructive operations
  against any client/production ERP database unless explicitly authorized in a future policy change.

Explicit development exception:

The following database is a disposable TEST DATABASE and is explicitly authorized for writes:

```
D:\PROJETOS\GTISISTEMAS\Projeto\TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB
```

For this exact file only, the agent MAY perform:

- SELECT
- INSERT
- UPDATE
- DELETE
- DDL
- transactional tests
- rollback/recovery tests
- destructive development experiments when necessary

This database has external intact backups and can be restored.

Safety requirement:

Before ANY Firebird write, the code must verify that the canonical absolute database path is exactly:

```
D:\PROJETOS\GTISISTEMAS\Projeto\TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB
```

If the path differs in any way, writes must fail closed.

Never infer write authorization from filename alone.
Never enable writes to other Firebird databases.

Secrets:
- credentials remain local in ignored environment files;
- never log, commit, or expose passwords.

Development priority:
- TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB may be modified freely as needed to validate the MVP.
- Do not over-engineer rollback protections for this disposable test database unless they are part
  of the product behavior being validated.

## GTI Fiscal write-target rule

The SGV keeps its fiscal defaults in the canonical product record (`C000025`); every other routine consumes them.
GTI Fiscal therefore writes ONLY to the canonical product record, and only fields whose mapping is proven
(`docs/SGV_PRODUCT_FISCAL_UI_MAP_V1.json`, `write_target=true`). It never writes to NFCE, NFCE_ITENS, item tables,
issued documents or any other transactional/historical table; those are read-only evidence for validation.
Company context (UF, CRT) is read from `C000004` at run time — never hardcoded.

## Local completion mission — exact write allowlist (operator-authorized)

For the "GTI FISCAL LOCAL COMPLETION V1" mission the operator explicitly authorized writes to the disposable COPIES listed, by exact canonical path, in
`docs/LOCAL_WRITE_ALLOWLIST_V1.json` (CONSTRUCAO, MMMODAS, RINCAO, UNIAO under `Projeto\Banco\`, plus TESTESOFICIAIS.FDB). Authorization is by exact
path only — never by directory or `.FDB` extension. Any other Firebird under `D:\PROJETOS\GTISISTEMAS` stays strictly READ-ONLY. Writes go through the
guarded executor (path allowlist, company-context guard, schema/type/length guard, compare-before-write, rowcount, transaction, audit) and only to
`C000025` fields whose contract in `docs/FISCAL_FIELD_CONTRACT_V1.json` has `WRITE_ALLOWED=true`. This authorization does not extend to production or client databases.

## Production deploy rule (Hub)
Normal deploy = `powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\scripts\deploy_hub.ps1 [-PublishAgent -Version X]` (docs/DEPLOY_HUB.md). Do not recreate ad-hoc deploy scripts (deploy115.py etc.) and do not improvise SSH/docker against 10.0.10.117. The script handles VPN/SSH retry, backup, upload, migrations, rebuild, health, release publish, download verification, and automatic rollback; the real error is in `logs/last_deploy_result.json` and the log.

## Versioning (adopted standard, see docs/VERSIONING.md)

Hub and Agent are versioned and released independently — never assume they share a version
number, and never make the Hub's `GTI_FISCAL_VERSION` bump touch the Agent's own version files
(`agent/pyproject.toml`, the `AGENT_VERSION` defaults) or vice versa. The panel's "Atualização
disponível" already compares an Agent's reported version against the highest **PUBLISHED**
Windows `AgentRelease`, never against the Hub's version — see `docs/VERSIONING.md` for the exact
mechanism and the current (informal) compatibility matrix.

## Permanent mission rules (fiscal completion missions, recorded 2026-09-28)

- No AI/LLM/embeddings, no paid API, no scraping — every rule/decision is derived from real ERP
  evidence or an explicit, audited operator/ADMIN decision (`FiscalContextEntry`), never inferred
  or guessed.
- No Firebird triggers or schema changes, ever, for any discovery/completion mission. All queries
  against any Firebird database (client, lab copy, or disposable test DB) are read-only unless the
  exact path is on an explicit, mission-scoped write allowlist (see above) — writes still go only
  through the guarded executor.
- Deploy only via `scripts\deploy_hub.ps1` (see "Production deploy rule" above) — never ad-hoc
  SSH/docker/psql against 10.0.10.117.
- If the Agent (agent/) changes in a way that affects its runtime behavior: bump the single-source
  version, build a new installer, validate it in a fresh Windows Sandbox (install, upgrade in-place,
  identity preserved), and never overwrite an already-published release. A pure version-label sync
  bump (release/VERSION, pyproject.toml files, the `AGENT_VERSION` default string) that changes no
  Agent behavior is not itself an "Agent change" requiring a new installer.
- Never reenroll an existing installation (never mint a new `installation_id`/token for a machine
  that already has one) — an in-place upgrade always preserves identity and local SQLite state.
- No remote-execution channel to any client's Agent host, ever (by design — see
  `docs/rtc_auto_apply.md`). An Agent version upgrade on a real client machine is always performed
  by a human operator on-site; the assistant never attempts RDP/WinRM/SSH/PowerShell-remoting into
  a client host, and never asks for or accepts a production `AGENT_TOKEN`/admin session credential
  pasted in chat to work around that — live validation of a real installation, when needed, comes
  from the operator (a panel screenshot, or a value they read and paste themselves).
- No real client/production data (CNPJ, razão social, product names/descriptions, per-product NCM)
  is ever published in a location a non-admin can reach (e.g. `central/static/`). Any evidence
  artifact referenced from a UI card must either be served through an authenticated ADMIN-only
  route, or be anonymized (generic client labels, no names/documents/descriptions) before being
  published as a static file.