feat: Agent distribution with secure enrollment from the control panel

One universal Windows Agent package per version (agent_releases: version/
platform/architecture/sha256/status DRAFT|PUBLISHED|REVOKED; the binary
lives on a local release-storage volume, never in PostgreSQL). An operator
creates a pending installation (agent_enrollments) from Agents / Servidores
-> + Nova instalação, then either downloads it directly or generates a
one-time HTTPS link (short TTL, single use). Either path streams the
package plus a freshly minted enrollment.json whose token is never written
to storage in plaintext, only its SHA-256 hash. On the client host,
gti-agent.ps1 install-auto verifies the bundle's SHA-256, refuses a non-
HTTPS Hub, enrolls via POST /v1/agents/enroll (deleting the enrollment
token immediately after, success or failure), writes an ACL-restricted
.env with the newly issued permanent Agent token, and registers the
Windows Service without starting it (Firebird stays unconfigured on
purpose). Idempotent, replay-proof, rate-limited per IP, fully audited,
never logs a secret.

Migration 0022_agent_releases_enrollment (verified fresh-DB ==
upgrade-from-0021 by pg_dump diff). GTI_FISCAL_VERSION/AGENT_VERSION
bumped to 1.1.0 as the single source of truth across code, packages, the
release manifest and every published AgentRelease row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
gti
2026-09-23 13:19:31 -03:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent b1c496fc1b
commit 8d6122c096
36 changed files with 1515 additions and 47 deletions
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"""In-memory per-IP rate limiting for pre-authentication routes.
Same spirit as painel-clientes-web's `app/rate_limit.py`: a single-process
in-memory counter, fine because the Hub runs as one container behind a
trusted reverse proxy (FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS), never multiple replicas behind
a shared load balancer. A process restart resets the history — accepted,
same tradeoff as that panel's SESSION_SECRET.
Used for the two public, pre-authentication Agent-distribution routes
(GET /dl/agent/{token}, POST /v1/agents/enroll): invalid attempts count
against the caller's IP; a legitimate Agent's own successful traffic never
gets counted, so it can never push other installations over the limit.
"""
import time
MAX_ATTEMPTS = 10
WINDOW_SECONDS = 5 * 60
_attempts: dict[tuple[str, str], list[float]] = {}
def _recent(bucket: str, origin: str, now: float) -> list[float]:
cutoff = now - WINDOW_SECONDS
return [t for t in _attempts.get((bucket, origin), []) if t > cutoff]
def blocked(bucket: str, origin: str, now: float | None = None) -> bool:
moment = now if now is not None else time.time()
return len(_recent(bucket, origin, moment)) >= MAX_ATTEMPTS
def record_attempt(bucket: str, origin: str, now: float | None = None) -> None:
moment = now if now is not None else time.time()
recent = _recent(bucket, origin, moment)
recent.append(moment)
_attempts[(bucket, origin)] = recent