feat: RBAC for RTC write modes (Gerenciador ADMIN only, denials audited), central backpressure for heavy jobs (HEAVY_JOB_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT), concurrency simulation evidence

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
gti
2026-09-25 09:46:21 -03:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 7063c8c161
commit af5d9b4436
10 changed files with 274 additions and 13 deletions
+23 -5
View File
@@ -319,6 +319,16 @@ def router(session_factory):
return RedirectResponse(f"/agents/{agent_id}?tab=jobs", status_code=303)
finally: session.close()
def _is_privileged(admin) -> bool:
"""Who may change what the Agent is allowed to WRITE. The identity comes from the Gerenciador SSO (`perfil`): only ADMIN. LOCAL break-glass accounts are administrators by construction.
A normal (PADRAO) collaborator can look at the control page and use DISABLED/DRY_RUN (read-only) but cannot approve, enable, apply or roll back."""
return admin.auth_source == "LOCAL" or (admin.external_role or "").upper() == "ADMIN"
def _deny(session, admin, tenant_id, action, target):
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=tenant_id, action="RTC_DENIED", target_type="installation", target_id=target, context={"attempted": action, "role": admin.external_role or admin.auth_source}, severity="WARNING")
session.commit()
return HTMLResponse("Ação restrita a administradores do GTI Gerenciador (perfil ADMIN).", status_code=403)
def _rtc_target(session, agent_id):
agent = session.get(Agent, agent_id)
installation = session.scalar(select(Installation).where(Installation.agent_id == agent_id)) if agent else None
@@ -344,7 +354,7 @@ def router(session_factory):
audits = list(session.scalars(select(RtcWriteAudit).where(RtcWriteAudit.installation_id == installation.id, RtcWriteAudit.outcome.in_(("APPLIED", "ROLLED_BACK"))).order_by(RtcWriteAudit.id.desc()).limit(25)))
ops = _ops_view(session, installation, agent)
return render(request, "rtc_control.html", {"agent_id": agent_id, "installation": installation, "mode": installation.rtc_write_mode, "modes": RTC_MODE_LABELS, "explanation": RTC_MODE_EXPLANATION, "ops": ops,
"rows": rows, "counts": counts, "status": status, "page": page, "pages": max(1, -(-total // size)), "total": total, "audits": audits,
"privileged": _is_privileged(auth_data[1]), "rows": rows, "counts": counts, "status": status, "page": page, "pages": max(1, -(-total // size)), "total": total, "audits": audits,
"L": {"status": candidate_status_label, "outcome": audit_outcome_label, "reason": abort_reason_label, "rule": rtc_rule_label, "catalog": catalog_state_label}})
finally: session.close()
@@ -361,13 +371,17 @@ def router(session_factory):
mode = (values.get("mode") or "").strip().upper()
if mode not in RTC_MODE_LABELS:
return HTMLResponse("modo inválido", status_code=422)
if mode not in ("DISABLED", "DRY_RUN") and not _is_privileged(admin):
return _deny(session, admin, installation.tenant_id, f"rtc-mode:{mode}", installation.installation_id)
if installation.rtc_write_mode not in ("DISABLED", "DRY_RUN") and not _is_privileged(admin):
return _deny(session, admin, installation.tenant_id, f"rtc-mode:leave:{installation.rtc_write_mode}", installation.installation_id)
if mode == "ENABLED" and (values.get("confirm") or "").strip().upper() != "PREENCHER":
return HTMLResponse("Digite PREENCHER para confirmar o modo automático", status_code=422)
previous = installation.rtc_write_mode
installation.rtc_write_mode = mode
installation.rtc_auto_apply_authorized = mode == "ENABLED"
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=installation.tenant_id, action="RTC_WRITE_MODE", target_type="installation", target_id=installation.installation_id,
context={"from": previous, "to": mode}, severity="WARNING")
context={"from": previous, "to": mode, "operator": admin.display_name or admin.username, "role": admin.external_role or admin.auth_source}, severity="WARNING")
session.commit()
return RedirectResponse(f"/agents/{agent_id}/rtc", status_code=303)
finally: session.close()
@@ -382,6 +396,8 @@ def router(session_factory):
agent, installation = _rtc_target(session, agent_id)
if not agent or not installation: return HTMLResponse("Agent not found", status_code=404)
action = values.get("action")
if not _is_privileged(admin):
return _deny(session, admin, installation.tenant_id, f"rtc-candidates:{action}", installation.installation_id)
scope = RtcCandidate.installation_id == installation.id
ids = [int(x) for x in parse_qs((await request.body()).decode()).get("ids", []) if x.isdigit()]
select_all = values.get("all") == "1" or request.query_params.get("all") == "1"
@@ -390,14 +406,14 @@ def router(session_factory):
new, old = ("APPROVED", ("PENDING",)) if action == "approve" else ("REJECTED", ("PENDING", "APPROVED"))
cond = scope & RtcCandidate.status.in_(old) & (RtcCandidate.id.in_(ids) if not select_all else RtcCandidate.status.in_(old))
changed = session.execute(update(RtcCandidate).where(cond).values(status=new)).rowcount
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=installation.tenant_id, action=f"RTC_CANDIDATES_{action.upper()}", target_type="installation", target_id=installation.installation_id, context={"changed": changed, "all": select_all}, severity="WARNING")
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=installation.tenant_id, action=f"RTC_CANDIDATES_{action.upper()}", target_type="installation", target_id=installation.installation_id, context={"changed": changed, "all": select_all, "operator": admin.display_name or admin.username}, severity="WARNING")
elif action == "apply_approved":
if installation.rtc_write_mode != "APPROVAL_REQUIRED":
return HTMLResponse("Disponível apenas no modo Aprovação manual", status_code=409)
codes = list(session.scalars(select(RtcCandidate.product_code).where(scope, RtcCandidate.status == "APPROVED").order_by(RtcCandidate.product_code).limit(500)))
if codes:
job = create_job(session, agent, "REPROCESS_PRODUCTS", {"codigos": codes, "reason": "RTC_APPLY_APPROVED", "requested_by": admin.id})
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=installation.tenant_id, action="RTC_APPLY_APPROVED", target_type="installation", target_id=installation.installation_id, context={"job_id": job.id, "products": len(codes)}, severity="WARNING")
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=installation.tenant_id, action="RTC_APPLY_APPROVED", target_type="installation", target_id=installation.installation_id, context={"job_id": job.id, "products": len(codes), "operator": admin.display_name or admin.username}, severity="WARNING")
else:
return HTMLResponse("ação inválida", status_code=422)
session.commit()
@@ -414,6 +430,8 @@ def router(session_factory):
require_csrf(web_session, values.get("csrf_token"))
agent, installation = _rtc_target(session, agent_id)
if not agent or not installation: return HTMLResponse("Agent not found", status_code=404)
if not _is_privileged(admin):
return _deny(session, admin, installation.tenant_id, "rtc-rollback", installation.installation_id)
if (values.get("confirm") or "").strip().upper() != "REVERTER":
return HTMLResponse("Digite REVERTER para confirmar", status_code=422)
audit = session.get(RtcWriteAudit, int(values.get("audit_id") or 0))
@@ -422,7 +440,7 @@ def router(session_factory):
audit.rollback_state = "REQUESTED"
job = create_job(session, agent, "REPROCESS_PRODUCTS", {"codigos": [audit.product_code], "reason": "RTC_ROLLBACK", "requested_by": admin.id})
record_audit(session, admin_user_id=admin.id, tenant_id=installation.tenant_id, action="RTC_ROLLBACK_REQUESTED", target_type="installation", target_id=installation.installation_id,
context={"audit_id": audit.id, "product_code": audit.product_code, "job_id": job.id}, severity="WARNING")
context={"audit_id": audit.id, "product_code": audit.product_code, "job_id": job.id, "operator": admin.display_name or admin.username}, severity="WARNING")
session.commit()
return RedirectResponse(f"/agents/{agent_id}/rtc", status_code=303)
finally: session.close()